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URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY: CASE STUDIES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY FORCES

R. D. McLaurin
R. Miller

Abbott Associates, Inc.

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TERMS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Accion Democratica (Democratic Action)--Venezuela
ALN	Armee de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Army)--Algeria
APC	armored personnel carrier
CCE	Comite de Coordination et d'Execution (Coordination and Execution Committee)--Algeria
CIA	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
COPEI	Comite Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente (Original name for Christian Socialist Party)--Venezuela
CRS	Compagnies Republicaines de Securite (Republican Security Companies)--Algeria
CRUA	Comite Revolutionnaire d'Unite et d'Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action)--Algeria
DGSG	Directorat General de Securite General (General Directorate of General Security)--Algeria
DGSN	Directorat General de Securite National--(General Directorate of National Security)--Algeria
DIGEPOL	Direccion General de la Policia (General Directorate of Police)--Venezuela
DOP	Detachement Operationnel de Protection (Protective Operational Detachment)--Algeria
DP	displaced person
DFU	Dispositif de Protection Urbaine (Urban Protection Element)--Algeria
DST	Directorat de Surveillance Territoriale (Territorial Surveillance Directorate)--Algeria
ELN	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Army of Liberation)--Venezuela
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)--Cyprus
ESMACO	Estado Mayor Conjunto (Joint Staff)--Uruguay
FAC	Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacion (Armed Forces of co-operation or "national guard")--Venezuela
FALN	Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation)--Venezuela
FLN	Frente de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Front)--Venezuela
	<u>also</u> Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front)--Algeria
GRE	Groupement de Renseignement et d'Exploitation (Intelligence and Exploitation Group)--Algeria
HQ	headquarters
ID	identification
IZL	Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization)--Palestine
JCJ	Junta de los Comandantes en Jefe (Board of Commanders in Chief)--Uruguay
LEHI	Lohamei Herut Israel (Israel Freedom Fighters)--Palestine
LIC	limited intensity conflict
LOC	line(s) of communications
MIR	Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (Movement of the Revolutionary Left)--Venezuela
MLN	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Movement)--Uruguay

MOUT	military operations on urbanized terrain
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCOA	Organizaciones Coordinandas para las Operaciones Antisubversivas (Coordinating Organizations for Antisubversive Operations)--Uruguay
OHEN	Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth)--Cyprus
OPFC	Oficina de la Prensa para las Fuerzas Conjuntas (Joint Forces Press Bureau)--Uruguay
PALMACH	Plugot Makharz (Assault Units)--Palestine
PCV	Partido Comunista Venezolana (Venezuelan Communist Party)--Venezuela
PEKA	Politiki Epitropi Kypriakon Agonos (Political Committee for the Cypriot Struggle)--Cyprus
PEON	Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neon (Pan-Cyprian National Organization of Youth)--Cyprus
PJ	Police Judiciaire (Judicial Police)--Algeria
PSYOP	psychological operations
PTJ	Policia Tecnica Judicial (Technical Judicial Police) Venezuela
RG	Renseignement General (General Intelligence)--Algeria
RI	Reunion Informaciones (Intelligence Coordination Group)--Uruguay
SAU	Services Administratives Urbaines (Urban Administrative Services)--Algeria
SDECE	Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre-Espionnage (External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service)--Algeria
SIFA	Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas (Armed Forces Intelligence Service)--Venezuela
SP	self-propelled (self-propelled guns)
TMT	Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistance Organization)--Cyprus
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
URD	Union Republicana Democratica (Republican Democratic Union)--Venezuela
UTC	Urban Tactics Units--Venezuela
US	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
ZAA	Zone Autonome d'Alger (Algiers Autonomous Zone)--Algeria

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The history of recent deployments of United States (U.S.) forces overseas suggests that the most likely environment for the commitment of such forces is in low intensity conflict situations. Urban terrain has become an increasingly prominent battleground in low intensity conflicts such as insurgency, but no clear U.S. doctrine exists for combating urban insurgency. The purpose of this report is to examine historical cases of urban counterinsurgency that may yield insights necessary to develop effective doctrine for such operations. The report is based on five instances of urban insurgency: Palestine (1946-1948), Algeria (1954-1962), Cyprus (1955-1959), Venezuela (1960-1963), and Uruguay (1968-1972), characterized by diversity in intensity, causes and types of violence, insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy and tactics, outcome, and many other variables.

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

Even if urban areas do not manifest security problems, incumbent governments must ensure that they do not overlook the cities. All successful insurgencies involve some urban activity. Consequently, incumbents should give full attention to plans for detecting insurgent activity in the city before a hostile movement is rooted there.

If insurgent activity is visible in an urban environment, its relative level of violence should not be misread. The urban component of an insurgency movement is vital, whatever its activity level. It must be effectively countered, even if the rural component fails, because well-rooted insurgent cells in a city can effectively reinfect other areas of the country.

Counterinsurgency strategy must recognize the political nature of the insurgent movement and must take care to focus on the removal of the movement's political roots. While police or army operations often represent one element of such actions, the content and direction of individual security actions must be determined by the political strategy that drives them.

Counterinsurgent policy must develop communications themes that will be sensitive to local, regional, national, and international considerations. The communications themes must be developed to provide a tactical resource at the local level, a magnet at the national level, and a buffer at the international level.

Counterinsurgent forces must eliminate the insurgent from the city. At least as important as the insurgent's fighting forces are financial, administrative, political, and communications cadres. Because these elements can work without visibility, the incumbent should not assume that destruction of the overt insurgent arm has eliminated the roots of the movement in the city. These roots must be removed.

Isolation of the insurgent forces is imperative for success. In the cities, isolation has several dimensions: Insurgents must be isolated from foreign support; urban insurgents must be isolated from the rest of the country; if possible, isolation of urban insurgents within a specific sector of the city is desirable; in any case, isolating insurgents from the non-insurgent population is imperative.

To effectively isolate the insurgent from the civilian population, pervasive protection measures must be implemented. Unless the population can be protected from coercion, it cannot be mobilized against the insurgents or for the counterinsurgent. These protective measures must be combined with control techniques to isolate the insurgents and their supporters and to exact a cost risk for insurgent support.

Urban insurgents seeking political change, and usually those involved in decolonization movements as well, almost always attempt to entice the incumbent into situations in which government responses can be portrayed as oppressive and can be used for psychological operations (PSYOP) purposes to alienate the population, while at the same time using existing legal procedures to hamper effective government action against the movement. Government must plan a coherent communications response to this campaign that carefully balances and monitors shifting public attitudes toward the use of legal and physical measures to control violence with psychological efforts that target community values.

ORGANIZATION, LEGAL STATUS, AND PERSONNEL

The incumbent government must establish external relations that will enable it to isolate the urban insurgents from support outside the country. If the country's borders or expanses of water are secure, the armed forces or other border control institutions must ensure that financial and material support for the insurgency do not cross the frontiers. This responsibility may also have to be borne by intelligence and special operations elements if borders cannot be secured. In this case, overseas actions may be required.

Division of responsibility for active insurgency operations is dangerous. While it would be foolish to identify an "ideal" locus for responsibility, it must be clearly centralized to the extent that policy is issued from one central authority. A speedy return to police operational responsibility is desirable when conditions permit. Armed forces may take the central role, but this cannot and should not be a long-term mission for them. Their resources are usually vastly superior to those of the police in quantity, and for maintenance of security against pervasive and violent threats also in quality. As the threat recedes to a question of law enforcement, police presence and responsibility are psychologically and politically preferable, and police methods inherently more appropriate.

Emergency exceptions to legal protections have a number of characteristics. In addition to limiting the protections exploited by subversive organizations, they usually also articulate continuing restrictions. These are important in providing means to rally public support behind the government. Such regulations should also ensure the centralization of executive authority for counterinsurgent policy, permitting a wider range of national executive action than many systems allow under normal circumstances. It is useful to identify the most salient

symbols and values of the political order and to find means of preserving those symbols and values, even indirectly, to mobilize public support. Legal ambiguity can provide new powers to government and yet preserve social goods.

Communications designed to protect the incumbent government image from predictable insurgent attack upon announcement of emergency regulations should be undertaken and begun before such regulations are imposed. Moreover, symbolic assurances of continued government attachment to traditional values and civil rights should be included by providing for review mechanisms, temporal limitations of regulations, or other techniques.

Early attention to rationalizing jurisdiction and competence among security forces in the urban environment is essential. Moreover, it is equally essential to avoid letting this decision be made on the basis of traditional politics. Resources, aptitudes, and public relations are all relevant considerations.

Abuses of authority and illegal use of violence by security forces must be minimized. Security forces provide proper channels for internal discipline, and these channels should be rigorously exercised. In some cases, governments publicize punitive action toward violators. In other cases, however, it is emphasized that the insurgents seek to exploit such action to alienate the public from the security forces and to build dissension within those forces. The alternative is vigorous discipline within the system. Clearly, both approaches have merits, and the executive body coordinating the counterinsurgency effort should weigh the competing considerations closely in each case.

Particular care must also be exercised with respect to public action that is not a part of the insurgency, even though it may encourage the insurgents or be easily seen by the incumbent as related to the insurgency. Legal demonstrations or protests or strikes are examples of such behavior. In some cases, demonstrations were organized by insurgent forces to provoke violence and reap the political benefits of government over-reaction. Governments in emergency situations must take care to monitor preparations for demonstrations, to rigidly enforce prohibitions against weapons at such demonstrations, and if necessary, to ban all assemblies.

Government attention to redressing public grievances that are not subversive of public order is important. Indeed, such action can help divorce the insurgents from their potential public base. Efforts to resolve legitimate problems should receive high priority and preferably innovative attention. At the same time, effort should be made to avoid crediting the insurgent movement for this government behavior.

TACTICAL AND SUPPORT ISSUES

Armed forces personnel not properly prepared, trained, or motivated for the peculiarities of the urban insurgency environment may well find it confusing, frustrating, and demoralizing. Confused, frustrated, and demoralized soldiers can be a serious liability in such operations.

Security forces facing urban insurgent organizations require manpower, a wide range of intelligence capabilities, efficient command and control, some mobility, good psychological operations, and effective leadership. Police forces

may generally have some advantages in intelligence, but only rarely do they maintain a reservoir of other resources adequate to combat an active and well-developed insurgency. The result is that armed forces are usually required to supplement or lead the struggle.

Among combat arms branches, urban insurgency is clearly a task for the infantry. Air and naval forces and helicopters may provide ancillary support, but the brunt of security operations must be borne by ground forces.

Intelligence organization may take a number of forms, but effective exploitation of intelligence and the most aggressive approach to deploying intelligence assets probably argues in favor of a substantial degree of unity of intelligence assets, at least among the regular armed forces during the active period of insurgency. Intelligence organization cannot reasonably be divorced from overall counterinsurgency organization, however.

Temporary deployment of regular armed forces into an urban area does not alter the inherent advantages of police institutions and relationships for long-term intelligence collection, particularly of a noncoercive nature. Integration of these assets into the counterinsurgent effort can be troublesome if frictions develop between military and police forces, but the value of the diverse intelligence products argues strongly and compellingly for a major effort to coordinate the two.

Modern urban life provides vast new and important sources of intelligence data that should be integrated as soon as possible into standard military intelligence processes for insurgent contingencies. These sources supplement the basic source for urban operations-human intelligence.

The urban counterinsurgent must develop the capability to attack one of the principal insurgent vulnerabilities, the communication system. This attack may take several forms, but one of the most potent is the indirect form of introducing false messages into the channel. Insurgent groups are by nature sensitive about security, and indications of treachery can produce a significant level of paralysis and self-mutilation in these groups.

Psychological operations is a critical component of government counterinsurgency, especially after some security has been restored. PSYOP is not lies; it is a systematic program designed to provide an alternate value structure to that offered by the insurgent, and a value structure generally more in conformity to the core values of society and its members.

Population protection and control constitute the most important single element in many of the foregoing activities. Without security, little else is possible. Effective population protection in urban environments challenged by well-developed insurgent movements can only work in conjunction with population control systems designed to link the populace and the government.

THE UNITED STATES AND URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

The final chapter of the report assesses the implications of the cases studied for U.S. capabilities in combating urban insurgency. The chapter suggests that while potential U.S. resources are quite extensive, current

priorities, organization, and concepts, as well as the political realities surrounding likely deployments of U.S. forces into urban insurgency situations in the near future, have left the United States ill-prepared to deal with this form of conflict.

URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY: CASE STUDIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY FORCES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND PROBLEM

The purpose of this report is to examine historical case studies that may provide useful lessons for developing doctrine to be used by U.S. military forces engaged in combating urban insurgency.

In the hundreds of cases in which U.S. force has been used since World War II, all have been instances of limited warfare. Whatever the cause of the spread of low intensity conflict (LIC), the fact of U.S. involvement is evident. Whether in conventional attacks such as the intervention in Grenada, in peacekeeping operations such as the Dominican Republic and Lebanon, or in counterinsurgency actions such as Vietnam and El Salvador, U.S. forces have been engaged almost continuously, either directly or indirectly, in LIC situations from the late 1940s to the present.

This report considers one kind of LIC environment in cities: urban insurgency. Any analysis of insurgency cases will show the key role played by urban actions in most major insurgencies. Yet, there is virtually no literature about military aspects of urban insurgency. How does insurgency affect military operations? How do military functions relate to operations in cities? What are these operations?

Insurgency is a form of conflict in which irregular forces as the primary standard bearers seek to bring about political change through the threat or use of violence. In general, insurgents do not, at least at the start of the campaign, have the same quantity or quality of military resources as the "incumbent" (usually a government). Nevertheless, successful military insurgency operations follow closely the standard principles of war (mass and the like) with modifications no more significant than those appropriate to conventional warfare. The urban area offers a variety of targets to insurgents because of the nature of densely inhabited areas, because of the demands that populations of such areas make on national resources, and because of the resources they in turn make available to the national government.

Major urban agglomerations invariably host one or more military installations inside or in proximity. Urban communications networks often support the military, and food and other logistic support flows to military forces from the "civilian city." National security forces are in most major urban areas. These may properly be considered insurgent urban targets. But just as conventional military operations involve far more than combat, so do insurgency operations. No insurgency can triumph, or even survive for very long, without extensive political, financial, communications, and transportation networks that are just as essential as or more essential than the combat

operations themselves. These activities so critical to effectiveness are urban insurgency activities that belie the assertion "urban insurgency is only terrorism."

We define urban insurgency as "the recourse by nationals of a state to planned and sustained illegal violence in one or more cities of that state to significantly alter government policy or to change government." Let us consider the elements of this definition.

We limit insurgency to cases in which violence is used. This component of the definition does not mean that all insurgent acts must be violent or even illegal. Insurgents, even as a part of the insurgency, may and usually do undertake a wide variety of legal and nonviolent activities. However, "insurgency" requires violence to be present as a part of the movement. While not all definitions insist that violence must take place, we feel that an "insurgency" that never translates its threats into physical compulsion should better be referred to in other terms. Insurgency must involve some use of force or violence. This violence may and often does involve terrorism. Terrorism is the planned use or threat of extra-normal violence for political goals against targets whose relationship to such goals is highly symbolic.¹ Because insurgents do not have the same level of military power as the incumbent government, in most cases they are unable and unwilling to engage in conventional military operations. They prefer forms of conflict in which intermittent hostilities and their irregular forces reduce the firepower, organization, and other advantages of the incumbent government.

The violence must be practiced by nationals of a state. Theoretically, there is no reason to so limit insurgency. However, violence perpetrated by foreign elements raises a host of other issues and definitional problems, and we have therefore excluded for these purposes cases when the bulk or even a large part of the insurgency was mounted by foreigners.² This does not in any way exclude cases in which foreign support (even extensive foreign support) in materiel or finances, for example, is provided. The "insurgents" must be nationals of the state against which the violence is directed, however.

The violence must be planned. Spontaneous eruptions of violence, even spontaneous eruptions that are sustained, are not here considered an insurgency. In our view, operations must be planned by one or more leadership groups in order to be considered part of an insurgent environment.

The violence must be sustained. While it is difficult to establish precise temporal parameters for "sustained," certainly even violence planned for the stated purposes in a city to last only a day or two would be difficult to call "insurgency." Our working measure of "sustained" in this context is sufficient duration for extra-normal responses of an organizational nature to be taken by the government. (We recognize that the level of violence may have more of an impact on the response measures than the time, but we also feel that a case so marginal in time and intensity that it created no special responses should probably not be considered seriously as an insurgency.)

The violence must be illegal. The authoritatively sanctioned use of violence by security forces cannot (in our opinion) be considered insurgency. Violence by security forces generally cannot be so considered unless it is directed against other legally established elements of the government. The legal use of violence by security forces, even if excessive, is not an insurgency.

The violence must take place in a city. This limitation is central to the concept of "urban" insurgency. It is not sufficient to seek to take power in a city; the violence itself must take place there. We have not established measures for urbanization for the purposes of this study, but the study cases involve settlements that are significantly more urbanized than the other geographical areas of the country.

Insurgency must be directed against government policy or against the government. In this sense, all insurgency is "political." Historically, most cases of insurgency intend to bring about a change in government, but we accept for our purposes lesser goals so long as they are political in content. Even if the purpose is to alter government economic or social policies, this is a clearly political purpose, as it aims at policy change.

Insurgents, in most cases, intend to win public support. They may do this through a variety of techniques, even advancing themselves as protectors of the people against depredations of the incumbent regime while using intimidation to secure public support. The psychological strategy does not matter; psychology is a major element of most insurgencies. Because insurgents do not have adequate military power to conduct successful conventional operations, psychological operations against government forces, and against the incumbent leadership, is almost always a principal focus of insurgent activities. This concentration on psychological factors is an element that reflects the close relationship of urban insurgency and urban terrorism, which also depends on psychology rather than firepower to accomplish its objectives.

RURAL INSURGENCY VERSUS URBAN INSURGENCY

While the extensive literature about insurgency concentrates on insurgencies outside cities (in the "countryside"), many of the lessons this literature advances are put forth much more generally. The striking fact of urban insurgency is that it is neither as rare nor as marginal to outcomes as the literature and general disregard suggest. The case is actually quite the contrary. Very few insurgencies have been successful without an urban component; moreover, the urban component has often been critical, even if the rural aspect received more attention. In a study of 57 internal conflicts in the 20th century, Condit and Cooper discovered a significant correlation between the topographic limitations of the insurgency and its success. The government was victorious much more often in purely urban or purely rural insurgencies than it was when the two were combined (see Table 1). The neglect of urban insurgency in the face of its widespread practice partly results from the fact that urban and nonurban insurgency operations necessarily differ significantly in type. Consequently, if the leadership remains outside the city and if the military operations appear to be conducted outside the city as well, media and analysts direct their attention outside the city. Meanwhile, strikes, demonstrations, intelligence collection, subversion, assassinations, fund raising, and numerous support activities vital to the success of the movement occur within the city.

Table 1

Outcome By Urban and Rural Location of Insurgent Operations^a

Urban and rural	Number of cases	Government military wins	Percentage of wins
Rural	26	15	58
Mixed	14	3	21
Urban	4	4	100

^aSource: D. M. Condit, *Modern Revolutionary Warfare: An Analytical Overview* (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1973), p. 114. The data are drawn from D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., *Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict* (Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971).

The nerves of the modern city provide lucrative targets for insurgent movements. Telecommunications facilities guarantee instantaneous global attention to insurgent attacks in cities. The same facilities have become much more critical to modern governments, and therefore more valuable as targets. Financial resources necessary to support the government's operations (and the insurgency's operations) are located in cities. Urbanization in most third-world cities has made effective population control much more difficult than in the past.

Perhaps more important, the city provides excellent cover for the insurgent. As the Zionist insurgents in Palestine demonstrated, factories that make machinery can clandestinely make weapons or communications equipment for the insurgents. The densely populated sectors provide the best possible cover to insurgents--human cover. The proliferation of transportation and communication vehicles in the contemporary city vastly complicates the problem of control.

The most important reason why insurgency cannot overlook cities is that is where the people are. In the Third World, the cities are an especially volatile mixture of newly urbanized groups often deeply alienated by the new form of society and even more often economically, socially, and politically marginalized. Elements of this potential force for social change tend to be easily co-opted by government, as the Algerian case shows. The struggle for control over people runs throughout this study as the theme of urban insurgency. As Condit (1973, p.5) so clearly put it,

Under the conditions of general war, cities are often assumed to be expendable. Under the conditions of revolutionary war, the government usually wants to rescue the city from terrorism but not to destroy the city physically in the process.

One of the first theoretician-practitioners to emphasize the role of urban insurgents in a revolutionary movement was Che Guevara. His predecessors generally minimized the urban aspects of insurgency. As Guevara wrote, "The importance of a suburban struggle has usually been underestimated; it is really very great." Guevara (1961, pp.38-39) was merely recognizing the importance of

the urban role in the Cuban revolution, a revolution that, to this day, is understood by others almost exclusively in its rural context.

Guevara wrote that urban insurgents must remain subordinate to the real leaders of the revolution who are in the countryside.³ In the aftermath of Guevara, a number of works on the value of urban insurgency appeared, especially in and concerning Latin America. Certainly, the most well known theoretician of urban guerrilla warfare is Carlos Marighella whose *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* is still available in bookstores and has been widely seen as the bible of urban insurgency. Marighella believed that the urban insurgent must be offensive in orientation, always on the attack; he asserted that he must exploit at all times his intimate familiarity with the urban terrain; he recognized that the central problem of the urban insurgent, like any other, is to communicate a political goal to the populace, but insisted that that goal is best communicated through bold and violent action. Thus, he saw the objectives of urban insurgent action as (a) posing an urban threat to vital institutions and installations of the central government and economy that will tie down security forces; (b) demoralizing of the security forces through selective terrorism and through insurgent eluding of those forces; and (c) demonstrating the vulnerability and weakness of government.

The urban insurgent movements in Latin America (and there were several in the period after 1959, when Castro seized power in Cuba) were generally unsuccessful. This is all the more remarkable in view of the pace of urbanization and demographic growth in the region throughout these years. Douglas Bravo, leader of the insurgency in Venezuela, remarked that the hundreds of thousands of new residents of the city are only technically "urban" in the sense of their physical environment; they remain rural to the core in their "political" views, resistant to insurgent appeals or any other disruptive factors.

MOUT FINDINGS

One of the main purposes of this research is to consider the differential applicability of military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) lessons learned to cases of LIC involving insurgency. Most of the research on MOUT has focused on weapons effects and presumes a level of violence approximating general, if nonnuclear, war. Thus, most MOUT studies are concerned with conventional operations in built-up areas, not with insurgency or other forms of LIC. It is interesting, but hardly surprising, that case studies of MOUT per se focus on World War II, although some articles have been written about Korea, which can be considered a limited but conventional conflict despite the presence of an insurgent element. Case studies of recent city battles, however, often not undertaken as "MOUT" studies per se, all involve LIC, and many of them (such as in Vietnam) can clearly be classified as urban insurgency. This reflects the prominence of LIC today, as we have previously noted, by contrast with general war. Despite the empirical experience that reflects frequent urban insurgencies to the exclusion of urban general war cases, MOUT "lessons" and doctrine are based on the expectation of intense rather than insurgent and LIC MOUT combat.

This study is an attempt to refocus some of our attention on MOUT in the LIC environment. It is quite apparent that many of conclusions about MOUT have little or no application in insurgency situations where there is no clear front

line, no continuity of battle, no question of progress or cohesive movement, no ground held or given, no permanently visible enemy. It takes little imagination to immediately see that some of the most salient aspects of previous work in MOUT are irrelevant to urban insurgency. They can, if put into practice, be completely counterproductive. Sufficient firepower is rarely a problem in counterinsurgency, but rather sufficient sensitivity. Effectively destroying a building in conventional MOUT is often an important goal; in urban counterinsurgency, not damaging the building is much more important.

Nonmilitary observers often conceive of military roles in unjustifiably narrow terms. The purpose of military forces is to defend the state and its vital interests against security threats in which violence plays a role. These forces are not the only security forces with this purpose; in most countries, a variety of security forces are constituted to defend national or subnational interests against violent threats. The armed forces are usually the largest and most well-equipped security forces charged with this responsibility, and the forces of last resort when the threat surpasses the ability of other institutions to handle it.

Yet, because of the national investment required to maintain modern and effective armed forces, the national military establishment is often the repository of some of the best intelligence assets (both physical and human), of national management resources, and of experience in organization to handle security threats available to the government. Military functions are not merely combat functions; they involve a wide range of support functions that embrace every aspect of human endeavor. It is the breadth of resources available to the national military establishment, and not merely its monopoly over major weapons systems, that commends that establishment as a primary tool to contain and defeat insurgency.

Because of the limited intensity and noncontinuity of combat in most urban insurgent environments, the noncombat military functions such as intelligence, psychological operations, and so forth, play a much greater relative role in military activities than in conventional combat. This report demonstrates that across all of the cases that display remarkable disparity in cause, order of battle, and outcome, the noncombative military functions assume a key, perhaps even a decisive, importance relative to combat functions.

METHOD AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

This study uses the case study methodology. Through this approach, the consideration of a range of factors involved in five different cases of urban insurgency is used to explain some of the principal factors in effective and ineffective counterinsurgency programs. Clearly, just as all battles and all wars are unique, so are all cases of insurgency. It is impossible to ascertain, isolate, and measure the specific ingredients in victory and defeat, for there are far too many variables. The complexity of reality cannot be permitted to prevent all analysis of war, however, whether full scale or low intensity. The use of empirical methods, whether for aggregate data analysis or for the analysis of specific cases, to derive individual lessons and study individual experiences has proved extremely valuable. This fact drives the present research.

Each of five insurgencies, representing a range of variables discussed more fully in the next chapter, is considered in some detail across comparable categories of issues. These issues or questions involve basic background data on the case and matters of insurgent and counterinsurgent organization, personnel, equipment, strategy and tactics, doctrine, operations, and effectiveness. On the limited basis of the five quite dissimilar cases, some conclusions may be drawn about the effectiveness or limitations of specific techniques in certain types of circumstances.

This report is organized into 11 chapters. This chapter discusses the purpose of the research. The essential research problem that the effort is designed to address places this problem in the context of LIC in an urban environment, discusses the problems of applying MOUT findings to the counterinsurgency environment, and describes the method and organization of the report. The second chapter provides an overview of the five cases individually and comparatively. Chapters III through VII discuss the specific cases (Algeria, Cyprus, Palestine, Uruguay, and Venezuela, respectively) in greater detail and focus on the issues relevant to MOUT in those cases. Chapter VIII then considers the political and strategic issues across all five cases, identifying the lessons learned and conclusions relevant to each case. Similarly, Chapters IX and X address individual military functions and tactical considerations across the five cases. Chapter XI summarizes the findings and conclusions of the study as a whole.

¹There are, of course, numerous definitions of terrorism. We have explained this definition at length in Peter Gubser, et al., (1975) Decisionmaking. Bargaining. and Resources (Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research.

²Palestine raises an interesting and unique case in this respect. Because the Palestine mandate called for the creation of a national home for Jews in that area, the territory experienced unusually heavy immigration of "foreigners," many of whom participated in the insurgency even as illegal immigrants (and hence foreigners). However, the bulk of Zionist forces was clearly composed of British subjects legally resident in Palestine. Moreover, the singular nature of the mandate must be taken into account in application of the definition to this case. Finally, there is no question that the members of the Zionist insurgent groups *considered themselves* to be nationals of the state, certainly a consideration as well.

³In fact, urban anti-Batista activities were quite autonomous during the Cuban revolution. While there was coordination at times, such coordination was as much the exception as the rule.

CHAPTER II

CASES

The five cases represented in this study were chosen to provide some representation of geographical dispersion, as well as differences in conflict duration and intensity, linkages between urban and rural insurgency, degree of external support, and political motivation of the insurgent. With only five cases, it was not possible to use examples from each continent. Moreover, considerations such as data availability, funding constraints, and the desire to secure different types of cases in other domains, limited geographical selection more than preferred. In particular, the absence of any cases from southeast Asia is noteworthy.

In Table 2, the five cases are summarized in terms of geography, cause (motivation of the insurgent), conflict duration, internal and external linkages, and conflict outcome. It is important to remember that the data in this table and the focus of the report address the specific urban environment. It is, for example, quite possible that the insurgent movement had significant external support but that the insurgent forces in the cities were cut off from such support. In that case, we consider the urban insurgents did not have external support.

Geography is indicated by regional identifiers.

Cause. We distinguish among three basic causes (although only two are represented in our cases): anticolonial, in which the motivation is to secure the independence of a territory; political change, in which the motivation is to bring about some change in the political order in an existing state; and fragmentation/integration, in which insurgents contest the legitimacy of the borders of a state, either to fragment a state (usually to establish a new state for their own community) or to integrate part of one state with another existing state.

Conflict Duration is indicated in years.

Internal Linkages refer to the linkages of urban insurgents with a larger national insurgency outside the cities.

External Linkages refer to external support for the insurgents. Table 2 does not discuss support for the incumbent governments. External support for the incumbent is an important consideration, but virtually all incumbent governments can secure substantial external support and such support is accepted under traditional norms of international behavior.

Conflict Outcome is described in terms of counterinsurgent win, counter-insurgent loss, or mixed. These terms are military, not political. It is quite possible for a military win to lead to a political loss for counter-insurgent forces, although practically, counterinsurgent military losses always produce political losses.

Table 2

Urban Insurgency Cases: A Portrait

Case	Region	Cause	Conflict Duration	Internal Linkages	External Linkages	Conflict Outcome
Algiers	Middle East/ North Africa	Anticolonial	8	Yes	No	Win
Cyprus	Medit.	Anticolonial	4	Yes	Yes	Win
Palestine	ME	Anticolonial	3	Yes	No	Loss
Uruguay	LA	Political Change	3	No	No	Win
Venezuela	LA	Political Change	4	Yes	Yes	Win

Abbreviations: ME = Middle East; Medit. = Mediterranean; LA = Latin America.

TAXONOMY OF URBAN INSURGENCY

There has been little real effort in the literature to establish discrete categories of urban insurgent behavior. One notable attempt (Conley & Schrock, 1965) establishes four models, two of which have multiple forms. Several of these patterns violate the definition we have established, however. They involve spontaneous demonstrations and *coups d'etat*, for example, neither of which we can accept as constituting insurgency.

A number of behavioral parameters could constitute the foundations of an acceptable taxonomy of urban insurgency. These criteria might include the following:

1. relationship of urban to rural insurgency, if any,
2. types of conflict behavior,
3. insurgent objectives,
4. insurgent strategy.

Thus, one might have in the first category (a) purely urban, (b) urban dominant, and (c) urban subordinate to rural operations. By "types of conflict behavior" we mean the specific insurgent actions (demonstrations, strikes, dissemination of literature, collection of funds, attacks on security forces or installations, assassinations or murders, sabotage, and so forth). These might be grouped into legal and illegal, violent and nonviolent, compulsory and voluntary categories; or they might be broken down on the basis of the immediate target. (Collection of money, for example, might include voluntary contributions, when the immediate target is the local populace supporting the insurgent, and compulsory contributions, when the target could include either the same populace or representatives of the incumbent regime.) Insurgent objectives might involve social revolution, termination of colonial status, or change of government, among many possibilities. Strategy involves consideration of how the insurgent intends to realize his objective. Is it to be through alienation of the local populace from the incumbent or military defeat of the incumbent?

For the purposes of this study, we have chosen to construct a simple taxonomy that is directly related to the objectives delineated in the previous chapter. This taxonomy is based on the definition noted in Chapter I and reflects the counterinsurgent orientation of the present study. It is certainly not the only approach, nor even the conceptually "best" approach, but we believe it to be appropriate for the limited purposes of this research.

<u>Insurgent Base</u>									
Urban									
Urban dominant									
Urban subordinate									
<u>Activity Types</u>									
<u>Intelligence</u>		<u>Financial</u>		<u>Attack</u>			<u>Communications</u>		
<u>compelling</u>	<u>noncompelling</u>	<u>compelling</u>	<u>noncompelling</u>	<u>institution</u>	<u>group</u>	<u>individual</u>	<u>internal</u>	<u>in-group</u>	<u>hostile</u>
interrogations	observations	extortion	contribution	government building	ambush	political	courier	radio	demonstrations
extortion	espionage	larceny	investment	round sabotage	raid	assessment	orders	message	threat
						abduction		face-face	
<u>Insurgent Strategy</u>									
Attrition of External Support				Alienate Public		Defeat Incumbent			

The range of activities available to urban insurgents is much broader than often realized (see Table 3).

Table 3
Types of Activities in Urban Insurgency¹

Mass	Student	Labor	Other Group	Communications	Financial	Violence	Other
Demonstrations	Manifestos	Demonstrations	Organize	Broadcasts	Fund collection	Sabotage	Blackmail
Riots	Strikes	Slow-downs	Infiltrate	Flags, posters	Arms purchase	Assassination	Threats
Picketing	Demonstrations	Strikes	Demonstrate	Rumors, leaflets	Solicit aid	Bombings	Extortion
Civil disobedience		Manifestos	Strike	Letter campaigns	Distribution	Raids	Disruption
Public			Subvert	Communication	Investment	Jail breaks	of public
Nonfraternization				Interception	Bribing	Ambushes	facilities
Facilities							

Using the previous categories, the cases considered in this study can also be broken down (see Table 4).

Table 4

Urban Insurgency Cases: A Second Portrait

Conflict case	Urban or rural	Insurgent		Characteristics Insurgent Behaviors
		Objectives	Strategy	
Palestine	Urban	independence	1	as, b, cd, r, s
Algeria	Urban subordinate	independence	1,2,3	as, b
Cyprus	Urban dominate	self-determination	1,2,3	a, as, b, r, s
Venezuela	Urban dominate	political change	3,4	a, as, b, cd, r, s
Uruguay	Urban	political change	3	as, b, cd, r, s

Note. Strategies are 1 = attrition of external support or metropole, 2 = attrition of external support or international, 3 = alienate public, 4 = defeat incumbent. Behavior types are a = ambushes, as = assassination, b = bombings, cd = civil disobedience, r = raids, s = sabotage

PALESTINE

Zionists undertook a guerrilla war against the mandatory power (the United Kingdom) to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. While Arabs played an important role in the international aspects of the drama, and in the level of tension and violence in Palestine, the Zionist insurgency during the period considered here, 1944 to 1947, was directed mainly against Britain. For its part, London refused to create a Jewish state since the vast majority of the inhabitants (Arabs) were opposed. Seeking a compromise between the two groups, the United Kingdom was caught in a vise from which it finally withdrew, admitting inability to resolve the dispute. Zionists used passive resistance, sabotage, abductions, and terrorism. Divided in views though they were, they united against Britain when it became apparent that London would not grant Zionist wishes. British cordon-and-search techniques without any semblance of a policy or objective were completely inadequate to the problem. When the British withdrew, the Zionists established the State of Israel as a Jewish state.

ALGERIA

Fighting in Algeria erupted suddenly on November 1, 1954, to begin one of the most important, enduring (8 years), well-known, and carefully studied nationalist conflicts of the century. The major security challenge in Algeria was not the urban struggle, although the "Battle of Algiers" was one of the most publicized eras of the insurgency. Muslim Algerians sought better status, then moved toward identification with the insurgent goal of independence. The French responded effectively to the challenge of urban

insurgency in Algeria, and created population and resources control systems that reestablished an acceptable level of security in major cities, especially Algiers. Operations were concerned with winning the "hearts and minds" of the inhabitants to win their behavior. Instead, the operations succeeded in winning their behavior while alienating their hearts and minds. Successful urban (and rural) counterinsurgency notwithstanding, Algiers demonstrates that one can win militarily and still lose politically. France granted Algerian independence in 1962.

CYPRUS

For Greek Cypriots, the insurgency directed against the United Kingdom was anticolonial in nature, and was undertaken with the explicit goal of creating *enosis*, union with Greece. The British, supported by the Turkish Cypriot minority (roughly one fifth of the Cypriot population), opposed *enosis*. At the outset of the insurgency, British policy explicitly indicated that independence was not a reasonable political objective. As a result of the insurgent pressure, the British government articulated alternatives to *enosis*, and backed these with strong and eventually effective measures to control violence. By mid-1958, the Greek Cypriot insurgents had accepted a truce, renewed (after some violence) at the end of the year when talks began between Greece and Turkey to negotiate a settlement. (The settlement provided for an independent Cyprus, thereby excluding both the *enosis* sought by the Greek Cypriot insurgents and the partition that Turkish Cypriots had demanded in return.)

VENEZUELA

In 1958, a revolution replaced dictator Perez Jimenez. A wide range of political elements joined in the victorious coalition. By 1960, the government was taking a line too moderate on socio-economic issues to satisfy extremists on either the right or the left. The communists and other parties shifted to opposition and then to conspiracy. Starting in October-November 1960, leftist elements in the major cities mounted a campaign of student demonstrations, riots, and attacks on public property against the government and the dominant party. Two groups called for a general strike and insurrection that failed as a result of strong government countermeasures. The failure produced a five-stage plan for rapid victory by the insurgents, a plan that centered on urban insurgency, but by the end of 1962, all hopes for a quick win had faded as military garrison mutinies were ill-coordinated. Subsequently, insurgent activity was diverted to the countryside. The military succeeded in pursuing and crushing the rural guerrillas. A final attempt at urban insurgency was undertaken at the end of 1963, but another failure prompted the antigovernment forces to call a truce and cease their activities.

URUGUAY

The Tupamaro insurgency was a leftist movement based in the cities of Uruguay. Formed between late 1962 and early 1963, it emerged in 1968 as a force determined to capitalize on the economic turmoil that swept the country after the late 1950s. The Tupamaros sought a socialist society and believed Uruguay was an exploited dependency of American imperialism. Their goal was to undermine and humiliate the government to such an extent that the authorities would resort to repressive measures that would alienate the public while building the Tupamaro image. Kidnapping well-known figures and holding them in "people's prisons" was a visible means of humiliating the government. Simultaneously, the Tupamaros mounted a wave of violence. Their success in kidnappings, murders, prison escapes, and other forms of urban insurgency embarrassed the government. The congress granted, as the Tupamaros had hoped, sweeping powers to the president who progressively applied repressive measures. The well-trained military and the other legal powers at the service of the president defeated the Tupamaros within 6 months after a full-fledged anti-Tupamaro campaign was initiated in 1972, however.

¹Many of these examples are derived from Conley and Schrock (1965).

CHAPTER III

PALESTINE (1944-1947)

Palestine is an ancient geographical name that refers to the general area of what are now the states of Israel and Jordan as well as some parts of southern Lebanon and Syria. As a political or administrative term, however, Palestine has referred exclusively to the land west of the Jordan River since the time of Harun ar-Rashid. Thus, there is some confusion about the meaning of "Palestine."¹

Palestine lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean sea. It is bordered on the east by the Jordan River, on the south by Egypt, on the north by Lebanon and Syria. At the time of the insurgency, all the borders had been largely delimited. The Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine were predominantly settled populations, although some nomadic Arab tribes occupied eastern Palestine. The historical origins of the western Palestine population are Mediterranean; these peoples were Arabized later. Throughout recorded history, they were predominantly settled town-dwellers. Most of the population historically lived along the coast where the largest cities were. The exception was Jerusalem, a city of extraordinary beauty and history, cherished by three great religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.²

Palestine is characterized by a great variety of topography. The Negev desert in the south is contrasted with the Judaeen hills and fertile valleys. The topography per se of Palestine played very little role in the insurgency, however, because violence remained sporadic, and, like other limited conflicts, was aimed much more at creating political pressures to change British policy than at actually forcing a change through military victory. The Jewish settlers tended to be clustered in the cities, while the Arabs were in the cities but dominated especially on the hills outside the cities.

The entire area of Palestine was under Ottoman rule until World War I when it was occupied by the United Kingdom (UK). It was not merely the inhabitants of Palestine and the external administering powers who were to influence the future course of the territory and lead it to an insurgency. The Jewish nationalist movement (called "Zionism") which developed in Europe in the late 19th century increasingly focused on Palestine as the proper place for a "national home for the Jewish people."³

For a variety of reasons of state having to do with the prosecution of World War I, the British government in 1917 formally committed itself to establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. This declaration, which was later incorporated in the mandate over Palestine, also committed the British to protecting the rights of the indigenous (Arab) inhabitants. These two commitments were completely incompatible. From the outset, increased Jewish migration to Palestine aroused great fears on the part of the Arab majority about its changing position within the land.

After World War I, a mandate⁴ for Palestine was conferred upon the United Kingdom. The terms of the mandate provided for the Jewish national home as well as for the rights of the Arab majority. The traumatic plight of Jews in Europe increased pressures to allow more Jews to emigrate to Palestine, but the Palestinian Arab community engaged in riots and demonstrations to protest British policy. When Britain limited or reduced Jewish migration, the Jewish community in Britain and Palestine exerted political and other pressures on the government.

As early as the beginning of the mandate, the links between the *Yishuv* (Jewish community in Palestine) and the international Jewish community were tight and effective. Moreover, the *Yishuv* was highly organized and functioned as a government. In addition to the civil functions of government, it also had a civil defense arm, initially established to protect the *Yishuv* from Arab violence. This military force, the *Haganah*, was to become the core of the Israel Defense Force, but in many respects was less decisive in establishing the tenor and pace of the insurgency than the more militant groups, the *Irgun* and *LEHI*.

In the 1930s, the tension between Arab and Jewish communities grew rapidly, and a number of riots and individual acts of violence took place. During this period, as in others, British policy and practice was characterized by ambiguity. While the British opposed *Haganah* activities in principle (and even this position varied over time), individual Britons (sometimes with highly placed support) assisted that organization in training and doctrine. It was in this same period that Zionist military forces split along lines reflective of fundamental political divisions within the *Yishuv*. The *Haganah* was dominated by the Labor movement, the principal political trend within the Jewish community. The Revisionists, another small but important element of the community, formed their own military organization, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (IZL), in 1937. The *Irgun* later fragmented, and among its parts *LEHI*, sometimes called "the Stern Gang," became the most radical of the Zionist insurgent groups. In the period before World War II, all three opposed British policy, but whereas the *Haganah* focused primarily on immigration policy and believed that eventually the British would support Zionist objectives in Palestine, the Revisionists had already declared that only violence (to which the *Haganah* was opposed) would bring about acceptable change.

World War II temporarily halted the growing frictions in Palestine. The Labor movement cooperated extensively with the government of the mandate. (Labor also devoted itself to developing clandestine links to the Jewish community in Europe; to developing immigration LOCs; and building up its arms caches.) Of the armed groups, only *LEHI* refused to endorse a truce with the British. (*LEHI*'s major leaders were killed or captured during the war.)

Throughout late 1944 and 1945, the militancy of the Jewish community increased. New men had assumed the leadership of both the IZL and *LEHI*, the fate of European Jewry was becoming better known, and British policy on immigration was becoming clearer. The IZL and *LEHI* renewed their attacks on the British mandate. For some time, the *Haganah* collaborated with the British against the *Irgun*. At the end of 1945, Britain announced its new immigration policy; immediately thereafter, the *Haganah* began its own activities against the authority. The constant British frustration in trying to articulate a

viable policy for Palestine eventually led to consideration of partition into Jewish and Arab states. But immigration policy fell far short of Labor demands, and neither the IZL nor LEHI believed Britain was serious about leaving the mandate and permitting the establishment of a Jewish state.⁵ Of the 1945 population of approximately 2 million, about 1.2 million were Arabs and about 600,000 were Jews. The catastrophe that befell European Jewry during the war severely complicated the problem and made any British freeze of immigration appear to be an act of antisemitism and inhumanity. The principal goal of the majority of the Zionists at the outset of the struggle was to open up Jewish immigration to Palestine, not to secure an independent state there.

INSURGENCY

This chapter considers only the 1944 to 1947 phase of the Zionist insurgency against the British. It was during that phase that actions accelerated and pressures on Britain to physically withdraw became undeniable. While technically the British did not withdraw from Palestine until May 15, 1948, they ceased any active role in maintaining law and order at the end of 1947. The chapter does not consider Arab-Jewish fighting, which during this period was limited and militarily irrelevant to the course of the insurgency. In December 1947, large scale fighting between Jewish and Arab populations erupted; this fighting is not considered in this chapter.

Organization

The Yishuv was divided into a multitude of political parties and movements. Nevertheless, the Labor movement was the dominant force in the community, a force that extended to every aspect of daily life. It is impossible to separate the functions of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and the Labor movement during this period, since each depended heavily on the other. The *Haganah* was therefore not just the Labor militia; it was widely seen as the military arm of the Yishuv as a whole. Political leadership remained in the hands of the chairman of the Jewish Agency, but the high command consisted of representatives of most of the major parties of the Yishuv. Operational military command was held by professional military men.

The British tolerated and used the *Haganah* in the early years of the mandate without officially accepting it. The large number of Jewish volunteers in World War II formed the backbone of the *Haganah* after the war. *Haganah* consisted of several elements, including the *Palmach*, an elite strike force; *Mossad*, a special operations section dealing with illegal movement of European Jews to Palestine; *Shai*, a counterintelligence force operating against the British in Palestine; and the *Hish* and *Him* reserve forces. Local units were static elements designed to defend specific settlements; they became an important part of the reserves. The "field units" formed in the late 1930s, by contrast, increased from battalion size to brigades. In 1947, they were formed into five brigades and this became the *Palmach*. Organizationally, however, *Palmach* was autonomous in almost every way. Both were completely responsive to the political leadership of the Labor movement.

By contrast with Labor, the Revisionists, who followed Zeev Jabotinsky, were a smaller but militant group of Zionists. The IZL derived from the Revisionist movement, and was headed by Menachem Begin during the period considered here. The Revisionists did not take direction from the Labor leadership, and the IZL was not responsive to the unruly Revisionist leadership either. Instead, it responded to its own small high command. The IZL began operations against the British around 1939, suspended its activities during World War II, but began to operate again against British forces in 1944. Theoretically, the IZL had a central command and four sections. Subordinate to the high command was a general staff composed of two sections, military and support. The military section was responsible for operational units and support units, while the support section concerned itself with financial, intelligence, and communications (including psychological warfare) functions. The six geographical commands were subordinate to the high command and the general staff. While the IZL maintained a complete military organization on paper, in 1944 there were essentially two groups apart from the high command and general staff, the combat force and the support elements. In 1944, there were 200 men in the former, 400 in the latter.

A more radical offshoot of the IZL, LEHI was created in 1940 (when most of the high command of the IZL actually defected to LEHI) and led by Avraham Stern until he was killed in a shoot-out with police in 1942. Unlike the IZL, LEHI did not declare a truce with the British during World War II, continuing its attacks throughout the war. LEHI endeavored to cooperate with the Nazis and later with the Italian Fascists as the primary threats to the "occupier." LEHI was not connected with any party and observed the directives of its own leaders exclusively. Organizationally, the small LEHI was essentially a terrorist group and was set up like the Irish Republican Army. Like the IZL, LEHI had a special operations section of Sephardim (Jews originally from Arab countries who therefore spoke Arabic and generally had more consistently Middle Eastern features) for use against the Arabs.

The Zionist insurgency against the British was in many respects a classical underground movement. In such movements, organization and communications are more important than size or physical resources. Communications techniques were well developed among the underground organizations. The state radio, which was nominally subject to British control, gave coded instructions to members in the course of its broadcast. Radio *Haganah* did the same more frequently. Couriers were used extensively, and were the predominant form of communication for the IZL and LEHI, which had no access to more sophisticated means of communications. (The IZL's radio station made very few broadcasts.) Light signals were also used. Communications were important also for propaganda purposes, critical in any insurgency where the support of the populace is essential. Zionist newspapers were a major channel of communications, and even the more extreme organizations had their newspaper connections. Posters were also widely used. Both the *Haganah* and the IZL were very active overseas in propaganda work.

Resources

The British had imposed strict limits on arms available to local settlements. Essentially, each village defense group was allowed only a handful of shotguns. By the end of World War II, however, nearly every potential Jewish fighter had some kind of firearm. *Haganah* began its operations with an inventory

of about 22,000 rifles, 11,000 submachine guns, 1,500 light machine guns, a small number of medium machine guns, 800 mortars, 72 antitank weapons, and four 75mm guns. These weapons lay hidden in small groups and were dispersed throughout the mandated territory, primarily in reinforced concrete underground storage cells. Most weapons were illegally imported, hidden in barrels of cement or machinery crates, transported in manure trucks, and so forth. Some arms were captured from government stocks. Small factories produced mortar bombs, grenades, and submachine guns as well as ammunition for these and other weapons. Similarly, armored cars were produced by the expedient of nailing armor plating to commercial vehicles.

Haganah financial support derived from the Jewish Agency and thus from the international Zionist movement. Particularly in the 1940s, extensive financial collections from the American Jewish community were undertaken. Financial support for the IZL and LEHI were much more limited. *Irgun* depended on the Revisionist groups, but also robbed banks, particularly British banks. LEHI resorted to bank robbery for its funds.

The singular nature of the manpower equation in Palestine must be noted. Because the Zionist movement was based on the return of Jews to Palestine, an unusually large proportion of the insurgents was "foreign born." The fact that they were also experienced militarily, a great number having fought in foreign armies before their arrival in Palestine, is often forgotten.

The *Haganah* had approximately 10,000 men at the outset of the campaign and more than 300 British-trained officers.⁶ In all, approximately 30,000 Jews who had served in various armies during the war joined the *Haganah*. However, the *Haganah* was able to depend on the entire Jewish community of Palestine for support in such areas as food, logistics, shelter, and communications. At its peak, the *Haganah* probably involved between 45,000 and 60,000 people including both reserve and active forces, perhaps 75% of whom were active, and about 3,000 of these in the *Palmach* strike forces. (The *Palmach* had had fewer than 2,000 men when the *Haganah* joined in the revolt against the British.) Only a fraction were full-time fighters, however. Organized support in logistics (e.g., transportation, LOCs) was provided through the Labor movement trade union, *Histadrut*.

The IZL had been a significant force before World War II, but as a result of divisions in the leadership, the split that formed LEHI, a period of inactivity, and departures to join the war effort, the membership of some thousands had substantially decreased by 1944. When operations recommenced at the end of 1943, the IZL had 600 active members, though its political support base was substantially larger, perhaps as many as 8,000 to 10,000. Nevertheless, those in charge of personnel recruitment were rigorous in selecting membership, insisting on ideological motivation yet removing adventurers and romantics. A considerable segment of the IZL membership had actually been trained in the *Haganah*. By the end of 1947, the IZL had a strength of about 2,500 fighters, with a somewhat larger number involved in other activities (mainly propaganda). Weapons were in even shorter supply. The arms hidden earlier had been stolen or lost, and in early 1944, only four submachine guns, 30 rifles, 60 pistols, and less than a ton of explosives remained. Arms were purchased illegally from British personnel, but more were stolen. Grenades, Sten guns, mortars, and mines were produced. Even as late as 1947, the IZL had arms for only 700 of its 2,000 personnel. Completely lacking were any communications facilities. Financial resources were

almost totally absent. Financial requirements escalated sharply as the pace of the insurgency increased, and contributions, extortion, and small burglaries no longer sufficed after the end of the war. Major thefts assumed a more important role at that time.

LEHI declined in size from 250 to about 150 between 1944 and 1947, with a political support base that remained without much growth at the level of 2,500 to 3,500. Neither the IZL nor LEHI ever had the organized infrastructure for logistical support that *Haganah* did, so they confiscated or borrowed articles as needed, and raided Arab or British stocks.

Strategy

There was no coordinated strategy across the three main groups of Jewish insurgents. The core element of the insurgency, the *Haganah*, sought to demonstrate to the British the impossibility of preventing Jewish immigration and the futility of concessions to the Arabs. *Haganah* focused its efforts until late 1945 on circumventing and defeating British attempts to intercept illegal immigration. Consequently, the organization depended to a great extent on overseas intelligence and connections that recruited immigrants and facilitated their travel to Palestine. By contrast, both the IZL and LEHI concentrated on British targets in Palestine, the latter almost exclusively human targets; both attempted to demoralize the British and to compel British withdrawal from Palestine through terrorism. When the *Haganah* objective shifted to independence for the Jewish state, it sought to persuade the British public and government that withdrawal was the only sane course to save lives. In this phase, *Haganah* also conducted sabotage operations against the mandatory authority, and in late 1945 and early 1946, *Haganah* engaged in numerous attacks on police barracks and military installations in diverse parts of Palestine.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Organization

Palestine remained a mandated territory during the period being studied here. British administration was civil in nature, and the British civil government was led by a high commissioner under whose authority British military forces in Palestine operated. Legal restraints on operating forces were few because the high commissioner established regulations tantamount to martial law. Senior military commanders delegated their authority under these regulations to local commanders. The organization of British forces in Palestine continued on an essentially military plane. Throughout the insurgency period after World War II, the units deployed to Palestine underwent few organizational changes. They included the 6th airborne and 3rd infantry divisions; the 9th infantry brigade; with miscellaneous assigned air support. Most of the encampments to which troops were deployed had been constructed during World War II. They lacked even electricity until 1948. Soldiers spent at least one of every three nights on duty.

Resources

British armed forces strength deployed in Palestine after World War II grew to approximately 90,000 men, in addition to 4,000 police.⁷ In addition, elements of the Jordan Arab Army (sometimes called "the Arab Legion") recruited, trained, and designed for use in Transjordan (east of the Jordan River) were occasionally deployed in Palestine (west of that River). In the Mediterranean, two cruisers, three destroyers, and other naval units patrolled to stop illegal immigration and gun-running. Naval units were supported by naval radar and communications bases in Palestine.

Strategy

One of the problems of the British effort was the absence of a realistic and cohesive strategy. The only strategy, developed in 1943 by High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael, was aimed at the complete destruction of the *Haganah* and the apparatus on which it depended and which constituted, in effect, a state within a state. Destruction of the trade unions, imprisonment of the leaders of the Jewish Agency, ending the Jewish economic monopolies, and disestablishing the *Yishuv* political organizations could only be accomplished by force, and neither the British public nor many of the British officials in Palestine were prepared to use the degree of force required to accomplish the task against the completely unified Jewish populace. Thus, British efforts were designed to restore law and order by responding to and preventing illegal activities. That is, initial reactions were to treat the insurgency as if it were criminal activity. When an appreciation of the magnitude of the problem developed, the British invested much more in improving the readiness of their forces but without any clearer or more realistic understanding of the necessity to develop a political objective. Eventually, when the British government decided to withdraw from Palestine, military operations were reduced.

The British counterinsurgency effort in Palestine consisted essentially of two activities: preventing illegal immigration and confiscating illegal arms. British forces also responded to specific illegal acts and therefore undertook actions to capture wanted "criminals." Throughout the Palestine experience, the British tended to favor cordon-and-search tactics. While extensive cooperation and interaction took place between the mandatory authority and the Jewish Agency leadership, they did not always distinguish very clearly between the diverse groups (*Haganah*, IZL, LEHI), and by 1946, such distinction became practically meaningless.

COURSE OF INSURGENCY

The insurgency in Palestine can only arbitrarily be considered in phases, because it lacks some of the clear and decisive turning points and chronological progress of other conflicts. Jewish resistance was increasing throughout 1945 and particularly after the war in Europe was over. In part, this was a reflection of differences of interest; in large part, it was a growing realization of the Zionists that British policy would not change. This realization was brought home when the British Labor Party revealed that its policy toward Palestine was not unlike that of its predecessor. At approximately

the same time, the *Haganah* attacked a detention camp, signaling a much greater hostility between this mainstream organization of the Jewish community and the mandatory authority.

From the autumn of 1945 until the beginning of 1947, British policy aimed at relentless pressure on the main Jewish organizations and the splinter groups, but a pressure applied within the overall context of a continuity of British experience. For the first half of 1947, the British government considered going well beyond previous attempts to contain and destroy the insurgency, but was never able to mobilize public support behind a stronger posture. The incident of the *Exodus* (July 1947), in which the government decided to return Jewish illegal immigrants to Germany, was a decisive event in turning public opinion against the British government. Soon thereafter, London decided to withdraw from Palestine on May 15, 1948.

ROLE OF CITIES IN INSURGENCY

Terrain, demographic, and resource distribution compelled the Zionist insurgents to focus much of their activity in Palestine in the cities. Most of the Jews lived in the cities. The countryside, and particularly the hills, tended to be predominantly Arab. Moreover, the hills of Palestine were generally barren. British targets were clustered in the cities.

A number of the sabotage and assassination activities of the IZL and LEHI took place in cities, because the best targets for these activities were in major urban areas. Urban settlements often masked arms caches, and illegal immigrants were also often best hidden within the teeming city populations. For their part, the British frequently applied cordon-and-search techniques to cities as well as villages.

OUTCOME

The result of the Zionist insurgency against the British mandatory administration of Palestine was the withdrawal of the British forces and administrative apparatus on May 15, 1948, and the immediate announcement of the establishment of the State of Israel. Both from the standpoint of Jewish immigration, the original rallying cry of the Jewish population of Palestine, and from that of the establishment of a state for Jews, the insurgency was successful. The British failed to hold Palestine, once considered strategically located; failed to achieve a compromise between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine; and failed to maintain the British presence either through the application of force or through tactics of divide and conquer.

¹This confusion is aggravated by the mandate conferred upon the United Kingdom after World War I. The mandate, generally referred to as the "Palestine mandate," actually included lands under British responsibility on both the east and west banks of the Jordan. Well before the mandate was enacted (from the very beginning of British occupation during the war), the United Kingdom made a clear distinction between lands on the east and west side of the river. To the west, a direct British administration was established; to the east, initial local

administration was followed quickly by the founding of the Hashemite monarchy.

²The common name for Jerusalem in Arabic is *al-Quds* (the holy).

³A number of different locations were considered for this Jewish homeland, but by the turn of the century, the emphasis in the Zionist movement was heavily oriented toward Palestine.

⁴The mandate system grew from proposals presented to the Paris Peace Conference by a number of leaders, including J. Smuts of South Africa and W. Wilson of the United States. When President Wilson, who had campaigned against a war of aggrandizement, arrived at the conference, he was embarrassed to discover that the American allies had reached secret agreements about dividing the colonies of the Central Powers even before the U.S. entered the war. It was not possible to deny the allies their wishes. The establishment of the mandate system theoretically transferred ultimate responsibility for these lands to the League of Nations. Nearly all mandated areas were administered as colonies by their mandatory powers.

⁵In any case, the IZL remained vehemently opposed to partition, insisting on the entire area of *Eretz Israel* (the Land of Israel), including at a very minimum, the land on both sides of the Jordan River. A small, partitioned state for the Jews would be too weak militarily, economically, and therefore politically to survive, in the IZL view.

⁶These figures represent something of an estimate based on a number of conflicting reports. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the *Haganah* fielded "a reasonably well-trained and equipped force of about 65,000 persons with a reserve of perhaps up to 40,000." These figures are substantially greater than those provided in any other source. They were derived from the British who may have had a political motive in exaggerating in intergovernmental communications the size of the insurgents. U.S. Army intelligence estimates for the period of the end of the insurgency placed the ceiling of Jewish mobilization at 200,000. These figures stand in sharp contrast to others in the open literature. (see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Information 493, "Certain Evidence Given to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine," May 3, 1946, TOP SECRET; and U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Memorandum for the Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates, CIA, November 13, 1947, SECRET). Both documents are now declassified and located in National Archives.

⁷There were a number of police units in Palestine. The Palestine police included British and Jewish and Arab Palestinians. From 1936 until the end of World War II, a number of other groups were formed: the Auxiliary Police, the Railway Security Police, and the Special Auxiliary Jewish Settlement Police. These were all predominantly Jewish groups.

CHAPTER IV

ALGERIA (1954-1957)

The Algerian insurgency arguably has had the greatest political and military impact of any of the colonial insurgencies in the post-World War II period. The lessons drawn from Algeria have imbued countless other insurgent groups, whether aimed at decolonization or simple political change.

Yet, the lessons of the urban insurgency in Algeria have been little studied by insurgent groups, and this for a simple reason--the counterinsurgents in Algiers firmly reestablished their control over the city, and in relatively short order. There are other limitations of the study of Algiers as a model of insurgency (or counterinsurgency), for example, the ethnic differences between insurgent and counterinsurgent, which are not always applicable; the geographic separateness of the habitation groups in Algiers; and the determination and brutality of the counterinsurgent forces.

Whatever the aspects of Algiers that set it apart from other cases (and each case is unique in some respects), the urban insurgency in Algiers is an important case in view of the magnitude of the effort of both sides, the human and material resources, the military efficacy of the counterinsurgent effort, and the seeds of political self-destruction planted by that very effort.

This chapter will focus as much as possible on the insurgency in Algiers itself. However, it would not be reasonable to consider the development of the urban insurgency without reference to the overall Algerian revolution within which the case in Algiers developed. Consequently, this introductory section will describe the national revolution as well as the situation in Algiers.

The enormous land of Algeria (more than 2.5 million km², about four times the size of France) had been under French control since 1830. Large numbers of French citizens had moved to Algeria, the northern territories of which were considered an integral part of France. Generations of Frenchmen had been born in this "part of France," and considered it as French as Burgundy or Champagne. Yet, less than half the "European" population of Algeria was actually of French descent, although all spoke French. The ethnically European population of Algeria was only 11% of the total Algerian population (estimated at 10 million in 1954); the rest, 9 million in 1954, were Arab.¹

While in theory the Algerians were French citizens and enjoyed the rights thereof, in practice this was never the case politically, economically, or socially.

1. Algeria was always administered for the benefit of the ethnically French colons (French settlers). The governor general, appointed by the French cabinet had complete executive and extensive administrative power. The bicameral

legislature, which enjoyed limited power, perpetuated colon political control by providing equal power for the European house and the Arab house despite their population disparity.

2. A typically colonial dual economy existed, with the colons far better off, and all linked to the modern sector, while most of the Arab population suffered economic privation and marginal survival.

3. Three-quarters of the European Algerians lived in the larger cities, while only 20% of the Muslims inhabited those cities.

While there had always been some resistance to the French, no systematic, militant, and organized opposition appeared before the end of World War I. In the aftermath of that war, as the number of educated Arabs grew, a group of them pressed for changes that would more fully integrate the Muslim Algerians into the French community, even on the basis of "merit." However, the colons as a group, dominated then as they would for the rest of France's period in Algeria by an extremist group among them, successfully resisted every attempt at integration, often using their political leverage in a fragile French political system to achieve their ends. Over time, the Arab moderates were eclipsed by increasingly strident voices, a process well under way by the outbreak of World War II. The end of that war saw one brief outburst of economically caused rioting to which French authorities responded with brutal measures (including bombing) at a cost of thousands, probably tens of thousands, of Algerian lives.

Another of the diverse threads that must be woven into the fabric of the Algerian revolution from the point of view of the counterinsurgents is the French colonial experience after World War II, and particularly the experience in Indochina. The humiliating rapid defeat of France by Germany in World War II, the weakness of the French political system in the postwar years, and France's economic and political decline in the world system were difficult for the French to accept. To lose in Indochina was bad enough; Algeria was much more intimately associated with the French consciousness. Moreover, the French army had begun to develop what certain of those involved in the strategy felt was an effective means to defeat the insurgency they confronted in Indochina. Yet, in their view, a political decision taken in Paris deprived them of the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of their approach, maintain the glory of France, and prevent the spread of communism.²

Algerian nationalists paid little attention to these developments. The father of Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj, had led the most strident nationalist groups, one of which formed a secret component in 1947; this organization brought together and deployed people trained for combat and generally armed. While that organization was destroyed by the French after 1950, its members remained in contact and formed the basis of the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA) which became the National Liberation Front (FLN). CRUA was organized only about 6 months before the revolution officially began with widespread violence all over Algeria on November 1, 1954.

The insurgency in Algeria was nationwide, not urban, but from the first day, violence in Algiers and other cities played a central role in the political drama. Two bombs exploded in downtown Algiers that day, the only major city to be victimized.

Algiers was certainly not built by the French, but in 1954 it was an overwhelmingly French civilization that dominated the city architecturally, in city design, in cuisine, and in institutions. Except for the Casbah, Algiers was a French city. The Casbah, by contrast, was an area approximately 1 Km² in area in which 100,000 persons, mostly Arabs, lived. The contrast between it and the European city was so great as to be a caricature of the cultural differences of the two population groups. The streets resembled alleys, wandering in and out, most of them impenetrable for any length to modern vehicular transport. Structures adjoined, and were so close that one could frequently walk or jump from roof to roof. Algiers and its suburbs had a European population of 300,000.

INSURGENCY

The insurgency in Algeria was never mainly urban, but from the outset, the insurgents recognized that European settlement in Algeria, which made their objectives so difficult to realize, also provided highly vulnerable targets. As we have seen, these targets were predominantly urban. The goal, as in Palestine, had to be to persuade the French population in France that the war could not be sustained at a reasonable cost. The problems in Algeria that had no counterpart in Palestine, were the size of the European community and the decisive political power of that community in the metropole.

Organization

The CRUA dissolved in favor of the FLN essentially at the same time as it organized the opening of hostilities. The military arm of the FLN was the National Liberation Army (ALN), which was organized as a regular, uniformed armed force. Algeria was divided into six regions, and the commander for each region had virtually complete autonomy. Some of the regional commands were active, others largely inactive. In the cities, notably Algiers, irregulars engaged in sabotage, assassination, propaganda, and fund raising. Algerians who cooperated with the French were the main target of the assassinations, but attacks on French police and other administrative facilities were common. In late 1956, the monthly average of violent acts in Algiers reached 700.

Despite the level of violence overall in Algeria, the French seemed to be making headway, and it was evident that much of the initial momentum and enthusiasm had passed from the revolutionary movement. In the autumn of 1956, the FLN went through a major reorganization. A National Council of the Algerian Revolution was created to become the precursor of the legislative branch, and a Coordination and Execution Committee to serve as a national executive. Less important, but directly relevant to our study, an Algiers Autonomous Zone (ZAA) was created. Following the establishment of the ZAA, the organization of the insurgency in Algiers evolved into a fairly sophisticated institution.

The senior leadership of the ZAA, responsible directly to the CCE, consisted of a council comprised of a political-military head with three deputies in charge of political affairs (also charged with financial responsibilities), military affairs, and intelligence (see Table 5). The basic unit of organization was the cell, and there were three types of cells mirroring the three deputies' functional responsibilities. Geographically, the city was divided into three regions (1) the bulk of the Casbah, (2) the remainder of the Casbah and western

Algiers and suburbs, and (3) eastern Algiers and suburbs. In each region were three sectors; in each sector, three districts. Cells, generally single buildings, comprised the districts.

Table 5

Organization of the ZAA After Mid-1957

ZAA Council								
Director								
Political Deputy								
Military Deputy								
Intelligence Deputy								
Zonal Political Director			Zonal Military Director Bomb Network			Zonal Intel.& Coord. Director		
Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3	Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3	Reg.1	Reg.2	Reg.3
S ₁ S ₂ S ₃	S ₁ -S ₃	S ₁ -3	G ₁ G ₂ G ₃	G ₁ -G ₃	G ₁ -G ₃	C ₁ C ₂ C ₃	C ₁ -C ₃	C ₁ -C ₃
D ₁ -3 D ₁ -3 D ₁ -3	etc.	etc.	C ₁ -3 C ₁ -3 C ₁ -3	etc.	etc.			
Cl-n Cl-n Cl-n								

Notes. S - sector; G - group; C - cell; D - district.

The regional political director had a political deputy and a financial deputy, reflecting his dual responsibilities. The respective duties of these deputies are reflected in Table 6. The political deputy was responsible for distributing propaganda, for secret transportation, and for diffusing shipments of supplies. It is interesting to note the overlap between the responsibilities of the political and those of the military leaders, for shock troops were a political responsibility. Shock troops were charged with intimidation and assassination, with ensuring that taxes were collected, and with backing up armed groups in the military hierarchy. The financial commission consisted of five merchants who established the level of taxes for the region's merchants, oversaw taxation processes, and kept the fiscal resources. In practice, the political organization had an intelligence branch that was temporarily assigned pending creation of the separate intelligence and coordination directorate.

Table 6

FLN Political Organization in Algiers

Regional Political Director					
Deputy for finance			Deputy for politics and propaganda		
Branch Supplies	Funds Collection	Finance Commission	Printing & Distribution	Sympathizers	Shock Troops

The military director in each region headed an organization composed of three 11-man groups. Each group was based on three three-man cells plus a chief and a deputy. In addition to these "regular" military personnel, the bomb network included between 50 and 150 people and was responsible directly to the zonal military director or overall director of the zone.

The organization of the intelligence and coordination deputy at the ZAA level constituted a general staff. While the intelligence and coordination directorate was in theory reflected at the regional level, it was never developed at that level before the FLN organization was destroyed in Algiers. Thus the organization depicted in Table 7 below is the zonal rather than a regional organization. It was comprised of a series of committees that served as staff sections. The coordination committee was in charge of liaison with the neighboring military regions, the CCE, the FLN in France, and with Tunisia and Morocco. (It should be remembered that the leadership of the CCE was predominantly in Algiers until the spring of 1957.) The liaison function included transport of arms and explosives. The intelligence committee was charged with FLN special services in Algiers, including some administrative functions related to the military and some assassination and sabotage duties as well as standard intelligence and security functions. The editorial committee was in charge of maintaining the awareness of senior regional officials of local and larger political developments and, in turn, of communicating with the people FLN decisions. A particularly important role was propaganda support. Articles were prepared for the FLN newspaper, *Moujahid*, dossiers for the United Nations debates, documentation for the foreign press, and contact maintained with intellectuals who were willing to assist the FLN. The justice committee performed an intelligence function, surveilling the Arab masses, in addition to arbitrating disputes among residents of FLN-controlled areas of the city. The health committee organized health services, including food, both to support the insurgency effort and more generally to assist the populace. In addition, a Red Crescent was established and endeavored to enter into contact with the International Red Cross.

In theory, each region was composed of some number of five-man cells. It appears that much of the intelligence work was done by persons in the other two organizational hierarchies, particularly the political. Residents loyal to the FLN (or in urban areas subject to FLN control, such as the Casbah) were expected to report all activities of the French security forces. As in the other cases, double agents were extensively used to report on strategy, force deployments, and plans.

Table 7

Intelligence and Coordination Organization of the Algiers Zone

Intelligence and Coordination Deputy				
Coordination Committee	Intelligence Committee	Editorial Committee	Justice Committee	Health Committee
CCE Morocco Neighbor	Intelligence Security	UN Foreign	Muslim Suits	Red Cross Medication
France Tunisia Wilayas	Attack groups	Legal Press	Surveillance-Civil/Crim'l	Health Liaison
		Intellectuals <u>Moujahid</u>		Acquisition Organization
				Hospitals Clinics
				Clandestine Clinics

Resources

The human resources of the FLN in the city of Algiers included the vast bulk of the Muslim population. (While Muslims loyal to France were used and played a decisive role in the counterinsurgency effort, they represented a very small component of the Arab population.) Estimates of active participants (i.e., members of the organizational hierarchy described previously) with the FLN in Algiers vary, but a reasonable estimate is 1,000. Of these, approximately 200 were in the military branches and bomb network, most of the rest in the political branch. These figures are somewhat misleading, however, since militant Muslims ready to assume active status were readily available for a long time. This quasi-reserve, when added to the active members, probably yields a figure nearer to 5,000. In addition, a small number of French citizens played a significant role in supporting the FLN. Specifically, a handful of Europeans, primarily women, served with the bomb network, and European journalists and some leftists (resident in France or Algeria) sympathized with the insurgents and facilitated their propaganda work.

The political branch was several times as large as the military branch. The former had approximately 50 to 70 persons in each region responsible simply for transportation and communications, while the latter had about 100 in the entire city, not counting the bomb network.

The organization and personnel policies consumed human resources. Many personnel were killed or captured. When this happened, the policy was to spirit away the other two members of the cell to the rural ALN.

Despite the importance of propaganda and the fact that the FLN was intensely aware of its significance, the materiel support provided to the propagandist elements of the political sections was scanty. Each region's printing and distribution unit had a typewriter and mimeograph machine.

The military section had relatively few arms. Each cell chief had at his disposal one machine gun, four or five pistols, and several grenades. Personnel were armed only when they left on a mission, and were disarmed when they returned.

The financial organization within Algiers was designed to be self-supporting. Overall, the national insurgency systematically taxed all Arabs within its areas of control, within the major cities, and large numbers of those working in Europe through unions operating in Algeria and France. Because of the terrorism and intimidation associated with taxation, many workers paid twice either at home and at work, or, especially in Europe, to the rival unions of two different nationalist groups. In some cases, taxes were also collected twice because of disputed district boundaries. On the national level, external assistance was important. Economic aid was received from Egypt, the People's Republic of China, Tunisia, Morocco, several African countries, and Yugoslavia. These funds had little effect on the urban insurgency, however.

Strategy

The strategy of urban insurgency in Algiers was always held to be strictly subordinated to the requirements of the overall liberation of Algeria from French control. Thus, no decision in Algiers should have been taken, regardless of the local impact, unless it supported the overall movement. Algiers became largely cut off from the rest of the FLN and operated for some time with complete autonomy.

The strategy of the FLN was to defeat the French on the battlefield, but from the beginning of the war it was understood that PSYOP must play an important role. Thus, the FLN was active in propaganda in the United States, in France, in the United Nations (i.e., in friendly countries especially among third world nations), and in propaganda and politics among Algeria's neighbors, as well as inside Algeria. Because international attention could effectively be focused only on Algiers, the capital played a critical PSYOP role. The FLN intended to accomplish several objectives in Algiers:

1. To demonstrate the inability of the French to establish peace,
2. To dispirit the French people,
3. To alienate the population from France,
4. To reinforce the psychological mobilization of the population against France, and
5. To communicate a perception of national solidarity against continued French control to the rest of the world.

The means of achieving these objectives were evident. French inability to establish and maintain peace could be demonstrated by continued violence, particularly spectacular violence such as bombings. Attrition of French personnel and equipment would dispirit the French, it was thought. Alienation of the population was accomplished through provoking overreaction of the French security forces. Strikes, demonstrations, and violence tended automatically to reinforce popular opposition to the French as a result of the psychological and

social distance between the two communities. Demonstrations and strikes were also seen as a way to effectively communicate the solidarity of the populace against the French to the outside world, since news media were present in Algiers.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

A number of security forces were involved in operations against the FLN in Algeria, and even in Algiers. While as in other cases the magnitude of the problem was not seen immediately, and certainly overconfidence occurred too early, these errors did not reduce the scope of the final military victory of the security forces over the FLN in Algiers.

Organization

The French military presence in Algeria had always been a significant factor in law and order there, and the symbol of French presence. Historically, the French army had had a major presence in urban areas where they assisted the police subject to civil administrative authority. The sharing of responsibility over military personnel was intended to give greater authority to the governor general; in practice, it highlighted the underlying power of the army (see Table 8). From 1954 to 1957, the military tended to concentrate more on rural operations, the police more on urban law and order. After 1957, the army was heavily involved in the cities.

Table 8

Police and Intelligence Organization in Algeria at Outbreak of Insurgency

	Minister of Interior		Minister of Nat. Def.	
SDECE Post	Governor General	Cmdg General 10th Mil. Region		
No. Af. Liai- son Services	National Police	Territorial Police	Gendar- merie	Armed Forces Security Service
Police d'Etat	PJ	RG	Units: Algiers, Constantine, Oran Oran,	Divisional Posts: Algiers, Constantine
Posts: Oran, Constantine	Prefecture, Subprefect.	Brigades: Alger, Oran, Constantine,	Subprefect. Companies	
Commissariats	Posts (to subpre- fect level)	Bone	Brigades	

Until 1957, the governor general was responsible for security in Algeria, and police responsibilities were conducted within the General Directorate of General Security (DGSG), which controlled administrative services, personnel, materiel, and operational uniformed and plain clothes police services (the criminal police [PJ], the Territorial Surveillance Directorate [DST], the General Intelligence Service [RG], and uniformed *police d'etat*) responsible for public safety, law and order in urban areas and on public thoroughfares. Within 2 months after the outbreak of the insurrection, the Algerian police were integrated with those of metropolitan France and were subordinated to the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) in the (French) ministry of interior. Authority over the Algerian police was delegated by the minister to the Algerian governor general.

A state of emergency initially declared in the spring of 1955 was limited in geographical extent and not applied to the major cities until the end of August. Its application allowed for the enforcement of travel controls, unusual security measures, and broadened powers for the military and police.

Responsibility for maintaining law and order in Algiers and other areas remained with the national police until the direct intervention of the 10th Paratroop Division in Algiers in January 1957 and the application of martial law. In May 1958, martial law was declared and the military commander in Algeria designated France's senior decisionmaker. In 1960, the Fifth French Republic reorganized the police, placing those in Algeria under the direct control of the civil authority in Algiers and also replaced the DGSG director with a French professional police officer.

The judicial branch was responsible for the PJ, although certain administrative functions related to crime were conducted by the DGSG. The PJ were organized into mobile brigades of from 8 to 21 officers, inspectors, and agents.

The DST was theoretically in charge of counterespionage, but operated on a much broader intelligence mandate. The DST identified and captured urban insurgents, assisting the police, gendarmerie, and army. Nominally subordinate to the governor general, the DST was directed by DST or the DGSN headquarters in Paris.

Additional intelligence work was performed by the RG, responsible to the governor general. The RG had discrete sections charged with intelligence about political activities, financial developments, social issues, communications, and foreign activities.

The *police d'etat* worked closely with the PJ and RG and were responsible to civil authorities. Approximately 2,000 troops were organized into 20 police commissariats within the *police d'etat* in the departement of Algiers.

Republican Security Companies (CRS), an elite security unit within the French ministry of interior, also served in Algeria. They supported both the police and the gendarmerie. Authority over the CRS in Algeria was delegated to the governor general, and they were employed to capture urban terrorists.

The gendarmerie was a paramilitary organization within the ministry of national defense.

Resources

At the outset of the revolution, the French army presence in Algeria consisted of approximately 55,000 troops. These numbers grew quickly; within a year, they reached 200,000. By August 1956, 400,000 French troops were stationed in Algeria, and the numbers continued to increase, reaching perhaps 750,000 at their peak. These figures include Algerian Muslim auxiliaries.

The insurgency led to the assignment of seven brigades of criminal police in the *departement* of Algiers (i.e., the city of Algiers and its domain). In addition, 20 Republican Security Companies were assigned there in early 1955.

Strategy

French strategy in Algeria before 1960 was relatively consistent. It assumed that the rebellion could be contained and defeated by effective measures designed to capture the loyalty and control the physical life of the Algerian population. To this end, the "battle of hearts and minds" envisioned a series of measures to (a) improve the social, educational, and economic position of the population while stressing France's role in these processes; (b) establish effective government control over most basic elements of life (including communications, transportation, employment, medicine, education, and food); (c) resettle elements of the population otherwise not subject to control; (d) collect and rapidly exploit all relevant information from the controlled populations controlled as a result of (b) and (c); and (e) indoctrinate controlled populations in order to maintain or restructure their loyalties. Within the cities, and especially Algiers, the fourth point (intelligence operations) became the key to the second (population control) and to the military defeat of the insurgents.

The mission of the Algiers sector was first, to assure the security of persons and goods therein; second, to destroy the FLN structure; and third, to win the bulk of the Algerian Muslim community away from the FLN. The first task was a police mission that simply required large numbers of personnel to establish effective surveillance through static guard positions and mobile patrols. The second goal was also a police function, but the magnitude of the problem substantially exceeded the capabilities of the Algiers police or any standard police organization. The French concept of the third objective in Algiers was that reeducation must be conducted by active and effective psychological operations, followed by organization and control of the society and then by provision of self-defense capabilities.

COURSE OF INSURGENCY

Although several of the initial explosions that marked the official beginning of the Algerian revolution took place in Algiers, very little of the initial combat activity of the revolution took place there. This is not to say that Algiers was isolated from or foreign to the insurgency, for that was not the case. Organizationally and financially, Algiers was the head of the body in revolution.

While operations in Algeria were decentralized to the Wilaya commands to a very great extent, even though subject to the overall policy control of the FLN collective leadership, a number of the organization's main leaders resided in the first 2 years of the revolution in Algiers. Thus, in many respects, Algiers was the head of the revolution despite its relatively limited amount of combat.

A significant proportion of the FLN taxes collected inside Algeria were collected in Algiers where labor was carefully organized and businesses systematically assessed. Moreover, intelligence penetration of the French administration was more fully effected in Algiers than elsewhere, since the earliest indicators of shifting French priorities and policies were evident in Algiers.

In June 1956, two FLN members were executed. Within a week, the FLN leadership ordered the Algiers branch (this was before the establishment of the ZAA) to attack European civilian males in reprisal, and 49 were shot at random by FLN squads roaming the city. European extremists responded; a bomb exploded in the Casbah in early August, killing 70 Arabs. The FLN decided to join the war in kind, that is, with bombs. The newly created ZAA was directed to prepare the campaign.

On September 30, three bombs were planted in European Algiers. One failed to explode, but the other two caused great damage and many injuries and deaths. At the end of the year, the mayor of Algiers was assassinated by Ali la Pointe (who later became a key aide to the head of the ZAA), and a bomb was exploded during the funeral procession. The European response to each incident was an ugly riot in which Arabs were brutalized. The ZAA organization was by this time deeply rooted in Algiers, and questionable Muslim elements had largely been removed from the Casbah which had become in many respects an FLN fortress. A number of additional assassinations followed. Terror was rampant in Algiers, and schools did not open in October. Civilian Europeans began carrying concealed weapons for security.

FLN difficulties elsewhere in the country and frustration with the slow pace of revolutionary progress were partly responsible for the critical decision to launch a general strike in Algiers in January 1957. However, the opportunities offered by the city in terms of publicity were far more important reasons. The important Soummam Conference (that created the ZAA) had emphasized the need to internationalize the revolution; the strike was called to coincide with the United Nations' debate on Algeria.

French setbacks in the Suez affair in late 1956, which further emboldened the FLN, stiffened the determination of the French army, already smarting from its perception of having been stabbed in the back in Indochina. Moreover, the governor general of Algeria was desperate to stop the rapid deterioration of the situation in Algiers. Against the backdrop of the recent bombings and assassinations and the impending general strike, he approved the deployment of the 10th paratroop division, just returned from Suez, into the city with full authority for the maintenance of law and order.

Within a week, the four paratroop regiments of the 10th division had deployed in Algiers. This deployment, however, was not simply a placing of military personnel and equipment. It was specifically designed to effect complete control of the city's population and resources. The city was divided

into squares, and each was assigned to a unit responsible for everything in that square. The entire Arab sector of the city was cordoned off, and a massive search undertaken. Check-points were placed at all exits. Intelligence and security units seized all police records to identify suspects who were then seized without warrants or charges.

Because the French realized the FLN had invested high hopes in the general strike, breaking the strike became the first order of business of the army. Three more bombs exploded before the strike. Initially, the population observed the strike, but the army response was swift, unswerving, and effective. The population was directed to return to work. But the army did not stop with "advisories." Armored cars dragged down many shopfronts with ropes. In one instance (not in Algiers), a tank shell was even fired into a shop. Trucks forcibly brought strikers to their places of work. Within 2 days, the strike, originally called for 8 days, had been broken.

With a clear French victory over the FLN in the strike, the army turned its full attention to destroying the FLN infrastructure in the city, and particularly the bomb network which had not stopped. In addition to the bombs just before to the strike, two more were set off in crowded stadia 2 weeks later. The main weapon in the French effort was the heavy paratroop presence in and growing control over the Casbah. Women had planted most of the bombs, and consequently for the first time, women leaving the Casbah were searched carefully.

About the same time as the strike, French officers of the 3rd Regiment Parachutiste Coloniale (RPC),³ perhaps the toughest regiment of the 10th division, arrested a locksmith who had a bomb design on his person. After extensive questioning, the suspect divulged the location of the FLN's secret bomb factory in the Casbah, but the FLN personnel had fled by the time the French raided the factory in early February. Only about a week later, the 3rd RPC captured the FLN's primary bomb carrier and the mason who had built the bomb shops. Under interrogation, they revealed the key locations and individuals, and the French moved very rapidly, seizing 87 bombs, 70 kg of explosives, electric and chemical detonators, and related paraphernalia, as well as many members of the secret bomb network.

Thus, in 2 weeks, the complete organization of the FLN in Algiers, developed over a period of 2 years, was endangered. The CCE leaders were still in Algiers, but they recognized the rapid French progress. Fearing for the future of the movement as a whole, they decided to flee Algiers leaving Yacef Sa'adi, head of the ZAA, in complete control of the Algiers organization. One of the most reluctant to leave Algiers was Larbi Ben Mhidi, one of the "nine historic greats" of the Algerian revolution. He moved to a safe house in the European quarter, but was arrested there within days, interrogated, and announced to have committed suicide in early March.⁴ In early April, with the city pacified and the FLN network in ruins, two of the 10th Paratroop Division's three regiments left Algiers.

Despite their intensive effort, the French did not find Sa'adi Yacef whose identity they had determined, but their destruction of the bomb network and of a large part of the rest of the Algiers ZAA infrastructure forced Yacef to suspend all operations. Nevertheless, in May, Yacef began once again to reorganize. Two paratroops were shot in the street. On June 3, several bombs hidden in lamp posts exploded, killing eight and wounding more than 90 persons, European and Arab alike. On June 9, another bomb in the casino outside Algiers killed nine

and injured another 85. Half of the victims were young women, and a large number lost one or both legs due to the positioning of the bomb. Another bombing, another binge of revenge--scores of injured and five killed among the Arabs as Europeans rioted.

Following the casino incident, the 10th Paratroop Division was recalled to Algiers. Adding to their already formidable operation a number of defectors, these *bleus* ("blues," so called because of their blue jeans) were planted to interact with the remaining FLN leaders. As a result, the new head of the bomb squad and the Yacef's military deputy were killed on August 26. Soon, French pressure reached the point that Yacef and the handful of members still active were hidden in two caches in the Casbah and unable to move. In late September, Yacef sent a letter to the FLN leadership requesting aid at once and describing the plight of the once-proud Algiers network, but the courier was intercepted by the paratroop intelligence personnel. Under interrogation, the courier revealed Yacef's location, and on September 24, the 1st Regiment *etranger* parachutiste (REP) captured Yacef. On October 8, acting on information supplied by the *bleus*, the French captured Ali la Pointe and the remaining two members in another cache nearby. The only remaining survivors of the FLN network still actively operating in Algiers were double agents for the French, agents who then proceeded to deceive other FLN groups outside Algiers.

Following the destruction of the FLN organization in Algiers, the French substituted and imposed their own methods of population and resources control. In every building, someone was responsible for all other building residents; each *responsable* reporting to another *responsable* for a larger area, and so forth. As a result of this *ilot* system, the French could, theoretically, and to a great extent actually, capture any resident of the city within a few minutes. This system was effective until the end of the insurgency.

ROLE OF CITIES IN INSURGENCY

In the history of the Algerian revolution, Algiers did not become the key to victory. The battle in Algiers was perhaps one of the most well-known elements of what is surely one of the most important revolutions in the modern era. Yet, the decisiveness and rapidity of the French victory gave very little in even symbolic value to the FLN.

Despite the limited contribution of fighting in Algiers to the political success of the Algerian revolution, the city was important in many ways. Its access to global media quickly focused the FLN's attention on the French and international arenas that in effect produced the political triumph of the insurgents. The city was certainly the key to the internal financial operations of the insurgency. And the defeat in Algiers can also be said to have contributed significantly to the final triumph of the FLN. The widespread French use of torture caused dismay and disgust in metropolitan France, producing the first serious consideration of whether the war in Algeria was causing moral decay in the metropole. Moreover, the victory itself forced the FLN to base its insurgency outside the territory of Algeria and to recognize that the desired political goal must not be made dependent on an insurgent military victory, for the decisiveness of the French "win" in Algiers demonstrated conclusively to the FLN leaders that as long as France had the will, they could certainly prevail on the battlefield.

OUTCOME

The French won a clear-cut military victory in the so-called "Battle of Algiers." Their methods, certainly the most systematic, cohesive, and broadly based of any modern counterinsurgent, completely destroyed one of the most deeply entrenched and carefully constructed urban insurgent organizations in modern times. The ZAA was virtually removed from the Algerian revolution from the time of the French paratroop victory in September 1957 until the end of the war.

Ultimately, the French were able to greatly pacify all of Algeria but never to completely quell the FLN. Yet, the effectiveness in establishing law and order in Algeria was too costly to be borne by France, and the real loyalty of the Algerian Muslim population was won by the FLN. In yet another political defeat, the French abandoned Algeria after their military victory there, undoubtedly a political decision that was as wise for long-term French interests as it was courageous in short-run political terms.

In the Algiers battle, 3,000 Arabs were killed, and another 5,000 were imprisoned or transferred to reeducation camps.

¹Actually, some of the non-European population were Berber, including Berbers from the Sahara area and others farther north, most notably the Kabyles. The Berbers are a Hamitic people (Arabs are Semitic), and Berber dialects are quite distinct from Arabic. Since the time of the Islamization of North Africa, Arab and Berber for all their differences have shared the Muslim culture which served as a powerful source of unity against the European colonizers.

²The officers associated with this approach, which is discussed in this chapter, were mostly politically conservative. There is little reason to doubt the sincerity of many of them who believed communism to be behind the problem in Algeria, as they had seen in Indochina.

³The 3rd RPC had been given responsibility for the Casbah.

⁴In reality, Ben Mhidi appears to have been killed by a security element of the French paratroops.

CHAPTER V

CYPRUS (1955 - 1958)

The island of Cyprus is neither in Europe nor in the Middle East, yet it has been at the crossroads of both for centuries. In a real sense, its geographic position has imposed the politics of the surrounding land areas on it. Thus, Cyprus has reflected in its own unique way Ottoman power, Ottoman decline, Greek independence, the British role in the Mediterranean, and the conflicts in the Middle East.

The demographic predominance of Greek-origin Cypriots was the primary factor in the insurgency that arose in the mid-20th century. The Greek Cypriot population, approximately 80% of the total, had long favored the incorporation of Cyprus in Greece. Turkish Cypriots, essentially the other 20% of the population, opposed incorporation. (The animosity between Greece and Turkey, which is a reflection of the animosity between Greeks and Turks as distinct and antipathetic cultural groups, is mirrored on the island.) Several historical developments persuaded Greek Cypriots of the inevitability of this incorporation, not the least of which was a British offer to cede the island to Greece in 1914. British policy had encouraged or tolerated this direction of thought for some time, but after World War II, major problems arose that precluded the union of Cyprus with Greece (*enosis*).

1. British concern with the significant communist role in Greece after the war argued against transforming the island to Greece, particularly in view of Cyprus' location astride British lines of communication to Middle East oil.

2. The vocal opposition of the Turkish minority on Cyprus, a much more significant consideration in an age of communications, came to be a real and humanitarian as well as political consideration in the United Kingdom.

3. This opposition was especially significant because of the growing importance of Turkey to the West, and eventually its inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955, which, combined with the strong stand of the Turkish government against *enosis*, were compelling factors in dissuading the British from allowing the absorption of Cyprus by Greece.

Cyprus was not really partitioned between Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations. On the contrary, of the more than 600 villages, more than half were mixed. There were approximately five times as many purely Greek villages as there were exclusively Turkish. In response to Greek demands for *enosis*, however, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkish government countered with a demand for partition of the island. The partition request was not realistic at the time, given the degree of mixture of the two populations. (Twenty years later, as a result of the Turkish invasion, a *de facto* partition was effected, but at a great cost in human lives and property.)

Islands are not generally considered good guerrilla terrain, but Cyprus is a mountainous and forested island. Although much of the island consists of small mountains, the Troodos range is excellent guerrilla territory. These are high

and rugged mountains, heavily forested, and extensive in area (approximately 80 km long by 10 km wide). They are laced with caves, characterized by intricate approaches and ridge patterns, and blessed with abundant water. This mountainous area constituted the sanctuary for the guerrillas, but was linked to an extensive underground structure in the major urban areas. About one-fourth of the population lived in six urban areas; Nicosia, the capital, Famagusta in the east, Larnaka and Limassol in the south, Paphos in the west, and Kyrenia in the north. The dispersion of the built-up areas increases the importance of the transportation networks on the island, but the limited size of Cyprus is also a critical factor. Certainly, the topography and lines of communication played an important role in the nature of the insurgency and in the effectiveness of insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Local government was not highly developed on Cyprus. In this case, it was not a question of the unwillingness of a colonial government to provide local leadership with experience in self-government that might later be used against the colonial power. Rather, the opposition of Greek Cypriot subjects to any local self-government reflected their determination to accept nothing short of enosis.¹ While political organization (in the sense that concept is used in the West) was absent, Greek Cypriots were highly organized in the church system. The ethnarch (archbishop of the Greek Cypriots) was elected through universal suffrage, and as such enjoyed a political rather than just a religious leadership position. Unlike both Greece and Turkey, Cyprus was a thriving and diversified economic center at the time the insurgency began.

The direct role of the Turkish Cypriot population in the insurgency was not great until the last phase, and thus receives little mention here. The nature of the island as a country characterized by deep and antagonistic ethnic divisions, and as a mirror of the ethnic and national antagonism between Greece and Turkey themselves, was a principal consideration in British policy throughout the insurgency.

The leadership of the insurgents was derived from the religious organization. Archbishop Makarios, the ethnarch of the community, was pledged to conduct the campaign for enosis. Since the British had finally made clear their determination to oppose enosis, Makarios concluded that only force would persuade them to change their minds. In such a struggle, he recognized that the community lacked the experience to impose its will on the British, and consequently he arranged for a retired Greek Cypriot officer, known for his passionate attachment to enosis as well as for his underground activities during World War II, to secretly make his way to Cyprus and to command the military aspects of the insurgency.

INSURGENCY

Organization

Archbishop Makarios was the political leader of the insurgency--Col. Georgios Grivas, its military leader. The actual organization of the insurgency is elusive, because the linkages between the political and military wings were not as clean and crisp as in many other struggles. A council, composed of lay representatives of all the elements of the Greek Cypriot community, planned many

aspects of the initial outbreak of violence. Makarios' unquestioned legitimacy as community leader, the juxtaposition of the political and religious within the community, and the homogeneity of the insurgency's popular base made clear-cut organization unnecessary.

Grivas and his fighters formed the main insurgency organization, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), soon after their arrival in Cyprus. Grivas had actually been working on the organization, recruitment, and assignment of volunteers for several years before his arrival in Cyprus. For all intents and purposes, EOKA may be said to have been established in the early 1950s when Grivas first began to organize personnel and resources for the forthcoming campaign. As early as 1952 and 1953, the forerunners of the EOKA organization systematically sought and located sites for arms caches and places to hide people. For recruitment, political communication, and other purposes, EOKA depended almost completely on the Pan-Cyprian National Organization of Youth (PEON), established by Makarios in 1950, which gave way after it was banned in 1953 to a similar underground organization, the Orthodox Christian Union of Youth (OHEN). The entire body of Greek Cypriot youth identified with the cause, the EOKA was able to use the young people effectively in demonstrations that were intentionally manipulated toward violence and predictable British countermeasures.

Organization of the insurgency was highly centralized and depended almost completely on Grivas himself. More than on its firepower, the insurgency depended on the intelligence resources that Grivas had long ago learned were critical in guerrilla warfare. EOKA penetrated British operations, and maintained operational cells all over Cyprus. Most EOKA groups remained small throughout the insurgency, however. Grivas also created a series of parallel organizations that provided political, economic, and other support. One of the most important was PEKA, the Political Committee for the Cypriot Struggle, an organization of professionals (journalists, lawyers, physicians, teachers, businessmen) dedicated to propaganda in support of EOKA.

EOKA's combat organization consisted of a headquarters unit of Grivas and his immediate lieutenants, seven mountain groups, and 50 town groups. The mountain groups ranged in size from 5 to 15 men (fewer over time, as Grivas discovered that a smaller number was better able to evade the British and supply itself), while the town groups had fewer (averaging about five). Mountain groups operated from the Troodos Mountains, conducting ambushes, raids, and other attacks in the rural areas. Town groups committed sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda. In addition, a small but very effective logistics support apparatus provided the communications capabilities (through couriers to a large extent), food, housing, finances, and intelligence.

Resources

Human resources of the insurgents were largely restricted to the Greek Cypriot population of Cyprus. Only a handful of the EOKA personnel were full time; most acted without compensation on their own time. While the active number of insurgents never surpassed about 350,² the emotional support of the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot population makes this number quite misleading. The hard core of the insurgency involved about 86 members in Nicosia at its height, about 34 in Limassol. The majority of the population aided the insurgents. The youth support groups, which were closely linked to EOKA through

the schools, the church, and Grivas personally, involved several thousand young people. Young people were invaluable in mass actions (demonstrations, strikes, riots), small groups (propaganda dissemination, bomb fabrication, liaison, attacks), and individual activities (intelligence collection, assassination support). As a group, only the communists among the Greek Cypriot community opposed the insurgency.

Fighters among the insurgents were generally under 25 years of age, of working class backgrounds, and male. Women were not allowed to assume active fighting roles in the insurgency, but they did conduct important supporting activities. It was Grivas who forbade female participation in the ranks of the fighters, rejecting several women who requested such roles. The youthful age of combatants is also a function of Grivas' views, as he actively sought youth for its "audacity."

Because the active number of insurgents was never high, neither was the quantity of material resources committed to the insurgent cause. Weapons were light, individual weapons for the most part. The EOKA inventory included hundreds of hand grenades from Greece and Italy; hundreds of incendiary and other home-made bombs and hundreds of Molotov cocktail bombs; about 500 shotguns (mostly old, hunting weapons confiscated from private citizens); a few dozen Mauser 7.92-mm rifles, a little more than 100 Thompson submachine guns, a number of Sten submachine guns, and about 15 Bren light machine guns, these latter all smuggled in from Greece. While this is certainly a modest inventory, particularly considering British resources in Cyprus, it is quite large for the number of active EOKA personnel involved in combat operations.

Approximately 4,750 bombs of various types were planted, of which more than 60% failed to detonate. About half of the 1,800 bombs that did explode caused major damage.

Financial support for EOKA's operations was derived directly from the church. Special funds were established to provide for the insurgency, and although there were some disputes between the ecclesiastical rulers and the insurgent leader, Grivas, nearly all his financial requirements were met.

The principal (virtually sole) external support for the insurgency came from Greece which, after 1954, was politically committed to such support. Given the nature of the environment, however, it was not possible to supply or use heavy equipment. Consequently, Greek support was of limited effectiveness after the United Kingdom began aggressive and heavy patrols of the Mediterranean. Weapons were smuggled in small boats and in components through the mail. Even priests smuggled explosive timers into Cyprus.

Strategy

The Greek Cypriot strategy recognized British military superiority and the impossibility of contesting British control conventionally. Instead, the strategy was designed (a) to persuade the British that the Greek Cypriots would fight indefinitely and therefore the British would inevitably grant self-determination; (b) to keep the issue alive internationally by using visible demonstration of problems; and in turn (c) to use these activities to continue to build the internal pressure for "self-determination." The Greek Cypriots sought

to convince the British colonial administration that self-determination for Cyprus was inevitable and that the pressure for *enosis* was too great for anyone even in the Greek Cypriot community to resist.

Because he understood the gross disparity of resources, Grivas recognized that violence without psychological operations support could not drive the British from Cyprus. But Grivas seems never to have sought a substantially larger organization. EOKA was a very small, but very solidly constructed group. Its leader emphasized the value of surprise, dispersal of attacks, and a large number of attacks. At the same time, Grivas was personally involved in planning most attacks, and his plans were much more meticulous and detailed than in other insurgency situations. Orders were clear, precise, methodical, and yet permitted some flexibility. They almost always foresaw the range of problems that might arise.

EOKA strategy as it evolved envisioned the use of violence as the principal means to persuade the British to leave and to command the more active support of all members of the Greek Cypriot community at a time when that community was enjoying substantial economic prosperity under British rule. Thus, three stages of violence were foreseen:

1. Against British or government installations,
2. Against Cypriot opponents of *enosis* and collaborators, and
3. Various measures of passive resistance also played a role in the strategy against the British including the families of British soldiers.

Such a strategy employed the use of demonstrations, strikes, riots, ambushes, bombings, sabotage, and murder, with some sniping at the outset, along with the psychological operations necessary to exploit these operations. The focus of the psychological campaign in Greece and Cyprus was *enosis*; but elsewhere, the campaign against continued British control centered on implementation of "self-determination." Since Greek Cypriots constituted the vast majority of the population, self-determination would in practice amount to *enosis*.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Organization


The movement in support of *enosis* was not new. The British government saw pressure for *enosis* in terms of the historic favor in which Greek Cypriots had viewed the idea, and did not see it as a new or different challenge for some time. Consequently, the British reaction to the insurgency was slow in coming. The fact that a tripartite conference of Britain, Greece, and Turkey finally was able to meet in late 1954 further retarded British recognition of the magnitude of the problem.

Essentially, the British continued to view the problem as primarily a police effort until late 1955, when the British military position in Cyprus was

reinforced. The counterinsurgency remained mainly a police responsibility, but by the time Archbishop Makarios was exiled in March 1956, joint civil-military police teams autonomously based in each of six administrative districts had assumed the lead. Operationally, teams included personnel from all British security services on Cyprus (army, navy, air force, commandos, engineers, police).

Field Marshal Sir John Harding's reorganization of the security forces involved the integration of those forces into a single operating team. He appointed himself Director of Operations³ and gave the deputy governor responsibility for administration, devoting himself to security issues. A chief of staff (who was a brigadier in the British Army) was given executive control of all internal security operations. A joint staff subordinate to the chief of staff consisted of all three services and a joint intelligence organization. An under secretary (Internal Security) was responsible directly to the governor for civil aspects of security operations and for communications between civil and military elements.

The command structure, illustrated below, provided the governor ample control of all operational aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. District security committees were established for each of the island's districts, and the governor met directly with these committees when necessary.



This organization, which reflects the naming of a separate director of operations several months after Harding's arrival, remained essentially unchanged even after the declaration of the state of emergency in 1956.

Resources

Although slow to react to the challenge of EOKA, the British government eventually responded with substantial force. The police force on the island swelled from 1,700 at the outset of the insurgency to more than 4,900 in 1957, including auxiliaries (about 1,400). The substantial growth in police force size enabled the British by 1956 to establish a mobile reserve force ranging in size from 165 to 583 (1957). Local police were mostly all Turks. Support equipment also changed dramatically during the emergency. The police obtained the most

modern radio communications equipment, enabling them to put headquarters, division commissariats, local stations, and patrol vehicles on the same network.

British thinking stressed the role of the police. Ultimately, the responsibility for security must be returned to the police, in the British view. The immediate threat to security far outstripped the police capabilities, however, and therefore, this was the role of the military. British armed forces strength on Cyprus, which numbered approximately 3,500 in 1955, attained a level of more than 30,000 men. After the first 6 months, the British force level had already risen to 15,000; after 9 months to 22,000. The outbreak of intercommunal rioting required increased manpower but also greater diversity in equipment, since suppression of EOKA involved combat weapons, while control of ethnic fighting more closely resembled riot control. Between late 1957 and mid-1958, British forces reached 32,000. This total included about 13 infantry battalions; several paratroop regiments; six artillery regiments; and one armored brigade group (one rifle battalion in APCs, one artillery regiment with 155-mm self-propelled [SP] guns, and three armored regiments with Centurions).

The British inventory was impressively large by contrast with that of EOKA. The British had more than 3,000 revolvers, a good number of Lee-Enfield sniping rifles (.303), about 3,000 Bren light machine guns, several hundred Vickers medium machine guns, significant numbers of 4.2-inch mortars, 87-mm howitzers, 105-mm pack howitzers, some 155-mm SP guns and Charioteer Mk 6 or Mk 8 tank destroyers, about 170 Centurion tanks, between 100 and 150 APCs, some Saladin armored cars (equipped with 17-pounder guns), Ferret scout cars, some Avro Shackleton patrol bombers, 6 or 8 Canberra bombers, a squadron of Bristol Sycamore helicopters, and at least 16 coastal mine sweepers.

In addition to the size of the security forces on the island, Britain enjoyed that luxury of many counterinsurgents on the islands, the ability to prevent insurgent supply of major end items. As early as January 1955, British authorities seized a Greek ship that landed on the island loaded with arms for Greek Cypriot liberation forces. From then on, patrolling around the island was constant, and it is believed that no major shipments of arms arrived.

The financial resources Britain was able to allocate for the suppression of the EOKA campaign were substantial. The police budget, for example, almost tripled in 3 years, from £600 in 1954 to £1,600 in 1956.

Strategy

British strategy regarding Cyprus was constrained by the importance attributed to the island in global British power. As a result, independence seemed impossible at the outset of the insurgency. Instead, a negotiated settlement flowing from Britain's shared interests with Greece and Turkey seemed a more desirable context to resolve the problem.

The tripartite conference (the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey) ended in failure in late September 1955. With that failure ended the attempt to reach a regional settlement. The British resolved to deal with the issue within Cyprus, instead. On October 3, 1955, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, became governor of Cyprus and assumed direction of the counterinsurgency. Harding imported 300 policemen with diverse specialties from the United Kingdom. In late November, he declared a state of emergency. Among

numerous provisions, the state of emergency outlawed all major Greek Cypriot organizations on the island (including the Cypriot Communist Party which opposed enosis).

At the same time, Harding also initiated talks with Makarios aimed at ending the problems on Cyprus. These talks, which lasted roughly half a year, resulted in no useful conclusion, since continued British control was inherently contrary to the Greek Cypriot aim of enosis. British strategy continued to focus on internal negotiations, combined with strong police efforts, until conclusive proof of the direct involvement of Makarios in the insurgency was available. After the exile of Makarios, British strategy focused on "putting down" the insurgency through security measures.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 for the first time allowed London to conceive seriously of an independent Cyprus, as long as the Britain retained certain rights on the island. A new British governor was therefore able to raise and promote this new alternative to enosis, an alternative which was eventually the basis of the settlement.

COURSE OF INSURGENCY

While the discovery in January 1955 of the Greek ship *Ayios Georghios* loaded with arms and explosives was the first visible sign of the impending insurgency, the official opening of hostilities took place on April 1, 1955, when 16 explosions took place at many official installations all over the island, including police stations, government buildings, power stations; the three in Nicosia involved Wolseley Barracks, the education department, and the Cyprus Broadcasting Service. Remarkably, there were no casualties.⁴ Leaflets at some of the sites were signed "Dighenis," the *nom de guerre* Grivas had chosen for himself. The attempt to resolve growing differences over Cyprus continued at the diplomatic level, but positions were already hardening.

After April, EOKA continued the irregular but rapid pace of its attacks and subversive activities. Most attacks were either sabotage or assassination attempts. Sabotage was primarily through the use of time bombs. The targets were buildings, logistic support for military camps (e.g., water pipes, pumping stations, generators), and airports. Attacks on police posts, unlike most sabotage attempts, were often designed to kill police. In terms of material damage, sabotage was not very effective. Most bombs produced very little damage.

Assassinations were very well planned in meticulous detail. The victim was typically watched very carefully. He was usually shot in the midst of a crowded street, and the attackers disappeared into the rapidly dispersing and panicky crowds. Normally, the attacker would be provided the weapon only briefly, perhaps minutes, before the attack, and would pass it to someone else, frequently a youth, in the confused seconds after the shooting. The attacker would disappear into a prearranged residence and slip away later. Other shootings took place in cafes.

Bombs were sometimes used for assassination too, but with little effectiveness. There was an attempt to assassinate the governor with a bomb placed near his seat in a cinema. Emergency regulations were issued in June permitting the detention of suspects without trial. But violence and attempts to

demoralize and secure cooperation (whether through persuasion or intimidation) focused on the police and the Cypriot government. A Special Branch officer was murdered in the middle of the day in center Nicosia in the presence of hundreds of onlookers; this produced a large number of resignations from the police force. A special campaign was launched by EOKA in October against police and police installations.

The breakdown of the talks and the appointment of the new governor produced a quick change. In addition to the organizational changes previously noted, Harding upgraded intelligence and public information activities; committed his administration to a sharp improvement in police quality and effectiveness; and initiated direct talks with Makarios.

Intelligence problems had previously been of two types: the absence of operationally useful intelligence and the lack of coordination of intelligence assets and products. Harding established a chief of intelligence to coordinate requirements, integrate activities, and ensure that resulting products were disseminated to the proper units. In addition, technical experts on fingerprinting, ballistics, and the like, were brought from the United Kingdom. Major efforts to recruit informers failed.

Public information or propaganda was immediately recognized as the natural response to EOKA's goal of convincing the British they had no alternative to allowing enosis. It was imperative to persuade Greek Cypriots that the British presence was desirable and that it was firm. Harding saw an accelerated propaganda effort as critical to the first goal. He created a public information office for the island government, but also established a public relations office for the security forces to ensure that their activities, not always benign, were portrayed in a favorable light and broad perspective.

Harding recognized that the condition of the police on Cyprus was lamentable. Consequently, he imported 300 British police. More important, he named as commissioner of police an able and experienced British constable. Training was improved. Moreover, in view of the concentration of EOKA attacks on police installations, army support in reinforcing these positions was also valuable.

At the end of November, approximately 2 months after his arrival and following the collapse of his talks with Makarios, the governor declared a state of emergency in Cyprus. With firm evidence of the involvement of the archbishop in EOKA's campaign, he exiled Makarios in March 1956 to the Seychelles. The 2 months preceding the declaration can be viewed as preparation for what was to follow. Harding had not wished to declare a state of emergency until his organizational preparation was complete. When the state of emergency was declared, it merely allowed the British to focus the results of the 2 months' preparation on the crisis.

Typical of the nature of the insurgency, EOKA personnel threw a grenade at the governor's chair at a ball on the day of the declaration of the state of emergency. A few months later, one of the governor's servants who had been courted and persuaded by EOKA, placed a bomb in his bed. In mid-December, in a highly publicized incident, EOKA ambushed an army Land Rover, but one of the occupants of the Rover killed one of the ambushers, wounded a second, and captured the other two. The killed attacker was a cousin of Makarios.

The early emphasis of EOKA employed the mountain and town groups. Especially after the deployment in early 1956 of the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade to Cyprus, the mountain groups were ineffective. They either had to remain in their mountain lairs for security, or they could attack. If they chose security, they accomplished nothing and were subject to government attack, that is, forced on the defensive; if they chose to attack, they were too small and isolated and lacked sufficient mobility to defend against government counterattacks. A major cordon-and-search operation in June 1956 conclusively demonstrated the vulnerability of the mountain groups. Consequently, EOKA concentrated its efforts much more in the towns after 1956.

EOKA offered a truce in August 1956, probably as a result of its losses in the army's Troodos Mountains operation. The British response was the equivalent of a demand for unconditional surrender, and EOKA immediately renewed its attacks. When the 16th Parachute Brigade was withdrawn for the Suez Crisis, those attacks escalated to more than 400 in November alone. The return of British troops after Suez significantly augmented government security force strength, and those forces attacked the mountain groups. Helicopters were invaluable in the mountains, and the British made full use of them. Increasing returns from the intelligence effort also yielded a much better idea of the nature, size, and motivation of the insurgent organization. For the first time, major EOKA losses occurred in early 1957.

In March, following a United Nations (UN) request for renewed negotiations, Grivas offered a truce on condition that Makarios be released. EOKA documents make it quite clear that EOKA truce offers came at times when Grivas felt the organization was weak and vulnerable and needed time to regroup and re-equip. Moreover, the propaganda war continued unabated during truces, so that "EOKA" never left the streets during these periods. The continued visibility of EOKA, in propaganda if not in attack, was considered vital by Grivas. The archbishop was released after the truce offer, but was not permitted to return to Cyprus. In general, conditions improved and tensions diminished. In December, Field Marshal Harding retired, and Sir Hugh Foot replaced him, signifying a greater emphasis on negotiations.

The new approach appealed not only to the Greek Cypriot community as a whole, but even to the leadership of EOKA, which sensed (incorrectly) that the road to enosis was now clear. However, the Turkish Cypriot community feared precisely that this sense was accurate, and Turkish political agitation became intense. As EOKA operations moved more toward gentler forms of pressure (passive resistance and symbolic⁵ rather than significant violence), intercommunal tensions resulted in riots all over the island. In October 1958, the British government decided to impose the MacMillan Plan⁶ with the result that EOKA terrorist operations, especially in the towns, started afresh and continued until the end of the year.

In February 1959, the governments of Greece and Turkey announced complete agreement on a resolution of the Cyprus problem--an independent republic. Makarios agreed and directed that Grivas cease all operations. Grivas followed these directions, surfaced in mid-March, and returned to Greece.

ROLE OF CITIES IN INSURGENCY

Built-up areas were crucial to Grivas' campaign. Although his initial plan incorporated both rural and urban operations, the pattern of attack and response quickly revealed that rural activities could not contribute more than secondary support to whatever was achieved in the towns. The towns were important for several reasons:

a. Grivas' men were so few that terrorism was a natural tactic for them to adopt. This terrorism was much more visible and therefore more effective in the city than in the countryside.

b. The visibility of the city attacks could be communicated globally, whereas the world seemed much less interested in rural guerrilla bands. Not only were communications media already present in the towns, but the targets were there also.

c. The likelihood of British countermeasures in the towns provided the real possibility for excellent negative propaganda against the British. This propaganda would be for external and Cypriot audiences.

d. Concentration on town targets and on police and civilian targets seemed likely, particularly if sufficient visibility could be achieved through the media to produce some measure of British repression. This would accelerate the propaganda offensive and, perhaps more important, would ignite anti-British feelings among Greek Cypriots. (While they supported *enosis*, most Greek Cypriots bore no particular ill will toward the British.)

e. Grivas' non-British targets were also in towns. That is, the Greek Cypriots who worked with the government, who worked with the British, were critical. Their collaboration for intelligence and other purposes was important. Those who refused to collaborate with EOKA were often killed.

It is instructive to note the importance of propaganda or PSYOP in the campaign. Previous work on the Cyprus insurgency has often failed to emphasize the central role of communications in Grivas' strategy. The disparity of forces being what it was, Grivas understood he could never aspire to "defeat" the British in any meaningful military sense. Force was used by EOKA in Cyprus almost exclusively for PSYOP purposes, as noted in the following figure.

EOKA Use of Force in Cyprus and Its Relation to EOKA Goals

<u>Target</u> <u>Goal</u>	<u>Type of Attack</u>	<u>Audience</u>	<u>Communication</u>
UK facilities	sabotage, bomb	Cypriot British global	Demonstrate UK weakness, EOKA strength show cost to UK in men & materiel publicize continued resistance
UK soldiers	assault (individual/group)	British	bring home cost of continued deployment
Cypriot police	murders	Cypriot	reduce UK-Cypriot cooperation; induce cooperation against UK;

It is little exaggeration to suggest that the entire campaign from the outset was almost completely dominated by the PSYOP factor. Grivas' memoirs reflect this overriding concern with creating the correct psychological climate and the awareness that without that climate, the military situation would certainly weigh against success. For the reasons previously noted, as well as for tactical military reasons already cited, the urban areas became the paramount focus of these PSYOP-driven EOKA attacks.

OUTCOME

Cyprus became an independent republic with guarantees to protect the rights of its Turkish minority inhabitants. Archbishop Makarios was elected its first president, but there was no threat of *enosis*. The United Kingdom retained sovereignty over important base areas on the island.

In the course of the insurgency, approximately 500 people were killed. Little is known of EOKA casualties, but they are thought to have included approximately 100 killed. British casualties included 142 persons killed (104 from among the military services, 26 civilians, and 12 police) and 684 wounded (respectively, 603, 49, and 32). Greek Cypriot casualties comprised 218 killed (203 civilians, 15 police) and 197 wounded (respectively, 154 and 43), while Turkish killed amounted to 29 (7 civilians, 22 police) with 172 wounded (respectively, 64 and 108). A handful of other nationalities also suffered casualties. These figures do not include the casualties from intercommunal rioting.

¹The Greek Cypriot community twice rejected constitutions offering local self-government, because they believed self-government to be inherently subversive of the aim of *enosis*.

²This figure represents the sum of the headquarters unit, the town groups, and the mountain groups. It does not, however, include the logistic support personnel. The "village groups," a sort of paramilitary unit equipped only with shotguns, are not included in this total either. Figures on the number of members in village groups vary widely. While active combat personnel of the groups probably never surpassed 175 in number, there seem to have been as many as 750 village group members, and village groups existed in all Greek Cypriot villages.

³The chief of staff deputy to the field marshal later took this title, and his deputy was then called chief of staff.

⁴One insurgent was electrocuted when, in trying to sabotage the island's power supply, he threw a wet rope over electrical wires.

⁵For example, Greek Cypriots boycotted British goods, removed their children from British schools, destroyed British street names, and so forth.

⁶Essentially, the plan envisioned a British governor assisted by a Greek and a Turkish representative and six Cypriot ministers, four Greek and two Turkish.

CHAPTER VI

VENEZUELA (1960-1963)

The political events leading to the outbreak of armed insurgency in Venezuela in the 1960s were largely a function of the interactions of two major groups of forces in Venezuelan policy. One represented the status quo, the rural landowners, the politically inclined senior military officers, the major merchants, and the conservative clergy. The other represented forces seeking social and economic change, the white collar workers, organized labor, the landless peasantry.

By far, the most reactionary element of Venezuelan society was the landowning group. Traditionally, they represented a minute proportion of the wealthy class. They determined the course of Venezuelan politics to a very great extent, especially through their alliance with the armed forces.

On January 22, 1958, a revolutionary general strike was almost universally effective with street rioting and increasing violent clashes with the police and soldiers. In the midst of the civilian uprising, the navy revolted and the dictator, Perez Jimenez, fled. A provisional *junta* of civilian and military leaders headed by Admiral Larrazabal assumed power (after a *junta* of five officers representing all three branches of the armed forces had tried in vain to seize control). The *junta* announced that free elections would be held as soon as possible and that the government would be transferred to duly constituted authorities. Unable to agree on a unity candidate for president, each of the three major parties nominated a candidate. Accion Democratica (AD) supported Romulo Betancourt; the Union Republicana Democratica (URD) nominated Admiral Larrazabal; and the Christian Socialists (COPEI) and Catholic church put forth Dr. Rafael Caldera. Elections were held on December 7, 1958. The announcement that Betancourt had been elected provoked riots by Caracas mobs. Betancourt was installed as president on February 13, 1959.

INSURGENCY

President Betancourt formed a coalition government of three members each from AD and COPEI and two members from URD. He did not abandon the AD program of extensive social development plans and agrarian reform, including the distribution of public and private lands to qualified farm workers, tenants, and sharecroppers. The program also provided for the development of transportation, credit, marketing, housing, education, technical assistance, and other services needed to help new owners of agricultural lands. This land reform program was the first in the nation's history. It incurred the hostility of the extreme right and made Betancourt unpopular with the Caracas urban population for its reversal of the traditional order of Venezuelan priorities toward social problems.

A small group within the AD was impatient with the Betancourt regime's approach to the country's problems, and preached Cuban-type revolution as the only solution for Venezuela's social difficulties. Finally, the "old guard" leadership of the AD, unable to control the dissenting younger group, expelled them from the party. The split soon spread throughout the country, and the dissidents were able to attract national leaders of the White Collar Workers Association and some state labor leaders belonging to AD. Some of those who were expelled or quit the AD formed their own political organization called the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

Organization

The MIR joined forces with the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) by late summer 1960 on a platform of revolutionary change. Following the AD-MIR schism, the government coalition began to break down. In November 1969, the URD withdrew from the government coalition. Thenceforth, the URD joined the PCV and MIR to present a united front against AD and other progovernment forces.

The arrest of three editors of an MIR publication calling for "popular revolution" marked the transition from political opposition to insurgent opposition. In October 1960, university and secondary school students, greatly influenced by Fidel Castro and his ideas, staged violent protests. Another street riot in November 1960 provoked by the MIR-PCV student coalition, led to the suspension of constitutional guarantees by President Betancourt. This move caused general dissension among the opposition political elements. From that point on, numerous riots and other acts of street violence erupted and continued in Venezuela during 1960 to 1963, leaving scores of persons dead and hundreds wounded.

Initially, these events erupted as a spontaneous reaction to government policies and without organizational directive or planning. The violence was not guided by any particular group or movement. It was conducted by scores of unorganized university and secondary school students. Yet, the spontaneous uprising in October and November 1960 led the leadership of the PCV and MIR to believe that the violence demonstrated revolutionary potential. They tried to control the riots and to organize and direct the violent eruptions. From mid-1961 on, the insurgents in Caracas began to use small "shock brigades," student auxiliaries for riots. The "shock brigades" were supplemented by small terrorist units called Urban Tactical Units (UTC). These UTC detachments consisted of about five to eight men. Student terrorists enrolled in special brigades of probably no more than 10 to 15 members.

Another split within the AD developed at the 1961 party convention, a schismatic group denouncing the coalition government and joining forces with the URD, MIR, and PCV. Henceforth, the insurgent opposition was committed to an armed struggle in an attempt to topple Betancourt. Between October 1960 and June 1962, the organization and operations of the student groups and Castro-communist movement were faulty. There was no central command and control to direct and coordinate the various insurgent actions. No attempt had been made to enroll the insurgent forces into one military organization. It was only in early 1962 that a clandestine National Army of Liberation (ELN) was formed. The ELN was dissolved in late 1962, and the communists and MIR insurgents enlisted all their forces in a new clandestine army known as the Armed Forces of National Liberation

(FALN). Their hard core was small (estimated between 500 and 1,000 men at its peak in 1963). The number of the rural guerrillas may have risen to about 250 by late 1964.

Resources

Major recruiting was done inside the universities, while the peasants were apathetic. The growth or decline of the movement depended on motivation among the urban populace, and especially among the students and other intellectuals.

Weapons and arms came from a number of sources. As a result of the 1958 revolution in which military stores fell into civilian hands, large quantities of light weapons were widely distributed among the urban population. Most arms were stolen from private owners by raids on ranches and villages. Robberies of police stations in the suburbs and isolated sites, as well as attacks on police patrols and military stores were other sources of arms. The FALN manufactured its own incendiaries and explosive devices, both mines and bombs. Workshops devoted solely to this purpose were numerous. Finally, arms were bought or stolen from sporting goods stores or by smuggling via routine contraband channels. A complete list of weapons is provided in Table 9.

Table 9
FALN Weapons

Weapon type	Quantity	Comment
Rifles	750 to 1000	U.S. M1, Garand, 7.62-mm FN Mauser 98, Lee Enfield
Submachine guns	100	
60-mm mortars		
57-mm recoilless rifles	9	
3.5-inch rocket launchers	20	
bombs, local manufacture	thousands	
mines, local manufacture	thousands	

The Castro government in Cuba apparently did not participate in the riots of October and November 1960. Cuba thereafter extended financial assistance, however. Between 1961 and 1962, Venezuelan youths were trained in Cuba. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated their number as 200 in 1962 alone. Training included classes in Marxism, sabotage, grenades, bazookas, machine guns, submachine guns, and semiautomatic rifles. Cuba also provided manuals for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and weapons maintenance. The Castro government seems to have refrained from sending any arms into Venezuela until 1963, when a large Cuban arms cache was discovered on a beach in the western part of the country.

Funds were derived from several sources. Bank robbery was an important source of financial resources. There is some evidence that the large and wealthy Chinese community in Venezuela was tapped by the People's Republic of China for sizable contributions to finance subversive activities in Venezuela. One of the activities was a training camp housing many of the alleged 600 Venezuelan trainees of the FALN in Cuba. However, no Chinese weapons were ever discovered in the FALN inventory.

Strategy

An insurgent strategy for "rapid victory" was laid down only after the failure of the October-November riots of 1960. The street riots and violence were spontaneous and failed to produce a mass uprising. Consequently, the opposition sought a more systematic or planned strategy.

The plan envisioned five progressive steps to proceed from early 1961 to late 1962. Stage 1 (early 1961) involved the creation of secret "active nuclei" in Caracas and other cities. Stage 2 (early 1961) called for violence, street riots, and subversive demonstrations. Stage 3 (summer and fall 1961) entailed the activation of the urban "shock brigades" for lightning acts of street violence and small "terrorist cells" for acts of robbery, assassination, and sabotage. The three stages were intended to induce a state of paralysis and alarm in the public. Stage 4 (early 1962) was to involve rural guerrillas in the country. Stage 5, to be enacted in summer 1962, envisioned the insurgents' undertaking conventional military operations in conjunction with rural guerrilla warfare and urban insurgency. No date for Stage 5 was set, however. The plan gave no specific indication about how transition from the fourth to the fifth stage was to be accomplished. The revolutionary army was to emerge from military garrison revolts that would be staged in the spring of 1962.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Organization

The place of the armed forces in Venezuelan society differs substantially from their role in many other countries. The army, in particular, is not supposed to intervene in political processes unless a threat of radical change in national policy and political institutions exists. Nevertheless, given the monopoly of physical power in the hands of the armed forces, they certainly constitute a potential power that affects any significant changes in existing political balances.

During the urban insurgency being studied here, the armed forces played a role beyond their typical defense activities. They constituted a reservoir of power in the organized political and social life of the state. The armed forces were geared much more as the ultimate weapon for internal control than for any external defense mission. It was never a secret that the armed forces held a veto over any civilian government if they chose to exercise it.

The Betancourt government enjoyed the general support of the armed forces. In return for government support of the military establishment, the military actively supported the right of the administration to continue as the constitutional civilian government.

Overall organization of the Venezuelan armed forces was centralized in a joint chiefs of staff. Four separate services existed: army, navy, air force, and marines. To keep the soldiers happy, the regime had gone to considerable lengths to ensure better pay, as well as better living and working conditions in the military.

By contrast, the police agencies suffered from poor organization. There were five different police organizations. Of these, the national guard was the best trained and had the highest morale. Venezuelan police were not handicapped by lack of equipment. Their physical assets did not erase the disadvantages of political influence and corruption, poor civil-police relations, ineffective criminal justice systems, and undereducation among police recruits, however. The several police agencies (except the national guard) were subordinate to district governors or to Justice, Communications, or Interior ministries. Most were nonmilitary police agencies. They were inferior to the military and national guard in funds, supplies, equipment, recruits, training, and administration.

1. The judicial police (PTJ) were charged with investigating crime and preparing cases for the courts.

2. The maintenance of law and order remained with the municipal police.

3. The General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) served partly as a political police agency concerned with internal security. In addition to its standard missions, DIGEPOL came to be a key element in the effort to combat communist insurgency. In this effort, DIGEPOL authority was abused, and the organization came to be feared for its brutality and its own "terrorism." Primarily a political investigation agency, DIGEPOL made a majority of the political seizures. It also participated in the antiguerrilla campaigns in a paramilitary capacity and interrogated suspects of the violent opposition. It was DIGEPOL that seized all publications of *Clarín* and eliminated the clandestine communist daily, *Tribuna popular*, on April 9, 1962.

4. The national guard, or FAC, was composed of approximately 7,000 men. It was a military or paramilitary service arm that covered a very wide range of activities. The FAC functioned as a combatant unit in war. Its duties were to guard industrial and transportation installations, to control riots, to assist in disaster relief, to combat subversion, to perform counterintelligence missions, and to investigate crime in the military. The FAC, though considered a police agency, was under military command.

5. In addition, state police (Venezuela is a federal republic) and the transportation police of the communications ministry were responsible for certain specialized activities marginally related to the insurgency.

Resources

The bulk of the Venezuelan armed forces, which totaled 15,000, was near the capital and the urban area immediately to its west. More than half of all military property lay within the federal district. This reflects the internal orientation of the army.

The armed forces of Venezuela did not lack adequate hardware to confront this small-scale insurgency. Much of the equipment came from the United States. In 1962 and 1963, U.S. military aid totaled about \$31 million, including \$23 million of equipment. Some have suggested that this level of assistance, certainly far above what was required for such a small force, was designed to create an incentive to develop military activities rather than intervene in political matters. Their inventory of lethal equipment and major end items is provided in Table 10.

Table 10

Venezuela Armed Forces Weapons

Weapons type	Quantity	Comment
Rifles	25,000	7.62 FAL, M1 Garand, M1 and M2 Carbines
Submachine guns		Thompson, M3
Machine guns		Browning .30 and .50
Mortars		30mm, 60mm
Howitzers		105mm towed
Recoilless rifles		106mm
Tank destroyers	10	M-18
AMX-13 tanks	circa 50	
M-4 tanks	>10	
F-86 fighters	22	F-86F
Other fighters	25 to 30	Mk 4, Mk 5
Trainers	50	T-33, T-4, T-34
Bombers	14	Canberras
Transports	50	C-47, C-54, C-123B
Helicopters	37 to 45	Bell 47, S-55, S-51
Destroyers	3	1953, 1954, 1956; 2 refitted 1959 and 1960
Frigates	6	Built 1956, 1957; modernized 1961 and 1962
Submarines	1	Built 1943; overhauled 1962

Strategy

Any government reaction to dealing with the burgeoning insurgency would certainly have far-reaching political ramifications. Betancourt had to be concerned with maintaining his good faith with his coalition partners as well as the general public. Moreover, in the early days of the Betancourt government, a

significant portion of the security forces remained sympathetic to the Jimenez era that had just passed.

A substantial component of psychological posturing and persuasion was clearly necessary. Two basic types of responses were exercised by the authorities, political or psychological and physical or military.

Although it was a key element in insurgent strategy to force Betancourt to resort to increasingly repressive measures that would divide the cabinet and alienate moderate opinion, the president displayed a very astute sense of timing. Betancourt delayed using emergency measures until the public was thoroughly frightened and conscious of the danger the insurgents represented. Throughout, Betancourt went out of his way to demonstrate his respect for legal due process, and exceptional measures for security were applied only when moderate opinion was already convinced of the need for them.

Police dealt cautiously with the rioting students in October 1960, using tear gas in an effort to avoid student fatalities. When criminal looting developed on the sixth day of riots, Betancourt authorized more police action and sent in the FAC and army troops.

After the November eruption of violence, some civil liberties including the right of free assembly were suspended. Most MIR and communist publications were closed. Criminal charges were brought against leaders of the two parties directly implicated in the violence. Steps were taken to oust PCV and MIR party members from influential posts in organized labor, in the national media, and in public secondary schools. (Ultimately, about 1,500 communist and MIR teachers were removed from the schools, labor, and other fields.) PCV members lost nearly all their positions of prestige and power.

Apart from military uprisings in the spring of 1962, the Venezuelan government faced a combination of urban insurgency and rural guerrilla warfare, neither deeply rooted in the people. In the city, the government responded with restrained police action and extensive psychological operations designed to communicate its deep attachment to democratic values; in the countryside, military forces quickly isolated guerrilla areas from each other and from the city and used more forceful but still limited military measures to reduce them.

The military mutinies of May and June 1962 provided neither the time for the government to develop a sophisticated strategy nor the need for such a strategy. The government met this direct challenge with military force. Following the events of spring, however, the government renewed its police actions and DIGEPOL, and the PTJ arrested and imprisoned a large number of suspects. At the same time, the government issued an executive decree banning both the PCV and MIR from future political activity, including the right to present candidates in local and national elections. Constitutional guarantees were restored 1 month after the uprisings.

At several subsequent points, outbreaks of violence again required the government to impose emergency regulations. In each case, the government followed the same strategy: rapid and decisive action to capture and prosecute those accused of illegal activities followed by a quick abolition of emergency restrictions. The tone established by the Betancourt administration from the outset continued to emphasize the importance of democratic freedoms, and

government policy to quickly restore liberties as soon as the immediate crisis passed served to provide great credibility to the government's claim of attachment to democracy.

COURSE OF INSURGENCY

The October 1960, violence in Caracas was spontaneous rather than planned insurgent action. The PCV and MIR were apparently so elated by the October riots, by the hesitant police response, and by signs of strain in the government coalition, that they decided more demonstrations and riots in Caracas and other cities might be enough to force Betancourt out of office. The moment of opportunity came in late November 1960 with telephone workers' strikes. PCV and MIR trade union leaders called for a revolutionary general strike. University and secondary school students poured into the streets for another round of violence and riots, this time with Molotov cocktails. Army and national guard troops again aided the police. The revolutionary general strike never materialized. Harsher government measures were applied to control the events. The failure of the November riots demonstrated to the PCV and MIR the need to settle upon some type of formal insurgency strategy.

After January 1962, the pace of urban insurgency slackened as the insurgents focused on rural guerrilla activities. Only when it appeared that the rural guerrillas were running into serious trouble did the number of urban insurgency incidents again reach the level of January 1962.

Military officers sympathizing with the opposition agreed to lead garrison revolts regardless of the views of the PCV and MIR (who thought such action premature). They were to make the transition from the fourth to the fifth stage in the insurgents' plan. Faced with this ultimatum, the insurgent leadership capitulated and agreed in effect to bypass Stage 4 of the original strategy and press toward final assault. A combined military and urban insurgency operation was conceived. The centerpiece of this stage would have been simultaneous uprisings by two military garrisons, the Marine bases at Carupano and Puerto Cabello. A simultaneous uprising did not materialize, however.

On May 4, 1962, the commanding officer at Carupano, acting on his own,¹ revolted. The rebel forces consisted of 450 marines and 50 national guardsmen. The revolt was crushed within 2 days at a cost of 40 dead and 50 wounded. On June 2, 1962, the garrison at Puerto Cabello revolted. Rebel forces of 500 marines and 100 civilian insurgents, liberated from the Puerto Cabello prison, engaged in 3 days of street fighting before being defeated by government forces (see Table 11).

With the collapse of the military revolts in the summer of 1962, the insurgents' hopes for a rapid victory ended. Thereafter, they resorted to bank robberies and thefts of various types of equipment (camping gear, canned goods, military uniforms, radio communications equipment). Pharmacies were robbed of first aid and minor surgical supplies. Insurgents disguised as agents of the security police and the Armed Forces Intelligence Services (SIFA) conducted sudden searches in private houses. Crime rates increased in the cities. In July 1962, a deputy to the national parliament resigned his seat and went to join the guerrillas. Other recruits, including two doctors, also made their way to the rural guerrillas.

In late 1962, the insurgents turned away from a strategy of protracted war and resolved to channel their energies into a second "rapid victory" strategy aimed at violent overthrow of the Betancourt government before the completion of its constitutional term in office. The new insurgent campaign involved acts of terrorism, sabotage, and arson. The violence was to continue until the presidential elections of December 1963.

In September and October 1962, a coordinated outburst of terrorist violence erupted in Caracas and other cities in an effort to undermine public confidence in the government and to induce military or civilian revolt. When this initiative failed, another and larger episode of urban violence occurred in January and February 1963. On this occasion, the FALN stole masterpieces from a French art exhibition visiting Caracas. Their activities also included hijacking a Venezuelan freighter on the high seas and a \$4.5-million fire that destroyed the main Sears warehouse in Caracas. The FALN at that time did nothing to hinder or repudiate the upsurge in urban crime and juvenile delinquency that developed in conjunction with the terrorist attacks. After this initiative also failed to generate public support, the attacks again slackened as the insurgents prepared for the all-out campaign of urban terror and insurrection in late 1963, which they hoped would finally topple the government or disrupt the elections scheduled for December 1, 1963.

On November 19, the FALN issued a demand for a revolutionary general strike. In Caracas, the FALN tried to enforce the strike by sniper fire and street violence, forcing many shops to close. Nine persons were killed and more than 70 were injured by gunfire. After 2 days of sniping, the violence diminished as police and military forces cleared the snipers' nests and arrested 750 known or suspected terrorists. By November 21, the city was back to normal. Twelve days after the elections, senior leaders of the PCV met and issued a statement calling a "truce" until the newly elected president took office in March 1964. In the spring, the FALN reassessed the situation and emphasized protracted rural guerrilla war, a recognition of the failure of the insurgent effort.

Table 11

Portrait of Insurgency Activities in Venezuela

Year	Type of Event	Killed	Wounded	Arrested	Weapons
1959	Bombing			106	
1960	Bombings Riots Shootings	29	332+	50	
1961	Demonstrations Shooting Skyjacking Bombings Riots	10 2 (police)	72 6 (police)	479	Grenades Dynamite
1962	Attacks Bombings Revolts Sniping Fire Guerrilla fights Demonstrations Sabotage	220 3 (police) 80+ (police killed or injured)	1186 1 (police)	29	Molotov Cocktail Grenades Rifles Machine guns
1963	Attacks Sniping Bombings Fire Robberies Jailbreak Kidnappings Seajacking Murders	7 2 (police/national guard [FAC])	60		Gasoline

ROLE OF CITIES IN INSURGENCY

Members of parliament and other politicians resided in Caracas. Effective coordination of the violence with propaganda, fund raising, and labor and student activities required location in the capital. Thus, the city was the prime target and the nerve center of the opposition insurgents.

Major recruiting was done inside the universities. Urban insurgents are people, and in this case, well-educated people. They liked and were accustomed to amenities available in the cities (imported jam was found in one camp site). Venezuelan guerrillas depended heavily on a systematic initial and continuing urban supply system. Materials captured by government forces (radios, tents,

clothing, medicines, books, maps, mimeograph machines, bugles) were generally available only in cities and larger towns. Venezuelan sources mentioned constantly that guerrillas thought life in the mountain areas was a serious strain.

When financial assistance from abroad was received, it also generally came via Caracas through the heads of the movement. The concentration of airlines and financial channels in the capital city made Caracas an attractive center for operations.

OUTCOME

The Betancourt government completed its constitutional term of office, and the insurgency, while never completely destroyed, diminished in significance to the point of being more of a nuisance than a threat.

¹The revolt was initiated because the brother of the commanding officer was arrested on charges of subversive conspiracy.

CHAPTER VII

URUGUAY (1968-1972)

Uruguay is precisely the kind of country Latin American urban insurgent theoreticians had in mind when they argued that insurgency can be city-based. Fully 84% of Uruguay's population is urban, and the capital city of Montevideo houses half of the country's total population.

Uruguay, traditionally one of the stablest nations in Latin America, had been a model of constitutional rule. It had a minimum wage, an 8-hour day, old age pension, and free university education. Divorce was permitted. Rigid control existed over important parts of the economy. Prosperity had come to Uruguay through the export of wool, meat, and leather. The world market for these commodities had begun to drop in 1953, however, and with it went the payroll and pensions of about one-third of the population. Borrowing heavily to cover the deficit, the country's foreign debt increased, resulting in inflation of over 135% in 1967.

During the 1950s, a well-organized propaganda campaign by certain sectors of the extreme left began taking root among the workers and students. This relentless campaign, besides influencing the students in Montevideo, reached the sugarcane workers of Bella Union, Department of Artigas, in the extreme northwest of the country. These workers were already agitated by a man who was later to be considered the founder of the Tupamaros movement, Raul Sendic Antonaccio.

Against this background of economic turmoil, the Tupamaros emerged as a force determined to capitalize on the situation and bring the government down. Officially called the Movement for National Liberation (MLN), the Tupamaros derived their more popular name from an Inca chief, Tupac Amaru, who was executed by the Spaniards in 1781. Their theorist allegedly was Abraham Guillen who provided an alternative to the Che Guevara-Regis Debray rural guerrilla thesis. Guillen emphasized armed insurrection of a favorable population rather than a favorable terrain.

In the 1962 elections, the left suffered a severe defeat, even after extensive propaganda. This defeat persuaded the Tupamaros and subversive elements to pursue their objectives through a clandestine armed struggle. A coordination committee was formed to plan and coordinate all forms of the armed struggle in the incipient subversive movement. This coordinating committee was the origin of the Tupamaro movement. In the period before 1968, the insurgents were primarily concerned with building up the resources for a major offensive. In the early years, they remained largely anonymous, working at establishing a favorable public image.

INSURGENCY

Organization

The Tupamaros were a mixture of people with different, and at times conflicting, ideological inclinations. They included socialists, anarchists, Marxists, and some who might best be described as "left wing nationalists."

The leadership of the Tupamaros was controlled by an executive committee of seven or eight and supported by a secretariat. The executive committee was nominally subject to a national convention comprised of representatives from all insurgent units. The national convention, however, does not seem to have met after 1970. Raul Sendic was the dominant factor in the executive committee.

The Tupamaros were organized into small cells of between two and six members. Cells were then linked together to form the columns that operated in particular geographic areas. "Columns" were subordinate to the committee. Combat columns in Montevideo bore the numbers 7, 10, and 15. Column 7 formed a ring around the city through its suburbs. Column 10 operated in the downtown area. Column 15 operated in the remainder of the city. Columns consisted of between 50 and 300 members. Some Montevideo columns had a specialized function, such as the medical treatment of wounded insurgents. Column 45 handled logistics and column 70 was in charge of recruitment, training, intelligence, and political affairs. Only a minority of the cells was engaged in combat. Combat cells had to remain in hiding while the rest were concerned with providing them logistic support. Cells and columns had an infrastructure of sympathizers who did not live underground but aided the Tupamaros in various ways. These supporters led normal lives; they conducted their daily business and went to their jobs without attracting any attention.

Cell members did not know each other's identity and used nicknames and false identity papers. Links between various cells were minimized by the principle of compartmentalization. The group leader of each cell was the only contact between cells and there was no hierarchical structure within columns.

Compartmentalization led to a number of problems in coordinating large scale operations. Even in their day-to-day operations, the Tupamaros often appeared to lack a unified command. For example, the capture of Raul Sendic and a group of leading Tupamaros in August 1970 did not seem to impair the planning and execution of later operations.

Resources

The Tupamaros received no external support or aid. While they were interested in developing contacts with revolutionary movements and governments abroad, they did not begin to do so until 1972. Thus, they were politically, ideologically, and militarily independent of foreign governments. The only external military link is the reported dispatch of some Tupamaros sent for training in Havana after 1968. Tupamaros exported Viet Cong-type booby traps to Argentina and Brazil, however.

Tupamaro strength grew from an original nucleus of fewer than 50 activists in 1965 to about 3,000 in 1972.

The Tupamaros were of predominantly middle class origin, including civil servants, students, and members of the professional classes, and a number of "career revolutionaries." Despite their leftist orientation, they attracted few members from the working classes. Captured Tupamaros included civil engineers, a professor of fine arts, a contractor, a photographer, bank employees, technicians, army defectors, and a priest.¹ The average age of the Tupamaros was 27, and one-fourth were women. Occupationally, the composition contained three groups of almost equal size: students (29.5%), professional and technical persons (32.4%), and workers (32.4%).

The Tupamaros had a number of well-placed sympathizers in the police, the military, the civil service, and the banks, all of whom provided them with vital information about the authorities. A network of support groups (Comites de Apoyo a las Tupamaros) was organized in the trade unions and among high school and college students. The Tupamaros themselves recognized that their most active support was derived from students.

Strategy

The Tupamaros never had an elaborate philosophical base, believing that the formula for revolution had already been well established in Latin America. They had little use for organized political institutions, elections, or laws. They reiterated their belief in armed revolution as the only solution for the problems of Uruguay.

The final objective of the Tupamaros' struggle was to set up a socialist order under which basic industries would be owned and controlled by the people. Their strategy was intentionally left vague to permit flexibility as conditions changed. Originally, they believed that they would provoke foreign intervention (from Brazil and Argentina) and could then present themselves as the vanguard of nationalist resistance. They had hoped to enlist workers and supporters of the left especially from the trade unions. However, two clear-cut approaches emerge from their operational behavior:

1. to demoralize the police and the armed forces by subversive propaganda and a campaign of selective terrorism; and

2. to try to drive the government toward repressive measures in the hope that this would arouse liberal critics at home and abroad and weaken the government's position by dividing the cabinet and inciting trouble in congress, where the president's partisans were in a minority. They also made it their business to aggravate the economic crisis, reasoning that if circumstances deteriorated, people would blame the government, not the Tupamaros.

From 1965 to 1967, the Tupamaros concentrated on gaining publicity and funds and on infiltrating the university and some public service corporations. In 1968, the Tupamaros shifted direction to engage in more violent activity (kidnapping, bombing, armed robbery, and murder).

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Organization

Uruguay was divided into four military regions of which Montevideo constituted one. In Montevideo, the service chiefs jointly directed the campaign supported by the ministry of interior which controlled the police. The army assumed sole responsibility for the counterinsurgency in other regions of Uruguay.

To handle the insurgent problem, the government of Uruguay created a number of antisubversive organizations. These organizations include the Board of Commanders in Chief (JCJ), a Joint Staff (ESMACO), regional Coordinating Organizations for Antisubversive Operations (OCA), an Intelligence Coordination Group (RI), and a Joint Forces Press Bureau (OPFC).

The JCJ and ESMACO were created simultaneously in December 1971. The former had the mission of advising the executive about joint plans pertaining to antisubversive activities, and about problems of national security and national defense. The latter had the mission of conducting studies, advising, coordinating and planning for the JCJ. These organizations facilitated the high level, centralized overall antisubversive effort, ensuring consideration of every aspect of the national problem, not just the military or police impacts as was previously the case.

OCA was created in each of the four military regions of the country, but the most complete and powerful was the one in Region I (Montevideo-Canelones) in existence since June 1971. This OCA operated with an integrated staff of representatives from all services in the region and including members of the naval prefecture. The OCA planned, coordinated, and conducted all land anti-subversive operations executed with the region.

The RI never became formalized. In existence since 1969, the RI functioned on the basis of informal meetings of representatives of the military intelligence service acting directly under the minister of defense, the intelligence departments of the three armed services, and the Montevideo police department.

The OPFC was the main propaganda instrument employed by the armed forces and police against the Tupamaros. The OPFC broadcast to every part of the country government views on national issues as well as the latest news about anti-Tupamaro operations.

Resources

Uruguay does not have a long martial history and before the insurgency, possessed only very small security forces. The country did not have compulsory military service. The armed forces had no history of involvement in national political life, and political discussions were forbidden within the ranks. At the outset of the Tupamaro offensive in 1968, only about 12,000 men were in Uruguay's armed forces, and approximately 22,000 men were in the police force, 6,000 of whom were stationed in Montevideo. Very few army officers or policemen at that stage had any specialized training in counterinsurgency techniques.

COURSE OF INSURGENCY

Tupamaro operations began on a crusading note, but the organization was quite literally "underground." As they moved toward a greater use of violence, the Tupamaros used municipal sewer systems to move around. For that purpose, they stole maps of the system, booby-trapped sewer hatches (to deter security forces from searches and to provide early warning of the approach of such forces), and dug out numerous underground hideouts connected to the system. They bought or rented houses, established entrances to their underground LOCs, camouflaged these entrances, and resold or leased the residences to unsuspecting "hosts."

The "underground" nature of the movement was not limited to LOCs, however. They constructed an elaborate system of hideouts and established sophisticated (at least one was concrete-lined) underground bunkers in nearby rural areas. Such bunkers might be divided into two or more sections (e.g., a living quarters and a supply cache), have electricity, air pipes, and expertly concealed entrances, and enjoy proximity to other hidden bunkers for reinforcement or other functions. Some hideouts had complete field hospitals, with fully equipped operating rooms, including all equipment for minor and even major surgery. The Tupamaros underwent basic medical courses in first aid that included bullet extraction, setting of broken bones, and treatment of burns. Some hideouts had photographic laboratories for document forgery.

The "crusading" of the Tupamaros involved exposing corruption in government which alienated the public and built its support for their movement. In addition to the theft of public data, they stole arms and explosives, birth and wedding certificates, and of course, money. They also committed many acts of vandalism (such as in the homes of hostile journalists), and engaged in a wide range of propaganda activities. They even kidnapped public figures.

Armed action was initiated in July 1963 with a raid on a Swiss Rifle Club and a theater that borrowed some rifles from the military for a play. On Christmas eve 1963, a "hunger commando" hijacked a delivery van and handed out presents and packages of food to the poor people of the Aparicio Saravia slums. Raul Sendic, the instigator of the initial raid on the Swiss Rifle Club, then fled the country. The remainder of the movement, boosted by some refugee terrorists from Argentina, spent 1964 mainly in training and creating an organization of five- to seven-man cells. In that period, they studied other insurgent groups: the French resistance during World War II, the Irgun, and the Algerian revolution. Operations began with bank robberies. At this stage, the government did not take the organization or its plans seriously, nor did it consider the movement capable of further development.

From 1965 to 1967, the Tupamaros concentrated on gaining publicity and funds and on infiltrating the university and public service corporations. Toward the end of 1967, after a wave of violence and the burning of several cars in Montevideo, the government was forced to take action. Violence flared due to agitation on the part of the various periodicals and political organizations supporting the subversives. As a result, the chief executive ordered two leftist newspapers closed and dissolved five leftist organizations, including the socialist party. Also, the government imposed strict censorship on news pertaining to Tupamaros operations. The Montevideo press was forbidden to refer

to the Tupamaros by name. Instead, they were referred to as "criminals" or simply "the nameless ones." After Jorge Areco Pacheco assumed the presidency in 1968, he shut down two radical newspapers and six extreme left wing political parties (but not the Uruguayan communist party which enjoyed exceptional freedom and was allowed to produce its own newspaper and to run a radio station). This was the first concrete action on the part of the government.

Meanwhile, high inflation had led to economic controls. Implementation of strict wage and price controls in 1968 stimulated violent strikes throughout the country. The government reacted with a show of force from the army and the use of emergency powers. From that point until the demise of the Tupamaros in 1972, acts of violence and urban insurgency punctuated the political life of Uruguay.

On August 8, 1968, after a series of armed robberies and acts of sabotage, the Tupamaros kidnapped Dr. Ulysses Pereira Reverbel, director of the state power company. This was the first kidnapping, and Reverbel was released 3 days later. This operation demonstrated the increasing strength and confidence of the Tupamaros, and the government mobilized 5,000 troops and police in an unsuccessful attempt to find Reverbel.

In early 1969, the Tupamaros broke into the Financiera Money bank, looted cash and securities from the vaults, and discovered confidential accounts that constituted evidence of the misuse of public funds and the secret formation of an illegal cartel. The Tupamaros exposed the contents of the stolen documents that revealed financial corruption and specifically linked 22 prominent Uruguayan citizens to these irregularities. Carlos Frick Davies, minister of agriculture, was compelled to resign in the ensuing scandal. In September, the Tupamaros abducted a leading banker, Gaetano Pellegrini Giampetro, holding him for 10 weeks. The Pellegrini kidnapping was timed to serve as a show of sympathy with bank employees who had gone on strike after 182 of them were fired. In addition to continuing robberies and kidnappings, the Tupamaros' most important operation took place on October 8, 1969, the assault against the city of Pando (population 10,000). They drove disguised as a funeral party (complete with hearse, mourners, and black cars) and proceeded to cut communications links and rob all the banks. The Tupamaros captured the police station, the fire station, the power plant, and the central telephone exchange. They also took 5 million pesos (approximately \$100,000) from three banks. Despite their precautions, the army arrived in armored cars and helicopters, chasing the Tupamaros' funeral party into the countryside. This event, although a tactical defeat with three Tupamaros dead and 25 captured (the remainder dispersed to their hideouts), was hailed by the group as a victory. The Pando incident galvanized the police and army into more energetic action; searches revealed arms caches, field hospitals, and bomb factories.

Until late 1969, the Tupamaros avoided bloodshed, and their only victims were shot when the police closed in and forced them to fight a street battle. The first man they "executed" was a police agent, Carlos Ruben Zambrano, who was murdered while sitting in a bus on November 15, 1969. This killing marked a change in tactics, and after that, the Tupamaros resorted to selective assassination.

In early 1970, the Tupamaros raided the home of a tobacco magnate, Luis Mailhos Queirolo. This robbery produced evidence that Mailhos had evaded taxes on a grand scale. He was later required to pay a fine of \$2,300,000. In the same period, 13 Tupamaros women escaped from jail while visiting the Sunday

service in church. This event was followed by the assassination of a police inspector. In April, a police inspector was shot in the street. Early in the morning of May 29, the naval training center was invaded, resulting in the capture of a substantial quantity of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. More murders of police agents dominated June. On June 17, the insurgents issued an extraordinary communique stating their readiness to observe a truce until early in July. During this period of calm, the government was supposed to reconsider its policy, and policemen and soldiers who had lost their appetite for battle were invited to resign and find new jobs. The impact of this bit of psychological warfare on morale can be gauged by the fact that police went on strike a few days later, demanding higher pay and the right to work in civilian clothes in order to make themselves less conspicuous targets.

In July 1970, the Tupamaros kidnapped a magistrate responsible for the trial of some insurgents. On July 31, they attempted four kidnappings in a single day, two of which failed. One victim was a member of the U.S. embassy who resisted his attackers when they entered his garage. The other, also a U.S. diplomat, managed, though bound hand and foot, to roll out of a pickup truck into which his abductors had shoved him. On that day, the Tupamaros also seized the Brazilian consul and a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) police advisor, Dan Mitrione, who was later killed. On August 1, they kidnapped Dr. Claude Fly, American agricultural expert. In December 1970, another bank robbery netted more than \$6 million, an apparently favorable sign for the insurgents. The year 1971 opened with the kidnapping on January 8, 1971, of the British ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, as a continuation of Plan SATAN which called for the kidnapping of well-known and important national and international personalities in order to demonstrate Tupamaro power and impunity, thereby embarrassing the government. Jackson was freed 8 months later. His release was a show of strength as much as it was a humane gesture. In March 1971, Uruguay's attorney general was kidnapped. He was released after he had been forced to admit (in tape recordings circulated to the press) that he had agreed to transfer political prisoners to military tribunals and that he had signed orders for further detention of prisoners after their original sentences expired. At the end of the month, Ulysses Reverbel was abducted a second time. Two months later, Carlos Frick Davies, former minister of agriculture, was kidnapped.

The kidnapping and murder of Dan Mitrione followed by Sir Geoffrey Jackson's kidnapping contributed to a sense of alienation from and loss of sympathy for the Tupamaros. That year (1970-1971) witnessed the beginning of the end for the Tupamaros. The murders helped to solidify public reaction to and change the public perception of the Tupamaros.

The Tupamaros' continued success during 1970 produced increasingly harsh repressive measures by presidential decree. As the Tupamaros had hoped, the Uruguayan congress immediately granted President Pacheco sweeping powers, including the power to suspend civil rights. In order that the insurgents might be defeated, the traditional liberal freedoms previously enjoyed in Uruguay were abandoned. Press censorship to deny publicity (the lifeblood of insurgents), detention without trial, and military involvement in civil government succeeded when a benevolent but irresolute administration had failed.

Shut out of the regular news media, the Tupamaros constructed their own "countermedia." To broadcast their own version of events, the insurgents used a mobile radio transmitter (confiscated in 1970) and enlisted the help of radio technicians to interrupt regular broadcasts.

In 1971, Operation HOT SUMMER was planned to eliminate the profits derived from the tourist industry. It achieved an important tactical success by restricting the inflow of tourists, mainly from Brazil and Argentina, but its success reduced the size of the summer labor force and produced a wave of public opinion against the Tupamaros from precisely that sector of the population whose support the insurgents sought. After this operation, many people withdrew their support from a movement that had left them without work.

On September 6, 1971, 38 more Tupamaros females escaped from a women's prison, and this escape was followed shortly thereafter by the escape of 106 men from Punta Carretas prison by a tunnel dug through a private house nearby. On September 9, the armed forces were assigned the mission of fighting subversion within the national territory. This decision caught the Tupamaros by surprise. The primary mission of the armed forces was to ensure that the elections would take place on November 28, 1971, as scheduled.

In late 1971, the armed forces made their move against the Tupamaros. The military and police patrolled the city streets. Intelligence focused on tracking the insurgents. The police found themselves doing military duties, trying to guard the city against internal attacks. The military, by contrast, were doing police work, trying to root out the subversive apparatus. The army watched suspects, letting one lead to another. Through this process, the military developed solid information about the Tupamaros, their operations, and their hideouts.

The armed forces' mission was accomplished, and the people voted against the left; they voted for the same party to continue in power. A vigorous 1971-72 election campaign showed that the democratic process had not lost its appeal. The results of the elections were disastrous for the Tupamaros and for the extreme left.

On April 12, 1972, 15 Tupamaros and 10 common criminals escaped from prison. Two days later, two police officers, an ex-subminister, and a navy officer were murdered. The following day, the military, acting upon information already available, began to roll up the Tupamaros. In two quick raids, eight Tupamaros were killed. On May 18, four soldiers on guard duty in front of the private home of the army commander in chief were murdered. This last act was considered the greatest provocation against the armed forces, and marked the loss of initiative by the Tupamaros. Abandoning large scale raids and kidnappings, they reverted to selective terrorism. In early 1972, newly elected President Juan Maria Bordaberry, with the mandate of the elections, declared a state of internal war and suspension of civil rights and gave greater freedom of action to the armed forces. These actions empowered the military and police to conduct searches and make arrests without warrants, conduct raids during the night (previously forbidden), hold suspects for indefinite periods, and give them to the military rather than the civilian courts when the authorities were ready to charge them formally. The results were dramatic. Through strong-arm techniques and the use of a well-trained army, President Bordaberry managed to crush the Tupamaros within 6 months. Hideouts were discovered. Numerous insurgent leaders were captured and much of the support organization destroyed. On June 27, in what amounted to a presidential coup d'etat, Bordaberry dissolved congress and announced that he would henceforth govern through a council of state. After the takeover, the armed forces imposed restrictions on the press, assumed the responsibility for managing public services, and closed all schools and colleges.

On September 1, Raul Sendic was wounded and captured a second time after a brief gun battle. By October, more than 2,400 suspects were in prison and more than 300 hideouts were discovered.

ROLE OF CITIES IN INSURGENCY

In the case of Uruguay, there is little opportunity for an insurgency to dominate public life unless it is urban, since well over three-quarters of the population lives in cities and half the population lives in the city of Montevideo. The Tupamaro insurgency was essentially focused on the urban area, and specifically the Montevideo area, and the countryside served only as an adjunct to the city for logistic convenience.

The goals of the Tupamaros, primarily psychological or psycho-political, were heavily oriented toward embarrassing the government in inherently urban ways. Kidnappings of prominent persons is an urban function, because prominent persons reside in the cities. The "Robin Hood" actions of the Tupamaros likewise were naturally city-oriented, since only the media of the city would promulgate the desired news efficiently. Exposing corruption could only be done in the cities, because the records are in the capital and, in any case, corruption on any grand scale must necessarily be of an urban nature in urban Uruguay.

The logistical infrastructure of the Tupamaros was unusually well tailored to the urban environment. Most insurgent groups modify typical rural insurgent behavior only minimally in cities, at least at first, while the Tupamaro use of the sewer system, and modifications of that system, show an interesting and uniquely urban touch. Infiltration into public sector activities also reflects, in the nature of the agencies and jobs chosen, a particularly urban concept of objectives and targeting.

OUTCOME

Although the Tupamaro insurgency established conditions that produced an erosion of Uruguayan democracy, government action and Tupamaro errors produced a clear-cut military and political win for the government. The Tupamaro insurgency was eliminated.

¹Father Indalecio Oliveira was killed in a skirmish with police. Priests had given some support to the Tupamaros.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter addresses general political and strategic considerations surrounding urban insurgency. Some of these factors are "environmental," that is, they are "givens" of the situation. For example, the status of Palestine as a mandate, of Cyprus as a colony, and of Algeria as French territory was inherent in the definition of the situation. Alteration of these terms of reference was already tantamount to defeat in two cases. In the third (Cyprus), it can be argued that the British ability to translate status issues to needs issues was one critical element in preventing an insurgent political victory.

This chapter and the two chapters following are structured in the same way. In each chapter, salient aspects of the individual cases relevant to the subject of the chapter are discussed under the heading, "case idiosyncrasies." A second section summarizes some important findings on the subject. Finally, conclusions are noted.

CASE IDIOSYNCRASIES

Palestine

Among the cases considered here, Palestine is unique in that an ethnic minority prevailed against a colonial regime even though the minority was opposed by the ethnic majority. The problems in Palestine resurfaced and reached a climax immediately after World War II at a time when the British government and public were least likely to be willing to invest more lives in a territory whose problems already appeared unmanageable and growing.

The Palestine Jewish community was extraordinarily unified with respect to all non-Jews, even if its internal differences were profound. Revelations of the magnitude of the Holocaust in Europe, and the tightness of the network of Zionist intelligence operations that grew up in its aftermath, reinforced this unity and provided both the spirit of sacrifice and the organizational framework to conduct the insurgency. The campaign against the British was dominated by a largely "passive resistance" mentality, but the campaign was punctuated and driven by a small minority within the insurgent camp that was far from nonviolent.

Algeria

The conflict in Algeria was a classical nationalist struggle, complicated by the presence of a very large and politically powerful French settler community. The ethnic and religious differentiation between European and Muslim in Algeria is often left unmentioned but cannot be overstressed in importance. It is unlikely that France, with more or less enlightened policies, and even with a

stronger political system earlier in the insurgency, could ultimately have avoided reaching the conclusion that suppression of Algerian nationalism was too costly a venture in terms of more salient French interests and values.

The conflict in Algiers, which is often seen exclusively in the context of its terrorist aspect alone, was multifaceted. Both insurgent and counterinsurgent were profoundly aware of the psychological dynamics of the contest and of its individual encounters. Most of the confrontational initiatives by the FLN were engaged precisely for this reason; the French elaborated perhaps the most sophisticated system for winning back the populace ever developed.

The fact that the Casbah was physically separated from European Algiers, and that most Algerian Muslims were physically distinguishable from Europeans, were capital advantages for the counterinsurgent. Moreover, the ability to isolate the city, as well as the Casbah itself, from the rest of the country proved invaluable.

Cyprus

The fact that Cyprus is an island has been presumed to be extremely important in facilitating the British task of isolating the insurgent. While previous studies have demonstrated the critical importance of isolating the guerrilla, and while it is not possible to estimate the psychological impact on prospective guerrillas of their isolation from external logistic support, the effectiveness of the British quarantine may have been less decisive in this case. While EOKA experienced shortages of arms supplies, the organization always had far more of its most widely deployed arm (shotguns for hunting) than it had men under arms.

At the time of the outbreak of the insurgency on Cyprus, the British government believed Cyprus was an irreplaceable strategic asset. NATO considerations (the importance of both Greece and Turkey) also worked against granting self-determination (which could only mean enosis). Faced with the consensus among 80% of the Cypriot population, the British felt the preferred method of handling the insurgency would be to negotiate a solution with Greece and Turkey. Until Britain had reestablished security internally and the Cypriot Turks had organized in support of their own interests, this was not possible.

Cypriot insurgents understood that their battle had to be won in the United Kingdom, not in Cyprus; the British government had to be forced by the public to withdraw in favor of "self-determination." Grivas believed that in the aftermath of World War II, the British public did not want to see any long, extensive commitment of British soldiers that was likely to prove costly in lives or treasure. Consequently, the focus of EOKA efforts was on persuading the British public that Cyprus was precisely such a situation and one in which eventual self-determination was inevitable, and continued deployment was merely a waste of the lives of British soldiers.

The unity of the vast bulk of the Cypriot population behind the goals of the insurgents gave EOKA freedom to maneuver and intelligence about British plans and operations. This public support of insurgent goals is undoubtedly the reason so

few active insurgents could continue and were willing to do so as long as they did. Conversely, EOKA's violence, which was at odds with the local culture, probably prevented the growth in size of the movement. (Grivas' meticulous concern for security also made it more difficult for combat units to be recruited, deployed, and managed.)

Finally, the question of leadership of the insurgent movement is important in the Cypriot case. During combat periods, the military leadership often dominates the political leadership in many violent situations. In Cyprus, however, the Greek Cypriot community was consistently unified behind Makarios, and the dependence of Grivas on Makarios' support was never in doubt. Even after the exile of Makarios, the fact that his religious role as ethnarch conferred his political power, permitted his unquestioned leadership to continue and remain unchallenged. When the British reached agreement with Greece and Turkey, and when Makarios acceded to this agreement, the disappointed military leader realized that he could no longer oppose the accord even though *enosis* was therein precluded.

Venezuela

Venezuela is distinguished from the preceding cases by several factors that can be considered political. First, the insurgents did not benefit from a clear-cut sense of sociological "difference" making them one with the "water" (populace) in which the insurgent "fish" must swim. The ethnic distinction between the Jewish community of Palestine and the British, between the Greek Cypriots and the British, and between the Algerian Arabs and the French provided extremely important opportunities for psychological mobilization against a "foreign" enemy. In Venezuela, the government was Venezuelan.

For reasons related to the previous point, targeting was very difficult. The most important foreign targets with symbolic value were related either to the oil industry or to banking which in turn was closely tied to oil revenues. Yet, it was universally known that the petroleum sector provided the greatest benefits to all Venezuelans. Targeting petroleum installations or activities related to petroleum would be a dangerous psycho-political gamble.

The success of the revolution in Cuba, which had toppled Fulgencio Batista in 1959 and had announced itself communist thereafter, was also a factor of some importance in that it influenced the gravity with which the United States looked upon other regional insurgent movements. Nevertheless, the events in Venezuela proceeded largely autonomously, and the failure of the insurgents and success of the national government must be considered mainly on the basis of developments within Venezuela.

Uruguay

The Uruguayan experience was perhaps the purest "internal" insurgency. Unlike Palestine, the insurgents were not from abroad. Unlike Greece, they did not look abroad. Unlike Venezuela, there was little reference to other experiences or ideologies and no external support of any magnitude.¹

The "Robin Hood" image of the Tupamaros, so carefully nurtured in the initial stages of the movement, deteriorated as the pressure to convert potential to real power impelled the organization to maintain a level of activity that required it to go beyond "Robin Hoodism." The government intelligence apparatus was able to destroy the image completely once it achieved sufficient success to capture quantities of documents. Image is important when an insurgency movement cannot compel loyalty, and the Tupamaros never had an adequate base to force such loyalty.

FINDINGS

While the overwhelming bulk of the voluminous literature about insurgency focuses on rural operations, very few if any insurgent campaigns have triumphed without an urban component. Insurgent campaigns that are exclusively urban have an even lower success rate than purely rural movements. The cases selected for study in this volume provide a number of insights concerning possible reasons for these empirical realities.²

Even in insurgency that is primarily centered on rural operations, success has always involved some urban activities. If for no other reason than to tie down security forces in the cities, or to acquire effective and efficient access to international media, cities are vital theaters for the insurgent campaign. For the counterinsurgent, whether the city is the primary focus of the insurgency, it is a focus that cannot be disregarded. The simple fact that cities are agglomerations of people and the continuing urbanization process in third world countries compels the government to ensure that it controls the city. Moreover, the same communications elements that attract the insurgent to city operations impel the counterinsurgent to meet this challenge.

The nature of insurgency in the cases we have studied may vary in several ways. Insurgent movements may be ideologically motivated; they may be nationalistic. Their goals will reflect these diverse orientations, and in some cases, their tactics must also be affected by them. (For example, Zionists could never aspire to a mass movement throughout Palestine.) At the same time, similarities that cut across these movements and situations appear at least as important for the counterinsurgent.

All insurgencies are inherently political. Through various means they seek to bring about a change in the political structure, institutions, or priorities of the political entity in which the insurgency takes place. Moreover, whatever their preferred strategy to achieve this end, it always involves the creation of an adversary relationship intended to mobilize some sector of the population, usually the majority, against the incumbent. Similarly, effective counterinsurgency must establish political objectives.

This report focuses on the military aspects of urban counterinsurgency because a military loss always produces a political loss. It does not, however, follow that a military win always produces a political win. The French won the Algiers battle, and they succeeded in establishing acceptable levels of security and control throughout Algeria, but the French left Algeria to the FLN. The

British defeated EOKA in Cyprus, but the political result must be considered a "draw." Even in Uruguay, where once again the insurgents lost militarily, one can raise questions about the eventual political cast of the outcome, since democratic institutions were seriously undermined in the country.

Thus, we focus on military and security-related aspects of urban counterinsurgency as a *sine qua non* of victory, but one must remember that they are a necessary but not a sufficient factor. One of the key challenges to the incumbent is to correctly, realistically, and candidly assess the insurgent situation. Each of these elements (accuracy, realism, honesty) may be quite independent of the others; all are vital.

Accuracy is required in analyzing insurgent capabilities, popular base, and so forth. This requirement is standard for any military operation. By realism in this case, we refer to an understanding of the nature of insurgency, an understanding that the problem is more than merely a physical security or criminal threat (whatever the requirements of psychological operations mandate calling the problem). Candor is required in developing a strategy and is especially troublesome in the counterinsurgent's self perception.

The nature of insurgency is political. The relationship and subordination of military to political requirements must remain uppermost in the minds of the counterinsurgent. Moreover, this requirement must be applied at the very beginning of the process of planning a military campaign. We have seen in several cases that security forces frequently perceive the situation too narrowly--as merely a question of the breakdown of security or of the reimposition of security conditions. This fallacy leads to an unduly restricted concept of the mission as one of destroying insurgent "military" (e.g., terrorist, sabotage, disruptive, ambush/raid, or combat) capabilities. Yet, these capabilities can wax and wane; to destroy them is merely to cut off a regenerating limb. The political substructure is the driving force, and strategy must be oriented toward combining narrowly military operations with, sometimes even subordinating them to, operations designed to remove the political roots of the insurgent organization.

Candor is often directly related to this understanding of the nature of insurgency. One reason the counterinsurgent is often unable to, or neglects to, target the insurgent political organization is that the incumbent leadership is unwilling to recognize and admit, for political reasons, the roots of the legitimacy of the insurgent and therefore the rootedness of the organization. Many of the problems of the British in Palestine, and even in Cyprus, concerned the unwillingness of the government to recognize the popular appeal of the insurgent movement. The kinds of questions such a recognition may raise are difficult to address, particularly in a colonial case. Yet, French operations in Algeria reflect a willingness to realistically assess these problems and provide tactically workable solutions.³

The "political" essence of urban insurgency means that the populace must remain central to the focus of all actions. This has been called the "battle for the hearts and minds" of the people. In Algeria, in Cyprus, in Palestine, the sociological or ethnic difference between the insurgents and the incumbents was a critical element in the insurgent campaign, and certainly made the incumbents' objectives more difficult to attain. By contrast, in Uruguay and Venezuela, the fact that one could not rely on the same kinds of distinctions made a "we-they" dichotomy more difficult to create and exploit.

Yet, we disagree with one of the truisms of counterinsurgency, namely, that popular attitudes are decisive. This is misleading and erroneous for several reasons.

a. Public perceptions and attitudes change over time.

b. At almost any time in most insurgencies, a small minority is strongly committed to the insurgent, a small minority is equally committed to the incumbent, and the majority bends with the security situation and other factors.⁴

c. Empirically, incumbents have effected military victories in situations in which the population did not support them.

Our argument here is that while public attitudes are important for the military situation, they are not decisive. Ultimately, of course, for the final political outcome, it is political attitudes that will be decisive. It is the purpose of military operations to affect these attitudes and either stabilize them if they are already favorable or move them toward a favorable position. The military operations can be successful even in circumstances of unfavorable popular political attitudes.

One of the central realities of the security situation is that public support is unlikely to be retained or recaptured by the government unless the government is in a position to ensure security. Even if they enjoy a great amount of public interest and support, most insurgent movements, especially in cities, employ some degree of coercion. Unless the government is able to protect people against insurgent coercion (psychological, economic, and especially physical), its ability to mobilize popular support will depend heavily on insurgent errors rather than its own successes.

Finally, the role of the security forces in insurgent and incumbent strategies may be dictated by objective circumstances at least as much as by other factors. When security forces are administered and staffed largely by an external power (as in Algeria, Cyprus, and Palestine), they are a target for penetration but not for subversion. When, by contrast, no government is seen by the public as "foreign" (as in Uruguay and Venezuela), insurgents will generally place a high priority on subverting the security forces, either attracting them to the insurgent cause or, at the least, dissuading them from pursuing a wholehearted and unified antiinsurgent effort. To some degree, the success or failure of insurgent appeals may be affected by the recruitment patterns for the security forces, whether they are drawn from rural or urban populations, for example.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In cases of domestic insurgency, incumbents must ensure that they do not overlook the city even if it does not give indications of security problems. If the insurgency is to succeed, the city will be involved. Consequently, incumbents should give priority attention to planning to detect insurgent activity in the city before a hostile movement is rooted there.

2. If insurgent activity is visible in an urban environment, its relative level of violence should not be misread. The urban component of an insurgency movement is vital, whatever its activity level. It must be effectively countered, even if the rural component fails, because well-rooted insurgent cells in a city can effectively reinfect other areas of the country.

3. Counterinsurgency strategy must recognize the political nature of the insurgent movement and must take care to focus on the removal of the movement's political roots. While police or army operations often represent one element of such actions, the content and direction of individual security actions must be determined by the political strategy that drives them.

4. Counterinsurgent policy must develop communications themes that will be sensitive to local, regional, national, and international considerations. The communications themes must be developed to provide a tactical resource at the local level, a magnet at the national level, and a buffer at the international level.

5. Counterinsurgent forces must eliminate the insurgent from the city. At least as important as the insurgent's fighting forces are financial, administrative, political, and communications cadres. Because these elements can work without visibility, the incumbent should not assume that destruction of the overt insurgent arms has eliminated the roots of the movement in the city. These roots must be removed.

6. Isolation of the insurgent forces is imperative for success. In the cities, isolation has several dimensions. Insurgents must be isolated from foreign support; urban insurgents must be isolated from the rest of the country; if possible, isolation of urban insurgents within a specific sector of the city is desirable; in any case, isolating insurgents from the non-insurgent population is imperative.

7. In order to effectively isolate the insurgent from the civilian population, pervasive protective measures must be implemented. Unless the population can be protected from coercion, it cannot be mobilized against the insurgents or for the counterinsurgent. These protective measures must be combined with control techniques to isolate the insurgents and their supporters and to exact a cost risk for insurgent support.

8. Urban insurgents seeking political change, and usually those involved in decolonization movements as well, almost always attempt to entice the incumbent into situations in which government responses can be portrayed as oppressive and can be used for PSYOP purposes to alienate the population, while at the same time using existing legal procedures to hamper effective government action against the movement. Government must plan a coherent communications response to this campaign that carefully balances and monitors shifting public attitudes toward the use of legal and physical measures to control violence with psychological efforts that target community values.

¹There was very little external involvement in Venezuela, but among a substantial element of the insurgents, there was a certain identity and belief in the Cuban revolution as a model. This was largely lacking in Uruguay.

²It has not been the purpose or the focus of this study to undertake an empirical

validation of these observations. However, D. M. Condit's data, cited on page 16, are compelling, reflecting as they do an extensive empirical analysis. Our observations are based on the definition cited and explained in Chapter I, pp. 15-16. These observations might not apply if a looser definition of urban insurgency, one that might, for example, permit the categorization of spontaneous urban demonstrations or a *coup d'etat* as "insurgency," were employed. See for example, Michael C. Conley and Joann L. Schrock, *Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1965).

³We distinguish the tactically workable from the strategically viable. As a result of the pursuit of tactically workable solutions, France succeeded in controlling Algeria. Colonialism in Algeria was doomed as a result of a shift in the nature of global political realities, meaning that the very issue of French presence in Algeria was foreordained, or, in other words, France's goals were not strategically viable. As a result of the use of tactically workable means, however, the French made the decision to withdraw based on an appropriately broad and balanced range of considerations.

⁴Instances of settler colonialism and the presence of minority groups often freeze specific groups into certain postures. The Arabs of Palestine were often anti-British, and even cooperated sometimes with the Jews, but never supported Zionist aims. Cypriot Turks and the European community of Algiers were never potential converts as groups to the respective insurgents' causes in Cyprus and Algeria.

CHAPTER IX

ORGANIZATION, LEGAL STATUS, AND PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with issues of security force and government organization; legal standards, practices, and status; and personnel.

CASE IDIOSYNCRASIES

Palestine

While the insurgency was fought between Palestinian Jews and British, the overlay of Jewish community concern with the fate of the Palestine Jews, and therefore with Arab-Jewish relations, was always a factor of paramount importance. Jews perceived the British to be sympathetic with the Arabs. (It goes without saying that the Arabs perceived the British to be sympathetic with the Jews.) The penetration of British security forces by the Jewish intelligence network in Palestine was a primary tactical factor complicating British operations.

Organization and Legal Status

Because of the British tendency to focus on specific and generic illegal actions rather than objectives in Palestine, the primary responsibility for handling the insurgency long remained with the police. The police initially conducted the cordon-and-search practices, set up roadblocks, and so forth. Only outside the territory of the mandate did the other security forces hold sway at the outset. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were responsible for coastal surveillance and for intercepting illegal ships carrying immigrants or contraband.

All British security forces in Palestine were directed by the high commissioner for Palestine. While local commanders often deferred to higher military authority in principle, the high commissioner delegated all command responsibility to senior military commanders who delegated it to local commanders. The highly political nature of the Palestine conflict was clearly understood by local commanders and was reinforced by the "limited" nature of the resistance of the Jewish community. Moreover, the security forces, many of whom had served elsewhere in British colonies, were frequently confounded by the unique sociological composition of the anticolonialist Zionists. In contrast with other liberation movements, the Palestine Jewish community was highly sophisticated, well educated, and tightly disciplined.

The highly organized and effective total community resistance of the Palestine Jews to police operations prevented the police forces from conducting their mission unaided. Consequently, more and more reliance was gradually placed on the military forces for executing, and for supporting the police in its attempts to execute, security operations.

The imposition of a variety of security regulations by the British definitely increased the psychological resentment of the Jews and assisted the insurgents.

Personnel

Members of the Palestine police generally came from a lower class social background. They were notoriously inefficient and ineffective. Following is an example given in an interview with a former member of the *Haganah*:

[The Haganah member] was once carrying some incriminating papers in a briefcase when he was stopped by a policeman. Many British policemen were recruited from the lowest educational class in Britain and could not read and write. [The Haganah member] had the feeling that [the policeman who had stopped him] was one of the illiterate ones. He then pulled an official-looking document out of his briefcase, pointed to it, and said, "This is a document from the High Commissioner that says that by law you are not permitted to search me." . . . [T]he policeman . . . apologized, and let him go (Rosenbaum, 1966).

Similarly, British troops were encamped in World War II camps quite isolated from the population. When assassinations and abductions became frequent, every effort was made to cut off the soldier from the people to protect the former. As a whole, the British mandatory administration never rooted itself in Palestine; it remained a foreign entity grafted onto the Palestinian reality. Morale and security were the constant problems of British personnel in Palestine. These problems are partly a function of more fundamental issues in the Palestine counterinsurgency.

The most effective counterinsurgents became favored Zionist targets, and these were therefore often transferred from Palestine abruptly to protect them. Among the military, many were sympathetic to the Jews (and many were sympathetic to the Arabs). Rotation of British soldiers friendly to the Jews was one technique of preventing abuses. Thus, both those who were most effective counterinsurgents and those who had the best contact with the insurgents (and might under different circumstances have served as intermediaries) were removed from the battleground entirely.

British morale was adversely affected by the nature of the insurgent organization, by the nature of the tactics chosen by the British, and by the lack of any coherent British strategy. The morale, cohesion, and determination of the Palestine Jews were clearly a factor in British troop perception. The widespread refusal of Jewish women to fraternize with British security forces was an example all the more powerful because of the sociological similarities of insurgent and counterinsurgent by contrast with most anticolonial movements. Penetration of

British forces by Zionist agents deflated morale. The reactive tactics preferred by the British in Palestine did not help morale, either. Moreover, when cordon-and-search tactics were used preventively, they were still largely passive, anticrime measures hardly satisfying to a military organization (though possibly more acceptable to the police). Finally, the evident inability of such techniques to address the basic issues in Palestine only reinforced the impression that British security forces were being asked to make sacrifices for a doomed cause.

Given the poor state of morale, it is hardly surprising that security was a constant problem in a variety of respects. Some soldiers stole and sold weapons from their supply dumps. Some senior British officers were paid to leave significant quantities of arms in evacuated camps. Bribes secured the release of incarcerated Jews. A number of Irish and Welsh commanders, particularly in the British army, helped the IZL. Prostitutes occasionally secured intelligence about British operations and facilities, although this technique does not appear to have been used often.

The security problem arose from the relative unity of the Jewish community and the effectiveness of the Zionist intelligence network which had completely penetrated British security forces. The cohesion of the Palestine Jewish community prevented all British efforts to enlist support and cooperation against the insurgents. The British tried, for example, to mobilize the majority of moderates against the extremist elements of the community, but after 1945 determined that it was impossible to recruit informants, much less more active collaborators. (Before late 1945, there was great ill will between *Haganah* and the Revisionist groups. For a period, the *Haganah* provided intelligence to the British about the IZL and LEHI, and even surrendered some of their members. Later, members of the two groups were interned by the *Haganah* but not given to the British. After the British announced their postwar immigration policy at the end of 1945, there was a sharp change in practice, *Yishuv* support for even extremist actions grew, and all three organizations cooperated.)

Shai intelligence operations against the British were extraordinarily successful. The main intelligence concerns were (a) securing materials for and (b) guarding secret arms factories; (c) guarding training areas for recruits; and (d) providing warning of impending searches. The last function was the measure of the effectiveness of *Shai* intelligence. *Shai* personnel monitored and decoded 74 British military radio stations. They also depended heavily on Jewish (and to a lesser extent non-Jewish) policemen and other government officials secretly affiliated with or supportive of the *Haganah*. *Haganah* officials were frequently aware of plans for cordon-and-search operations before the commanders of the units assigned to perform those operations learned of them. The extensive organization of the Jewish community facilitated intelligence collection, since Jews reported anything that might be important (such as a Jew seen talking with British soldiers). The *Haganah* used every source of information available and orchestrated these sources with remarkable sophistication (British soldiers and officials, Arabs with close Jewish ties by family or who cooperated for financial gain). Arabs also collaborated with the Zionists against other Arabs, sometimes for money, often as a result of family or tribal feuds. The British had a few *Haganah* spies, but their work was generally much less effective. The command finally prohibited the writing of orders, since written orders were invariably compromised. Cordons were ordered verbally.

Algeria

Organization and Legal Status

The Algiers *departement* of France was subject to the administrative authority of governor general through a prefect appointed by the French minister of interior. The initial reaction of France to the rebellion was to increase the prefect's powers by instituting special laws and regulations permitting him wider latitude in search, seizure, and arrest, and even granting the power to resettle populations when necessary. Even before the Battle of Algiers, the governor general used military personnel to fill many vacancies in civil administrative positions. Similarly, when France suddenly increased its educational efforts, building classrooms in rural areas, the teacher shortage led to staffing these classrooms with military personnel.

The entry of the 10th Parachute Division into Algiers in January 1957 essentially led to the take-over of security functions by the paratroops. Paratroop power was increased later and army power prolonged by the declaration of martial law in 1958. By the terms of the declaration, the French military commander in Algiers became the senior French representative in Algeria. Military power was subsequently reduced as the Fifth Republic began the process or reevaluating its links with Algeria. Nevertheless, even during martial law, organization of security responsibilities continued to be divided and reached a rather high level of definition.

The Zonal commanding general was subordinate to the Algiers Prefect but had immediate responsibility for the entire Algiers *departement* (including that area outside the capital). One of the general secretaries of the prefecture represented prefect authority in a mixed zonal general staff.

Below the zone level the Algiers sector was subject to the authority of a colonel who acted as chief of staff to the prefect. He commanded a mixed general staff including both military and civil officials:

Military	Civilians
CO, mobile gendarmerie group	Chief, Algiers police
CO, Algiers gendarmerie section	PJ representative
One protective operational det.(DOP)	RG representative
One military security radio	DST representative

Within the Algiers sector were seven subsectors, of which five incorporated Algiers proper. A colonel or lieutenant colonel was in charge of each subsector. He, too, had a mixed general staff including

Military	Civilians
regular military units	Algiers urban police
Harkas ¹	PJ radio units
territorial units	CRS
gendarmerie brigade	DST radio

Initially, the French, endeavoring to treat the outbreak of violence as merely expanded criminal activity, only slightly adjusted legal protections afforded citizens and administrative procedures. Insurgents were processed through the standard criminal justice system which was rapidly overloaded and always too slow.

The entry of the army into the picture altered the process substantially. The army established its own system of processing suspects. Internment camps and "clearing and transit centers" (CTTs) were constructed and employed, though they remained illegal for some time. Prisoners were screened in the CTT, then either released, held for trial, or sent to indoctrination camps. Theoretically, these camps were under civilian control, but they were completely run by the army psychological warfare branch.

Personnel

The French Army was a conscript institution throughout the period being studied. French draftees displayed attitudes that might be expected of other conscripts in similar circumstances. Their views reflected the diverse views of the French public, some supporting the effort, many opposing it. Certainly, the nature of the conflict was difficult for many to understand and accept.

The French officer corps was more attuned to and prepared for the Algerian insurgency than any of the other military officer establishments considered in this study. It had a long and painful experience in Indochina during which senior personnel serving in Algeria had themselves participated in the development of a complex and coherent counterinsurgency doctrine. They were determined to protect their institution's honor, deeply scarred by the Indochina experience and reinforced by the bitter action in Suez. Algeria was seen at least partially as a means to regain this lost honor. Many suggested that if France turned its back on the army in Algeria, the army would force France to support it, and a brief coup attempt was undertaken. (Actions in May in Algeria were probably as responsible as any other single element in returning power of General Charles de Gaulle and the end of the Fourth French Republic.)

Algerian police were unprepared to handle a deeply rooted Algerian insurgent infrastructure in the Casbah. Although competent civil servants, they could not have reestablished law and order under the grip of the FLN on the Muslim community of Algiers, assisted by the sympathies of a small but valuable segment of the European community.

Cyprus

As in the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine, the inherent ethnic conflict between Greek and Turk lay unspoken beneath the EOKA insurgency. Although EOKA appealed to Turkish Cypriots to oppose the British and to support an independent Cyprus in which Greek and Turkish Cypriot would live in peace together, Turkish Cypriots always perceived enosis as contrary to their interests.

Organization and Legal Status

Cyprus was and remained a British colony throughout the period of this study; the status changed at the conclusion, when the island was granted limited sovereignty² rather than self-determination. While the initial responsibility for handling the insurgency belonged to the police, the level of the problem and the manifest inability of police forces to handle a disturbance of this magnitude led to the declaration of a state of emergency after which the army shouldered the bulk of the responsibility, especially in the mountainous base areas. The army assumed charge of patrols and guard duty at key points (lines of communications and installations vital to the economy) and served as reinforcement or reserves for police posts, since the latter had become primary EOKA targets. The police remained a primary focus of British concern and preparation, however, especially in the cities.

Typical of British operations in insurgency environments (e.g., Malaya, Kenya), responsibility and operational control for both police and military affairs were vested in a single director (the governor) who integrated and coordinated the overall effort using both police and military resources. In Cyprus, district security committees in each area of the island consisted of administrative, police, and army representatives. In addition to the legal and tactical advantages of such an approach, it allows the face of law enforcement to remain a police matter, preserving the facade of constitutional continuity. Moreover, all security elements felt they were participating fully in preserving order.

The founding of a Joint Army Police Staff School in late 1955 (whose functions were assumed by the Internal Security Training Center in 1957) further reinforced the integrated nature of the security task by undertaking training on joint operations and cooperation in planning and implementing security programs.

The integrated command structure (see Chapter V) was especially effective in Cyprus because of the small area and population of the colony, which effectively placed the governor in direct contact with all senior police, civil, and army officials. One measure of the effectiveness of the structure established by Harding is that it remained without major changes for the duration of the insurgency.

A special court was created in early November 1955 to render decisions about political crimes and threats against the public order. The state of emergency declared at the end of that month, allowed substantial changes in legal protections, including granting the governor the right to declare emergency regulations. Most of these regulations were penal in nature, but others involved individual and group restrictions, while still others enlarged the powers of the government in various ways.

Changes of the penal procedures resulting from the emergency regulations resulted in the prescription of the death penalty for a variety of offenses. Initially, the crimes for which capital punishment was a recourse were few; but these increased over time including merely carrying a weapon. Another change that arose later was the imposition of a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes. The laws were not systematically enforced, however, and British judges continued to apply all procedural requirements for evidence and proof before sentencing or to execute such capital sentences as were imposed, with the result that only 38 persons were sentenced to death, and only 35 sentenced to

life imprisonment. Moreover, of the 38 recipients of a capital sentence, only 9 were actually executed. The vast majority of sentences under the regulations were for relatively minor crimes. Minors could receive caning.

New restrictions resulting from the emergency regulations included arrest and detention without warrant, liberalized search and interrogation procedures for security forces, additional flexibility to photograph and fingerprint, and so forth. Detention without trial was also employed, though on a basis more limited than that permitted under the emergency declaration. In addition, the government received greater power to limit movement of people by restricting them to their homes or interning them, as well as deporting foreign nationals. Group restrictions prohibited meetings and assemblies, as well as strikes except for labor reasons. New restrictions were placed on the press, and the government was given new authority to prevent (censor) publication of certain types of information and to discipline publishers with the closure of their places of business. All Greek organizations were banned. Curfews were imposed on movement, especially by young men. Even movement from home to place of work was closely regulated.

Government powers were increased in a number of areas, some of them appearing bizarre. The government was given the authority to prohibit certain types of banners (the Greek flag, for example) in some or all places. For the first time, identity cards were required of all Cypriots. Possession of EOKA pamphlets was an offense punishable by 3 years' incarceration.

Personnel

Because *enosis* was universally seen as a Greek Cypriot goal and just as universally as contrary to the interest of the Turkish Cypriots, and because Greeks and Turks lived all over the island, the British administration naturally looked to Turkish Cypriots to provide valuable intelligence. Moreover, Turkish Cypriots tended to form a disproportionately large element in the island police. (This tendency was accentuated by EOKA's strong-arm tactics against many Greek Cypriots in the police who did not cooperate with EOKA.)

On the Greek Cypriot side, EOKA was so effective in securing cooperation that British forces in 1958 dismissed all their Greek Cypriot employees following a number of attacks inside military installations. Constituting 80% of the population, some Greek Cypriots were clearly required to work with British forces in providing indirect support and the like. Throughout the insurgency, the British were never able to destroy EOKA's excellent intelligence apparatus for providing information about British activities. The effectiveness of this apparatus is partly reflective of the size of the EOKA organization, of its ethnic character, and of the intensely personal involvement of Grivas himself in recruitment and management. Organizations with ethnic or religious or similar bases of loyalty, where recruitment is effected among active persons whose levels of activity are testaments to the depth of their conviction and loyalty and where that recruitment is carefully scrutinized by a very small number, such organizations are difficult to penetrate and eliminate.

From the beginning of the insurgency, the British government understood that ultimately, security on Cyprus would be a police matter, even if it exceeded police capabilities at the time. Consequently, return of the police to police functions was considered a mark of progress. It was in this context that the

consistent emphasis on upgrading police capabilities must be taken. The addition of 300 police officers by Field Marshal Harding was not merely a step to increase the numbers of police available; it was a step to improve their capabilities by importing highly capable police personnel. Similarly, police officials, such as Commissioner Geoffrey White, were selected from the United Kingdom on the basis of outstanding previous performance so they could rebuild an effective police force on the island. In the meantime, army support was necessary, as described above.

Venezuela

In Venezuela, unlike the previous cases, no ethnic distinction between insurgent and government existed. The inability of the insurgents to create a "we-they" dichotomy appears to have been a major problem of the insurgency. The government's effectiveness in demonstrating dedication to democratic principles, partly through the manipulation of legal controls, was a major factor in preventing such a dichotomy.

Organization and Legal Status

The FALN insurgency exceeded the capacity of internal security forces to maintain law and order. These forces consisted of six distinct police organizations. Day-to-day law and order was the domain of the municipal police. The PTJ were responsible for investigating crime and preparing cases for the courts. DIGEPOL was a political internal security organization. The FAC, or national guard, was a paramilitary force. These diverse entities were supported by the Venezuelan armed forces, consisting of an army, navy, air force, and marines.

Except for the FAC, most of the police agencies were characterized by low pay, poor morale, corruption, selection of undereducated recruits, poor training, poor relations with the civilian population, and poorly developed institutional relationships. The police agencies were subordinate to the ministries of justice (PTJ), communications, interior (DIGEPOL), or to district governors in the case of the municipal police. The FAC and military police were under military command.

The states and federal territories had their own police forces in Venezuela. The federal district force in Caracas, the largest single civilian force in the country, had about 7,000 members. The effectiveness of these forces depended largely on the local or state government's will to resist the insurgents, a will that varied considerably from place to place. Governors were appointed by the president, but operated under separate and varying state constitutions. Thus, some governors had more freedom than others in method; a vigorous governor could maintain an effective and disciplined force. In the capital, matters were even more complicated. Throughout Betancourt's term of office, one of the main obstacles to developing effective crime prevention and counterinsurgency in Caracas was the domination of the municipal council of the federal district by a coalition of parties opposed to the national government. This coalition frequently refused to vote adequate funds for the district's police force, and deficiencies had to be compensated by the federal government.

In 1962, after several studies of the capital's police were conducted by Chilean, British, and American specialists, some improvements were implemented. New officers were appointed to the police academy and the personnel section of the municipal police. A total of \$4.75 million was spent on new equipment; SIFA was formed. A police coordination commission of responsible political officials of the national and municipal governments was formed. This commission was chaired by the federal minister of interior, who had important security responsibilities.

The Venezuelan government had the authority to impose emergency regulations in times of national crisis. These regulations limited movement and the right to assemble. Many governments faced with internal dissidence abuse such emergency regulations or use them in such a way that insurgents can exploit the appearances of "government oppression" for propaganda purposes. From the outset, the Betancourt government used its emergency powers very sparingly and dispensed with them as quickly as possible.

Personnel

FAC personnel were superior even to the army for the street fighting in Caracas, because they were generally of city origin rather than peasants and were better educated. FAC personnel were career oriented; they were not conscripts. Without the formal military atmosphere of the regular army, FAC personnel fit into the city better, and were in a good position to collect intelligence and administer community action projects.

Uruguay

As in Venezuela, no ethnic distinction existed between insurgents and other Uruguayans, including those in government. Unlike Venezuela's Betancourt government, the slow increase in activity level of the Tupamaros, their image as a "Robin Hood" organization, and the long tradition of democratic government inclined the government toward less action. Little organizational or legal initiative was taken before the Tupamaros' turn toward violent expression, even though their existence had been known for a long time.

Organization and Legal Status

The military and police intelligence services worked in close coordination after 1969, and troops gained valuable experience in the anti-subversive struggle through their cooperation in police operations after mid-1970. The armed forces role was limited for most of the period to cooperation with the police, however; not until 1972 did the armed forces assume responsibility for the overall antisubversive effort.

We have discussed the series of organizations that evolved to coordinate the operations against the Tupamaros (the JCJ, ESMACO, OCOAs, RI, and the OPFC) in Chapter VII. The network of cooperation institutionalized in these organizations and processes provided for extensive and effective coordination of activities against the Tupamaros, even if it did not overcome the inherent institutional weaknesses in the individual security forces.

Despite the reluctance of the government to take strong action against the Tupamaros, as early as 1967 a wave of violence compelled the government to impose its weight on the press and to act against several leftist organizations. Press restrictions (even the prohibition against publishing the Tupamaros' name) were of limited effect as long as the Tupamaros' public image was favorable. Moreover, judicial processes were perverted, partly as a result of Tupamaro intimidation of judges and potential witnesses.

By 1968, the government had closed four newspapers and dissolved or banned 11 organizations. Yet, the violence escalated. The president then declared "ready security measures" that allowed the government to apply specific measures exceptional to normal constitutional processes and safeguards. In such cases, the president still had to report each security measure to congress within 24 hours of its establishment, and congress had the power to review and decide its legality. The security measures imposed in Uruguay permitted the arrest of people or in-country transfer. (Persons to be transferred by the national government had the option of choosing to leave the country.)

President Pacheco requested greater powers from congress, but they were not provided. Following the attack on Pando in 1969, congress granted President Pacheco sweeping powers, including the power to suspend civil rights. Press censorship, detention without trial, and military involvement in civil government were instituted.

Following the 1971 election, President Bordaberry declared a state of internal war, in effect giving the military an important role in the anti-Tupamaro campaign. Actions included suspension of civil rights, censorship, closing of educational institutions, treatment of suspects by military courts, secret arrest and detention, night raids, and military administration of public services. The internal war status that permitted these activities was declared with strict time limits (30 days, though it was extended for another 45 days), and security forces actions were subject to subsequent congressional scrutiny.

Personnel

At the outset of the insurgency, few army officers or police had had any specialized training in counterinsurgency techniques. Government forces were inexperienced and thin on the ground, lacking an elite corps for counter-insurgency operations.

Security forces were not prepared to guard against the hostile intelligence penetration that is characteristic of insurgencies. The Tupamaros had penetrated society through an elaborate network of agents and sympathizers inside the administration, the police, and even the armed forces. (It was a Tupamaro agent in the naval training center who enabled the insurgents to enter the compound, raid, and occupy it.) The police were particularly ill trained, equipped, and organized for the duties of combatting urban insurgency. After 1968, a special police corps, the Metropolitan Guards, was established, and the Americans and Brazilians provided training and instruction.

The major advantage of the insurgents was their favorable image which tended to attract public support. While the Tupamaros had agents in the armed forces, the level of public support they attained was never possible in the armed forces, despite the democratic nature of the regime. The universal understanding

between officers and men was a vital element in armed forces cohesion. No noncommissioned officers were in the Uruguayan armed forces to act as a buffer between the two, and officers and soldiers were therefore quite close. Enlisted personnel were mostly of rural origin and remained immune to Tupamaro propaganda (appealing mainly to educated urbanites). The soldiers proved easy to train in urban operations but much more readily amenable to rural operations training.

FINDINGS

The jurisdictional problems that affect every administrative entity have traditionally served as a magnet to criminals, whether organized or individual. At both the national and local level, insurgency leaderships consistently attempt to exploit jurisdictional problems. They recognize the limitations of national jurisdiction and often organize materiel, personnel, or financial support from outside the national territory. They frequently locate base areas or LOCs in such a manner as to exploit internal jurisdictional cleavages. Inside cities, which usually have a greater number of responsible public force organizations, they often play on rivalries, exploit ambiguities in responsibility, raise issues of authority and legal competence (since their presence and activities raise precedents), and try to penetrate or otherwise neutralize these forces.

There is no correct or "right" organization for urban counterinsurgency. Alternate organizations have succeeded in winning . . . and losing. A number of factors determine appropriateness and effectiveness of organizational structures.

First, existing institutions and structures perceived to be legitimate are an important factor, especially since organizational considerations, like others, must reflect the political nature of the counterinsurgency effort and the long-term objective of securing public support. The ability of the Venezuelan government, notwithstanding numerous organizational hurdles, to communicate through action its adherence to democratic values and its determination to protect those values, was more effective in neutralizing insurgent appeals than would a more efficient organizational structure, one that might have alienated the public by persuading it of the soundness of insurgent accusations of government "oppression."

Second, the nature of the insurgency (its base, objectives, and composition) must be considered. Illegitimate institutions may not be worth retaining if they incapacitate the counterinsurgent campaign. If the committed insurgent base is a small one, as it usually is, and the bulk of the population is uncommitted, dramatic changes in organizational structure may violate efforts to maintain the legitimacy of the incumbent and to communicate the value of his objectives. Insurgent goals that are essentially alien to the values of the public (a situation that occurs more frequently than is commonly recognized) permit the government great flexibility and a substantial cushion for error.

Third, the level of effectiveness of existing structures is a factor. Institutions that have never been particularly effective in preserving public order but have simply not been challenged before, must be reassessed to determine the value of their preservation.

While no single organization monopolizes effectiveness, it is imperative that clear leadership exist within the government on the counterinsurgency campaign. Clearly, organizational requirements will be affected by local political values and traditions. At the same time, security policy decisions must be centralized.

The importance of integrating all components of the urban counterinsurgency struggle cannot be overemphasized. The operating powers may be dispersed, but the leadership must be able to access channels that affect the roots of the insurgent infrastructure. To accomplish this end, it is vital that the leadership direct a broad and diverse range of economic, political, and social, as well as security agencies. Effective counterinsurgency operations will always require some reorganization in Western systems, since such broad actions and powers are generally antithetical to the libertarian traditions of restrictions on executive power. This is particularly true in the most democratic systems.

Federations, because of their underlying political value systems as well as their complex jurisdictional provisions, constitute especially vulnerable political systems. The problems presented to the Betancourt government in terms of the federal district municipal board are characteristic of some of these vulnerabilities. The political philosophy of most federal forms recognizes power superior to that of the federal executive, usually institutionalized at regional levels. Efficient organization for national security against urban insurgent threats will often necessitate dealing with at least three hierarchies of political jurisdiction, then, as well as a multitude of security organizations and a value system that sharply limits the legitimacy of government security action against people.

The rights of people and the ability of the state to take security action that restricts or compromises those rights vary enormously from one country to the next. Among the cases considered in this study, British practices recognized very substantial limitations of government security actions, but once emergency regulations were passed, the protection of individual rights was ensured within the judicial system where it remained an active concern. By contrast, civil rights in Algeria were frequently, almost systematically at times, violated by national authority. Both Latin American cases demonstrate sharp fluctuations in civil rights but extraordinary leniency in penal practices. At various times, nearly all recognized leaders of the PCV and the Tupamaros were in prisons in their respective countries. Under the liberal prison systems, however, they continued to act as cohesive groups, making policy statements and writing position papers. In Venezuela, most leftist prisoners apprehended through police roundups were permitted to read almost anything, to discuss political and doctrinal issues, and even to write for publication. Similar liberties existed in Uruguayan jails. In neither case were executions of political prisoners practiced.

Emergency regulations have been used in most cases to overcome legal restrictions of government action against people. We have already noted that insurgents consistently use government security actions as a means of mobilizing the public against the government, frequently citing legal changes as evidence of antidemocratic values, intentions, or behavior. In all the cases studied here, insurgents endeavored to provoke government reactions that would alienate the public. Thus, there is a careful, sensitive balance to be struck between the need for efficiency and the need to retain or secure public support.

In all cases, public behaviors not part of a planned insurgency campaign occurred that were still supportive of or helpful to the insurgency. Government response to such situations must be very cautious, since insurgents are particularly eager to exploit such opportunities to secure greater identification with a larger public.

The personnel of security forces will become the targets of the insurgents. If the insurgents succeed in creating a sense of identity between themselves and the public, or believe they have succeeded, they will tend to attack security personnel physically, portraying them as oppressors. If they have not succeeded in creating a sense of identity, they will try to subvert the security forces.

Internal conflict situations typically involve the ability of insurgents to identify and secure the support of at least some members of the security forces. These personnel are most valuable for the intelligence they provide, but are sometimes used for sabotage, sedition, and arms acquisition.

Abuses of authority and excesses of violence on the part of security force personnel in isolated cases is a certainty. It is equally certain that the insurgent will learn of these excesses in the city, where communications are highly developed and little is private, and will try to exploit them for political purposes.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The incumbent government must establish external relations that will enable it to isolate urban insurgents from support outside the country. If the country's borders or expanses of water are secure, the armed forces or other border control institutions must ensure that financial and materiel support for the insurgency do not cross the frontiers. This responsibility may also have to be borne by intelligence and special operations elements if borders cannot be secured. In this case, overseas actions such as the French used in the Algerian case may be required.

2. Division of responsibility for active insurgency operations is dangerous. While it would be foolish to identify an "ideal" locus for responsibility, it must clearly be centralized to the extent that policy is issued from one central authority. British preference for police forces' responsibility has some merit but cannot be applied in all cases. By contrast, it is clear that a speedy return to police operational responsibility is desirable. Armed forces may take the central role, but this cannot and should not be a long-term mission for them. Their resources are usually vastly superior to those of the police in quantity, and for maintenance of security against pervasive and violent threats also in quality. As the threat recedes to a question of law enforcement, police presence and responsibility are psychologically and politically preferable, and police methods inherently more appropriate.

3. Emergency exceptions to legal protections have a number of characteristics. In addition to limiting the protections exploited by subversive organizations, they usually articulate continuing restrictions. These are important in providing means to rally public support behind the government. Such regulations should also ensure the centralization of executive authority for counterinsurgent policy, permitting a wider range of national executive action

than many systems allow under normal circumstances. It is useful to identify the most salient symbols and values of the political order and to find means of preserving those symbols and values, even indirectly, to mobilize public support. Legal ambiguity can provide new powers to government and yet preserve social goods.

4. Communications designed to protect the incumbent government image from predictable insurgent attack upon announcement of emergency regulations should be undertaken and begun before such regulations are imposed. Moreover, symbolic assurances of continued government attachment to traditional values and civil rights should be included, either by providing for review mechanisms, temporal limitations of regulations, or other techniques.

5. Early attention to the rationalization of jurisdiction and competence among security forces in the urban environment is essential. It is equally essential to avoid letting this decision be made on the basis of traditional politics. Resources, aptitudes, and public relations are all relevant considerations.

6. Abuses of authority and illegal use of violence by security forces must be minimized. Security forces provide proper channels for internal discipline, and these channels should be rigorously exercised. In some cases, governments in our studies publicized punitive action toward violators. In other cases, it is emphasized that the insurgents seek to exploit such action both to alienate the public from the security forces and to build dissension within those forces. The alternative is vigorous discipline within the system. Clearly, both approaches have merits, and the executive body coordinating the counterinsurgency effort should weigh the competing considerations closely in each case.

7. Particular care must be exercised as well with respect to public action that is not a part of the insurgency, even though it may help the insurgents or be easily seen by the incumbent as related to the insurgency. Legal demonstrations, protests, or strikes are examples of such behavior. In some cases (e.g., Venezuela), demonstrations were organized by insurgent forces to provoke violence and reap the political benefits of government overreaction. Governments in emergency situations must take care to monitor preparations for demonstrations, to rigidly enforce prohibitions against weapons at such demonstrations, and if necessary to ban all assemblies.

8. Government attention to redressing public grievances that are not subversive of public order is important. Such action can help divorce the insurgents from their potential public base. Efforts to resolve legitimate problems should receive high priority and preferably innovative attention. At the same time, minimum credit should be allowed to reflect to the insurgent movement for this government behavior. Algerian civic action was successful, but many Algerians attributed the new-found government interest in their plight to the government's fear of the FLN.

¹Harkas were Algerian Muslim auxiliaries assigned to regular French military units.

²The concept of limited sovereignty is somewhat controversial. In this case, Cypriot sovereignty was limited in terms both of the international rights and

duties of the state and in terms of its domestic public order. Internationally, Cypriot sovereignty was granted with the very visible proviso that the UK could continue to occupy and use certain military base areas (with conditions to safeguard Cypriot rights) but also with the more important proviso that the country could not abnegate its sovereignty without the consensus of both Greek and Turkish communities. Domestically, the island's independence was limited by international agreements guaranteeing certain domestic guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot minority.

CHAPTER X

TACTICAL AND SUPPORT ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers a variety of tactical and support issues for each of the five cases studied and discusses in the Findings and Conclusions sections several of the principal approaches used by counterinsurgents.

CASE IDIOSYNCRASIES

Palestine

Combat Functions

Infantry

As in most cases of urban insurgency, the role of combat forces is limited in cities. Thus, infantry is not used in classic infantry roles, but in ways that are contrary to doctrine. Yet, the size of infantry in most combat organizations dictates that infantry or paratroopers are deployed in cities. In Palestine, British paratroops were the most "hardened" troops used to suppress the insurgency. Jewish writings and statements consistently decry the paratroops' attitudes and determination by contrast with other British security forces.

Infantry (and paratroop) forces were used in most of the security operations conducted by the British, but most of the time and effort of these forces were invested in static defense of police facilities and other public buildings.

Special Operations

The attempt to separate the Zionist insurgents from the bulk of the population never succeeded. To achieve this objective would have required a completely different political approach on the part of the British government. As long as British immigration policy remained unchanged, the vast majority of the Jewish community would support the insurgents. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance the British placed upon isolating the insurgents, intelligence assumed a critical role in government operations. Special units were formed within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police. These units paid little heed to legal restrictions, however, and violated even the permissive wartime security regulation. They abducted people from the streets, used torture in interrogation, and generally became associated with widespread security

abuses. There also arose within this group a small number of counterterrorists, apparently unsanctioned by the British government, which drew its support from rightist elements of the colonial administration and populace.

Air

The Royal Air Force (RAF) was employed to prevent illegal immigration into Palestine and to block the importation of illegal arms. In some cases, RAF aircraft were also used to find insurgents after an attack. Photographic reconnaissance was a primary means used to plan cordon-and-search operations before the troops to be employed were intimately familiar with the areas to be cordoned.

Navy

The Royal Navy (RN) had an important mission in preventing illegal immigration and importation of arms. It is believed that the RN seized the majority of ships bound for Palestine with contraband and illegal immigrants.

Support Functions

Intelligence

British intelligence enjoyed little success in the face of a relatively cohesive Jewish populace, whose unity was significantly increased by the recent events in Europe. Attempts to recruit and use agents in the *Haganah* were generally unsuccessful; the case was quite the contrary. The challenge for British intelligence was a counterintelligence effort, for as noted above, Zionist penetration of the British military presence was extensive and the Zionist intelligence effort was both sophisticated and effective. Telephones were tapped, and agents were many. The result was a tendency within the British command to further and further reduce the number of people to whom planning for future operations was exposed.

Among the unusual intelligence techniques used by the British were metal-sniffing dogs used to search for arms caches.

Communications

The mandate government issued edicts about all sorts of things, but *Haganah* frequently put up posters informing people to what degree to follow these regulations. Even though the state radio was theoretically run by the British, *Haganah* ran it almost entirely. Messages and orders for *Haganah* were frequently sent secretly over the radio. By contrast, the IZL used couriers primarily and avoided printed orders as much as possible. The IZL as well as *Haganah* often knew government codes, tapped telephone and telegraph lines, and listened to military and political radio broadcasts.

Because of the lack of effective communications security, the British command increasingly acted without written orders or orders transmitted over standard communications channels. Instead, instructions were given verbally, directly from the senior commander to an immediate subordinate. Even on large scale cordon operations, no more than three persons might be informed before midnight for a cordon operation planned to begin by 3 a.m.

Psychological Operations

At times, *Haganah* planted rumors to mislead British forces about operations, personnel, or equipment. Posters and mail were the main propaganda vehicles used to convince the British to change their views and to reduce morale.

British sensitivity to psychological issues in the Palestine insurgency was not great. The main issue at the outset was the question of immigration, especially of displaced Jews. Extensive media coverage illustrated numerous incidents that arose as illegal immigrants were transferred to other ships for deportation or detention. When policy changed to provide for deportation back to the the country of origin, the insurgents were able to arouse substantial sympathy in both the United States and the United Kingdom for Jews, many of whom were being sent back to Germany. British immigration policy turned even the moderate Palestinian Jews who were most against terrorist attacks into stalwart supporters of militant action against Britain.

British psychological operations were not highly planned. In general, it was the British goal to cut off outside support for the insurgents. Therefore, the British government tried to exploit incidents that made the insurgents look bad. During the war, for example, the British government invited American journalists to a trial of two Jews accused of smuggling arms to Palestine and therefore of sabotaging the war effort. The LEHI assassination of Lord Moyne, the British minister of state and a close friend of Winston Churchill, was seized upon as a repulsive terrorist act. Similarly, after 1945, the British argument was that the open immigration policy requested by the Jewish Agency would destroy the economy and would produce Arab violence. Later, the British government suggested that the migration of Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) was a Zionist conspiracy to exploit and force DPs to Palestine against their will.

Tactics and Techniques

Certainly, the dominant British military activity in Palestine was the use of cordon-and-search techniques for illegal arms caches and for illegal immigrants or wanted persons. A typical cordon and search involved cordon troops, outer cordon troops, cage personnel, escort troops, road blocks, search parties, screening teams, and reserves. Characteristically, topographical intelligence for these operations was derived from aerial reconnaissance. (Ground-based reconnaissance after a while was always observed and contraband or wanted persons removed from the intended area of operations.) Bases were often sealed before an operation, and orders were provided verbally to no more than a few officers, because otherwise they always "leaked." Troops normally moved out in the early morning hours (e.g., 3 a.m.) to surround the area of operations before first light. Among the precautions used to cover the operation were deception techniques to disguise the intent of visible preparations. Civilians

on base were guarded until the operation was completed. Troops were assembled under cover of darkness. At times, cordoning forces even started in the opposite direction from where they later went. The actual move into the target built-up area was effected in usually about a half hour for a town of 20,000 residents, with troops approaching from more than one direction to prevent escape.

Once the cordon troops were in place and outer cordon troops were installed at key points outside the circle around the objective area, loudspeakers announced that the population was to remain inside its homes. Areas were constructed with wire in which to do the screening, in which to intern suspects, and to separate those who had already been screened from those being screened. Telephone lines to the outside were cut. Young residents, sometimes excepting pregnant women, of each housing unit were escorted to a screening area where their ID cards were checked against lists of residents of the settlement. Meanwhile, search parties carefully investigated each building. Search parties, in addition to a subaltern, non-commissioned officer, about 10 privates, and a member of the Palestine Police (as an interpreter), tried to assure that an elder of the village was present and that nothing was removed or damaged. Suspects were detained in a special area until their status was clarified. In the case of the typical cordon and search of a town of 20,000, the total elapsed time of the actual cordon might approximate 6 hours.

Cordon-and-search techniques were applied against settlements of all sizes from the smallest to the entire cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. At times, strong resistance was encountered. Police were sometimes refused entry to homes. Hand-to-hand fighting erupted in the streets, requiring additional troops. In this general confusion, suspects escaped. People from nearby settlements at times broke into cordoned areas.

The largest cordon-and-search operation took place following the attack on the King David Hotel. This operation involved the entire city of Jerusalem, followed by Tel Aviv and later part of Jaffa. Almost 800 persons were detained after interrogation, and five arms dumps were found, the largest in the basement of the Great Synagogue.

During the brief period in which the British government decided that even the *Haganah* was unacceptable, an attempt was made to destroy the organization. With artillery, armor, and RAF units standing by stop resistance, Jewish Agency headquarters were occupied. At this time, about 3,000 leaders of unions, political parties, and other groups were arrested and 27 settlements searched.

One of the advantages available to the British mandatory authority was special laws dating primarily from World War II. Under these regulations, the administration could detain or intern suspects without trial. Special military courts under these regulations could decree stiff penalties. Not widely used to its full extent, the law still created an uproar in Palestine and unfavorable publicity abroad. Also under the special regulations, fines could be imposed on towns and villages, an approach that proved to be quite counterproductive.

The major British operation to prevent illegal immigration involved both the RAF and the RN. These were essentially surveillance operations until and unless ships with illegal immigrants were actually found. As indicated previously, most of the immigrants were believed to be stopped during the period being studied.

Other tactics widely used by the British in Palestine involved (a) curfews, (b) restrictions of road traffic, (c) road blocks, (d) patrols, (e) surveillance, and (f) spot checks.

Curfews were used for several purposes. Curfews were usually imposed from dusk to dawn. Later, daylight curfews were also imposed. The manpower cost of enforcing daylight curfews was very high, especially in the larger cities, such as Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. Martial law was imposed in March 1947, and for a time, Tel Aviv was under a strict curfew for 4 days during which the entire population was screened. At times, the *Haganah* ordered people to violate curfews. Curfews were often imposed following riots (e.g., in Tel Aviv during October 1945). Another employment of curfews was as a punishment for terrorist activity or supposed support or tolerance of terrorist activity (e.g., in Tel Aviv during December 1945 and Rehoboth in June of 1946). Curfews were commonly used to support cordon-and-search tactics, but they were also used to prevent Arab-Jewish clashes and to prevent demonstrations (e.g., in July 1947 in Haifa, when a ship, the *President Warfield*, carrying illegal immigrants, was intercepted and it was discovered that the immigrants were to be returned to Germany). Curfews had some effect, but particularly total curfews.

Road traffic restrictions and road blocks were commonly employed as in any instability. Roadblocks and checkpoints were easily avoided by the Zionist insurgents, since they were very familiar with the terrain. Only when the soldiers literally saturated an area did these techniques present a problem to the insurgents. (In some cases, British soldiers were deployed every 10 m along a street.) For the same reason, patrols were easy to avoid. Patrols were designed to enforce curfews, to hinder illegal guerrilla training, to curtail movement of illegal persons and supplies, and to protect key sites thought to be actual or possible targets (e.g., during the 1946 Zionist campaign against the railroads, police stations, and air fields). Some patrols followed fixed patterns, which made them easier to avoid; others did not have fixed patterns. Whether with aggressive patrols or other tactics, most Zionist insurgents evaded capture, sometimes by using disguises, frequently with falsified papers, often by staying hidden for months at a time.

Surveillance operations were also valuable in collecting intelligence at times. A team of 12 army personnel was organized exclusively for surveillance operations in Jerusalem in 1947. Suspects were continuously watched to develop a more complete map of linkages and the patterns of underground organization. This activity yielded more information than a much larger cordon-and-search operation could have.

Generally, people were not allowed to carry weapons, and all weapons, vehicles, and radios were registered. Some people could legally carry weapons. Chemical sales were controlled to prevent the manufacture of homemade explosives, but the *Haganah* used chemicals from the Dead Sea and from commercial fertilizer to make explosives.

Everyone was required to possess an identification (ID) card at all times. Nonpossession of this card was considered *prima facie* evidence that the suspect was an illegal immigrant or had engaged in illegal activities. ID cards were routinely forged, however, and false IDs were common.

The number and variety of attacks against installations and personnel representing the British government made Palestine into an armed camp. All trains, for example, had armed guards since the railroad system was the favorite target of the the insurgents for a while (particularly the IZL). Cities were constantly patrolled, and all government buildings were protected by extensive barbed wire and sentry blocks. The ratio of British security forces to the total population reached the level of 1:5. Newspapers were censored, travel restricted, the mail and cable traffic monitored. Eventually, British forces withdrew into barbed wire and sandbagged compounds, completely isolated from the population. UK security forces to total population ratio was 1:5.

Algeria

Combat Functions

Of the insurgencies considered in this study, certainly the Algerian revolution was the largest and most ambitious insurgent effort from the military standpoint. The bulk of insurgent conventional military operations, and even the vast majority of unconventional military operations, took place outside the urban environment. This section will consider only the activities in the cities, and particularly Algiers.

Infantry

The main forces used by the army in Algiers for the crisis periods were paratroops. Their operations are covered functionally in other sections of this report. Other ground forces served a vital role in criminal justice, civil administration, intelligence, communications, transportation, police functions, and so forth, all of which are addressed elsewhere. In no case did infantry or paratroop units conduct any classic "infantry" campaigns in the city, although the isolation of specific locations to seize suspects was conducted with unusual and very effective classic military planning and with the deployment of resources possible only among military establishments. (These operations are described elsewhere.)

Special Operations

French intelligence and security activities merged heavily into the special operations area. These activities, along with civic action and psychological operations, reflect more clearly than any others the legacy of the French Indochina campaign and the sophistication and self-deception that that campaign spawned among military planners and operators.

The clandestine French intelligence organization, the Documentation and Counterespionage Service (SDECE), ran with the paratroops a special operations group called the "11th Shock," which specialized in intelligence-connected clandestine military operations. It was the 11th shock that quietly and without visible authorization seized all police dossiers on the eve of the paratroop assumption of responsibility in the Casbah. The 11th Shock created the Intelligence and Exploitation Group (GRE), which established the bleus, an elaborate and effective network of defectors or turncoats. The bleus

were directly responsible for neutralizing the final ZAA leadership, and became the agent ZAA leadership thereafter, enabling the French to penetrate the senior levels of other FLN regions. The French even assisted their *bleus* in exploding their own bombs in Algiers to establish the *bleus*' credibility. The successes of the *bleus* achieved such heights that FLN members and supporters no longer knew whom to trust. Villagers in some cases began refusing to provide food. "Are these really nationalists or French agents as a result of which I shall be punished?"

The SDECE and 11th Shock operations did not stop at Algiers' edges or even Algeria's or France's borders. Rather, to disrupt external supplies to the FLN, the French operated actively internationally. They threatened the lives of arms dealers and fabricators. (They did not stop with threats, either, assassinating a number of such FLN suppliers with bombs or sniping or other methods.¹ Most of these executions were committed by professional assassins working on a contract basis.) They caused the "misdirection" of arms shipments, or replaced arms consignments with other products, on the high seas. They created fronts that supplied arms and explosives, but the arms were faulty, the grenades had instantaneous fuses, and so forth.

To create dissension within FLN ranks, the 11th Shock also found certain leaders whose security concerns bordered on paranoia. It was among these leaders that false information "incriminating" other FLN members was planted, leading to full scale purges. The purges often confirmed (through torture-induced confessions) the faulty information, reinforcing paranoia. The effort, originally based in Algiers and from the use of the *bleus*, once again effectively paralyzed several major regions of the FLN for some time.

Air

No conventional air operations were used during the urban insurgency in Algiers, since no direct confrontations between FLN and French forces took place. However, helicopters were used to move quickly within parts of the city, and the paratroops used helicopters even in the Casbah to quickly arrive and seal off specified locations.

In addition, the French Air Force was employed, along with the navy, in patrolling the Algerian coast and borders to prevent arms and explosives smuggling into Algeria, including Algiers.

Navy

The only navy role in the Algiers battle was naval antismuggling patrols that contributed, along with the border control measures of the other services, to cutting off the supply of explosives available to the ZAA. The establishment of bomb factories inside the Casbah reduced the value of this contribution, however.

Support Functions

Intelligence

One of the greatest single efforts of the French in Algiers was that devoted to intelligence activities, including collection (including interrogation of prisoners and the use of informers) analysis, and timely dissemination and use of intelligence, as well as counterintelligence. In this section, we discuss the overall intelligence distribution of responsibilities and actions first; then we address the activities of the paratroops.

The security organization of France in Algeria is described in Chapter IV. A number of the many security organizations involved in the maintenance of law and order had collateral intelligence functions, either open or clandestine. General intelligence (RG), which retained the primary intelligence responsibility, reported to the governor general and maintained up-to-date files on a wide range of developments affecting the territory. Within each *departement* and within each city as well, a police commissioner was responsible for its duties. RG maintained continuous surveillance of political activities, economic developments, foreign institutions, the movement of people into and out of the territory (RG-manned border posts), as well as social changes and communications. DST, reporting nominally to the governor general but responsive to its own headquarters and those of the DGSN in Paris, was charged with counterespionage duties. In reality, DST also became involved in direct action. DST was behind one of the least successful counter-gang efforts during the revolution.

The chief of staff of the 10th Parachute Division, Colonel Yves Godard, was himself a veteran of intelligence and security activities. He had been the first commander of the 11th Shock just after its formation by the SDECE and the division. His background was reinforced by the presence within the "paras" of an extraordinarily talented, sensitive, and innovative, but extremist, group of field grade officers with Indochina experience, including Colonels Roger Trinquier, Marcel Bigeard (commander of the 3rd RPC in charge of the Casbah), and Francois Coulet (commander of the only French Air Force paratroop commando unit [140 men] sent to Algeria).

Roger Trinquier contributed heavily to the development of the French theory of counterinsurgency warfare. His book, *La Guerre moderne* ("Modern Warfare"), was quickly translated to English and remains a standard of the genre. Trinquier was placed in charge of the Urban Protection Units (DPUs) that were responsible for the *ilot* system. Under this system, the entire city was divided into sectors; each sector into subsectors; each of these into blocks, and the blocks into specific buildings. In each building, a *responsable* was to be able to find and identify each building resident within minutes. He was then to provide information to the block representatives who were usually Arab veterans of the French Army. The block *responsable* was expected to report any suspicious developments in his area of responsibility.

Enormous numbers of suspects passed through this system, one of the most efficient processing systems ever created in a functioning democracy². These subjects were transferred to the Operational Detachment for Protection (DOP), an interrogation branch. The use of torture became institutionalized in the DOPs of the paratroop battalions, and has been widely discussed. While it is

not apparent that torture was a useful technique of intelligence collection in Algeria overall, it is quite clear that it contributed significantly to the speed and thoroughness of the paratroop "pacification" of the city of Algiers.

The bleus were a source of important intelligence, as well, often of a very timely nature.

Communications

The French had the most advanced tactical communications equipment available for their use. They also employed communications intelligence equipment, tapping telephone conversations and intercepting radio messages. Communications intelligence of this type was of relatively limited use, however, since the guerrillas depended primarily on couriers and mail drops for sensitive communications.

Food

While French security forces exerted serious efforts to control food as one of many means to isolate the FLN, these efforts were centered outside the cities. There was little opportunity inside the cities to exercise such tight control.

Psychological Operations

PSYOP, along with intelligence, civic action, and the determined application of force, was one of the key elements of the French counterinsurgency effort in Algeria. Although PSYOP was not as important in Algiers as it was in the country as a whole, it is important to understand the role and thrust of the French PSYOP effort as a whole to appreciate the context of French perception of counterinsurgency, whether rural or urban. The French doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare placed heavy emphasis on reeducating the guerrillas, on psychological action directed against the populace, and on the creation of an entirely different set of views and values everywhere.

The essence of French counterinsurgency concepts was a recognition of the interdependence and interaction of the military, political, and psychological domains. The psychological aims were seen as steeling the will of friendly personnel (including security forces, Arab Algerians, and France itself), which was termed "psychological action," and destroying the political and military structures of the FLN and reeducating captured FLN members, called "psychological warfare."

Psychological warfare was relatively new to the French armed forces. The experience in Indochina had given some impetus to the field, but it was not fully developed when the Algerian problem exploded. Only in April 1956 was the psychological operations service officially established, and it was not integrated into the command structure as the G-5 until November 1957 (after the victory in Algiers). A PSYOP training center was established in Arzew, and all officers serving in Algeria were sent to it at one time or another. From the outset, however, psychological warfare was central to French actions.

Loudspeaker and pamphlet companies produced enormous quantities of oral and printed materials: training films and current events programs for French forces, leaflets, films, and broadcasts for the Arabs. A great proportion of the latter audience's materials were tactical PSYOP in nature, that is, employed in close support of military or police security operations. For example, 2 million leaflets were distributed in Algiers in the month of March 1957, during the Battle of Algiers.

In addition to the loudspeaker and pamphlet companies, individual officers were deployed to field units to ensure that PSYOP considerations were taken into account in planning operations and to provide rudimentary instruction in PSYOP to other personnel.

Reeducation or indoctrination was a major effort of PSYOP, and was applied to suspected FLN members or supporters. (Those definitely FLN were killed or tried and treated in accordance with criminal justice systems.) The internment camps for reeducation, nominally subordinate to civilian prefects, were controlled by military officers chosen by the PSYOP staff. The camps were intended to be brainwashing centers, that is, posts where intensive psychological pressure was mixed with guidance and careful monitoring. The problem of the French in this context was that the entire effort was so manpower-intensive that inadequate numbers of personnel were available for the kind of intense monitoring required. Moreover, brutality and excesses were common, even though the PSYOP leadership consistently cautioned that they must be avoided.

The power of the G-5 personnel grew to encompass an unforeseen area. G-5 officers helped organize and orchestrate colon actions against French policy. Thus, following the establishment of the Fifth French Republic, G-5 was disbanded.

The role of PSYOP in Algiers itself had little bearing on the outcome in the city. PSYOP was employed constantly, but the paratroop commander in charge of the Casbah, Col. Marcel Bigeard, was more oriented toward force than persuasion. Despite the considerable influence of the PSYOP personnel in the paratroop command and an active campaign of follow-up PSYOP, the initial battle in Algiers was determined by intelligence and security operations rather than psychological operations.

Civic Action

Civic action was another important element of the French counterinsurgency effort, and was as systematically developed and applied as PSYOP. The civic action effort, like PSYOP, derived from the Indochina experience--France's Mobile Operational Administrative Groups (*groupes administratifs mobiles operationnels*), which had noble goals but arrived too late to make an appreciable difference in such an intense conflict environment. In Algeria,³ Special Administrative Sections were established in 1955 to redevelop bonds between European and Muslim rural Algerian communities, improve administrative self-government capabilities in the Muslim communities, and reduce FLN control over them. In 1957, Urban Administrative Sections (SAUs) were created to accomplish the same objectives in urban areas in very different circumstances (namely, the anonymity of densely populated urban areas, [see Table 12]).

SAU officers normally spoke Arabic or Berber. They served as a link between civil servants and the security organization, but also as a bridge between the latter and the Muslims. SAUs often concentrated on shaping the attitudes of youth. Typically, SAUs dealt with housing problems caused by rapidly growing slums in and around the city. They identified economic problems and the possibilities for overcoming them, often through changes in market or labor organization (e.g., by assisting in the development of unions). They organized work projects designed to improve urban infrastructure in concrete ways and reduce unemployment and marginalization. They improved health and sanitation standards, and brought modern civil administration to populations that had lived in urban obscurity. Many of these same functions also unobtrusively increased French control over the urban populations by regulating economic relations, more accurately identifying all residents, and building strong economic interdependencies and incentives. The improvements were also designed to increase a sense of loyalty to France.

SAUs were designed to be civil institutions and were originally placed under nominal civil control. With the responsibility for security to the military and the shortage of trained manpower available for such duty, they were eventually completely absorbed into the military effort. Standards for recruitment and selection were extremely high, but pay was low because the program never received adequate funding. Moreover, the situation was very dangerous, because the FLN considered SAU officers prime candidates for execution. (In general, they had excellent relations with the Muslim community and were therefore seen by the FLN as a major threat.)

Table 12

Chain of Command of Civic Action Units

Governor-General	Military Commander
	Commander, SAS/SAU Officer Corps
Prefect	Senior Prefect Officer
Subprefect	Senior Subprefect Officer
SAU Commander-----Operational Commander	

Tactics and Techniques

The French did not hesitate to adapt the modern technology of combat to urban operations. As a low intensity conflict, the adaptation of firepower was not needed, but a means for communication, transportation, intelligence, and control.

Curfews were used to control movement and to increase the effectiveness of other control measures. Curfews were imposed before important arrests to slow the discovery of exposure and to maximize the exploitation of such intelligence as might be derived from interrogation of arrested persons. Thus, soon after curfew was begun, arrests were made and interrogation began. Before the end of the curfew, French forces would have already tried to exploit the revelations of interrogation by arresting others.

Night action was particularly valuable for the French. Movement was reduced, since most people were asleep. Thus, people moving at night were more likely to be halted since they were inherently more suspicious. Extensive patrolling was an essential element of the paratroop control of the Casbah.

Night and day, every half hour, from every one of our bases (which are scattered all over Algiers), commandos of from 4 to 12 men will go forth silently into the city to make a tireless check of avenues, streets, alleys, even the stairways in buildings (Leulliette, 1964).

When the paratroops moved toward a suspect building in the Casbah, they remained sensitive to the 3-dimensional aspects of urban terrain. Typically, they would seal off a street at ground level and land with helicopters on the flat roofs, entering from top floors. One of the advantages of such techniques in the Casbah is that the upper floors of houses extend outward to such an extent that, with the narrow alleys below, they almost touch across LOCs, providing greater than normal lateral flexibility for the insurgents. The capture of the Algiers bomb network chief and Yacef's military deputy was characteristic. Their location was determined through information provided by the *bleus*. The street and then the building were sealed off. The suspects were hiding in a second floor apartment. Helicopters patrolled above, and troops from the 3rd RPC moved toward the apartment. Loudspeakers were used to communicate to the two Algerians.

The intelligence and administrative organization pattern developed by the French in Algiers is important, if only because it proved so effective against enormous odds. In February 1956, the French Army completely changed its strategy in Algeria and in Algiers, implementing a new approach to population, resources, and territorial control. The new approach was called *quadrillage*, and essentially meant dividing the country into manageable geographical units. A hierarchical organization based on civil administrative divisions was established; the *departement* equated to the military zone, the *arrondissement* to a sector, and the *commune* to a subsector. Military operations tended to focus at the sector level. French forces were stationed in all major cities.

Quadrillage was applied in a special way in Algiers because of its size, its importance, and the growing troubles in the city. When the paratroops moved into Algiers in January 1957, they conducted a complete census of the city of Algiers and issued new identity cards for all city residents. A central headquarters was established at the main entrance to the Casbah, and mobile checkpoints in radio contact with the headquarters were set up at key locations to control entry into and exit from the Casbah. Identity checks were common, and long lines were frequently visible. The *quadrillage* approach was further developed into the *ilot*

system (previously described) in Algiers. The system was established for both security management and intelligence, and was monitored by the Urban Protection Unit (DPU) under Colonel Roger Trinquier. The GRE bleus were linked to the DPU also.

Cyprus

The Cyprus insurgency was less intense than that in Palestine, and certainly much less than the Algerian revolution. Consequently, the majority of British actions in cities were closer to police than to military operations.

Combat Functions

Infantry

The primary role of the infantry in the cities was to defend possible targets (government and security force installations, key buildings, army camps) against EOKA sabotage. Another infantry role involved cordon-and-search operations which were conducted in the cities of Nicosia and Famagusta. Techniques of cordon and search were essentially the same as those employed in Palestine, but used a wider range of technology (e.g., helicopters, fast patrol boats, and planes with searchlights, as well as dogs). More conventional infantry operations took place in the Troodos Mountain area, where sweeps were particularly common in the mid-years of the insurgency.

Armor

Armor was not really in evidence in any major way in the cities. Armed patrols, generally using Land Rovers, were frequent on the roads to interdict EOKA supply lines.

Special Operations

British experience with counter gangs had proved very valuable in Malaya and Kenya. Consequently, the same approach was undertaken on a small scale in Cyprus. These counter gangs (called "Q units") were composed of former EOKA personnel. They were not intended to seek and destroy EOKA units but to collect operationally useful intelligence. Little has been written about the Q units, but overall, they seem to have performed well.

Air

British use of air power in Cyprus was limited mainly to blockade enforcement. This reflects the very low level of hostilities in the urban environment, where large groups of insurgents were never a problem, and the poor visibility in the Troodos Mountains. Helicopters supported a number of operations against guerrillas in the Troodos Range and outside the urban areas

generally and to provide enhanced security for potential targets. Helicopter teams were formed in 1957. Each aircraft had a six-man team with one radio and two dog handlers and their dogs.

Navy

The Royal Navy, too, was primarily used for blockade enforcement. It functioned very effectively in Cyprus.

Support Functions

Intelligence

While the intelligence effectiveness of the British forces has been judged cautiously, largely on the basis that Grivas was never caught, it is not clear that this is the best measure to use for assessing effectiveness. In circumstances when the vast majority of the population clearly identified with the aims of the insurgents, when that same majority identified with the insurgents as part of the same ethnic group to which the British were foreign, it is hardly surprising that British intelligence encountered severe problems. These problems were aggravated by the British insistence on maintaining as high a role for the police (by contrast with the army), in which Greek Cypriots had some supporting roles, as possible. The real problem was not what it appeared to be; it was lack of cohesive organization and strategy.

The changes (described in chapter V) by Harding effected a systematic and effective organization of intelligence resources as between the police and the military forces. Establishing an island-wide intelligence network, the British maintained dossiers for all ethnic Greeks moving between Greece and Cyprus. They were able to act upon intelligence more rapidly while it was still fresh. Moreover, the effective coordination of intelligence improved the ability to communicate public views and attitudes to the British and served as more credible insurance against abuses of authority. The addition of technical expertise in such areas as fingerprinting and ballistics was also valuable.

The effort to catch Grivas was a conspicuous failure. Using dogs, the British offered a reward for Grivas' clothing. They intercepted phone calls and letters to him, and eventually even captured his diary. Rewards for betraying EOKA leaders generally failed in Cyprus. In one case, with some previous success in a different case, a British administrator tried the approach of giving papers to everyone which must be returned. (With all citizens returning papers, no one can tell who provided the information.) All the sheets of paper were returned blank, however. Greek Cypriot reticence to betray EOKA leaders probably reflects the ethnic identity issue more than any real EOKA success.

With the intelligence data provided by the network of informers and by good interrogation, as well as by captured information, the British were able eventually to assemble a complete organization chart and then mount operations against specific targets whose role was better understood. This effective use of intelligence was a hallmark of the British effort in Cyprus. In

the first quarter of 1957, EOKA lost 16 members killed (three of whom were senior EOKA leaders) and 60 captured, much of this toll the result of effective exploitation of intelligence. Given the size of the organization, these losses were truly crippling.

The counterintelligence problem was a serious deficiency. Since Greek Cypriots were everywhere in the island administration, security was a constant problem, and EOKA consistently penetrated British security precautions. Key British meetings were recorded by a Cypriot Special Branch sergeant, secretly a member of EOKA.

Communications

British tactical communications improved markedly after Harding's arrival. Modern equipment allowed the police and army units to reach their colleagues anywhere on the island at any level.

Engineers

The Royal Engineers had an excellent record in Cyprus. Apart from their role outside the city (they discovered and destroyed scores of mountain hideouts), they developed new equipment after 1958 that revealed the solidity of floors and walls and could measure the size of the space behind them. While the engineers performed ably, it cannot be said that any of their activities made a significant difference in the insurgency.

Psychological Operations

As we have noted previously, even before the insurgency had begun, the EOKA leadership recognized that the key to victory was psychological operations, particularly creating the necessary psychological climate in the United Kingdom that would necessitate withdrawal. The British were somewhat slower in addressing the PSYOP issue, but Field Marshal Harding heavily emphasized it after his arrival.

The principle and assumption under which the government operated was that the majority of Greek Cypriots did not approve of EOKA methods and only supported the organization as a result of its intimidation. Therefore, the government sought to turn the population to open opposition to the organization. The method of accomplishing this end was to identify an acceptable alternative to *enosis*. Plausible as the British approach may appear, it never really succeeded. First, while there was certainly no deep ethnic antagonism separating Briton and Greek (as there was between Greek and Turk), the British were seen as foreign and different, while (however unacceptable its methods) EOKA and its leaders were seen as ethnic Greeks. Moreover, *enosis* remained the goal not only of EOKA, but also of the entire Greek Cypriot community. Thus, the British opposed not just EOKA's goals, but the deeply felt desires of the population they sought to win. It was only when the community leaders abandoned *enosis* that the Greek Cypriots were ready to accept an alternative.

The common response of counterinsurgents is to seek moderates among the opposition and to endeavor to deal with them, either sincerely to reach

an acceptable and "sellable" compromise or cynically to buy time and weaken the extremists by suggesting that moderation may lead to positive results but extremism would not. The British in Cyprus also sought moderate mediators, but after early EOKA attacks on Greek Cypriot "moderates," they were no longer visible. Because the British could never protect the populace, they could never wean it from EOKA. Yet, this protection was the critical element in intelligence, psychological operations, and political progress.

Operationally, the period after Field Marshal Harding arrived reflected great PSYOP activity. The government significantly expanded information services, established a public relations department, and appointed public relations officers for the police. Highly talented people were recruited for service. (The internationally known novelist Lawrence Durrell served as a public information officer.) A central news room was manned 17 hours daily--quite un-Cypriot. Greek radio was jammed. A communications offensive was undertaken internationally, that is, at the United Nations. The thrust of British efforts was to articulate alternatives to enosis and to explain the reasons for security actions. EOKA was blamed for security restrictions, and British responses were portrayed as modest, reasonable, and humane. Extremely close coordination between civil, military, and police information services characterized the period following Harding's arrival. The emphasis was placed on gaining the confidence of the free press and on ensuring that falsehoods were quickly exposed and destroyed. The British government recognized that excesses did occur at times, and was careful to punish those guilty of abusing their power when possible.

The Cyprus Broadcasting Service doubled its Greek language broadcast time and jammed Greek radio beginning in 1956, and the British government used telephone and mail intercepts in some cases, mainly to find EOKA leaders. The confessions of captured EOKA members were broadcast along with appeals by name to their former comrades. These appeals had little effect, however.

In addition to broadcast propaganda, the British used leaflets extensively. Leaflets were dropped from aircraft and distributed by security forces. Recognizing that their own leaflets were attracting few readers, the British even tried to duplicate the appearance of EOKA leaflets to attract readers. British leaflets denounced EOKA crimes, noted British plans for self-government, and blamed EOKA for problems and hardships resulting from the insurgency that blocked progress toward self-government. Leaflets and British propaganda generally emphasized that Grivas fully understood the British would not leave Cyprus, and that EOKA attacks were therefore futile and irrational. The propaganda stressed that EOKA was being destroyed. (EOKA forbade the population to read British propaganda, and it appears that few actually read it. Some EOKA youth were paid at times to collect British leaflets and burn them.)

As in Palestine, British forces assumed a defensive posture in the built-up areas, and depended heavily on search techniques. Reactive though this approach may be, mass searches humiliated loyal Cypriots and probably had negative PSYOP consequences, for the most part. Sir Hugh Foote, who was able to establish a somewhat more relaxed administration (EOKA already having been severely crippled), tried to show that Grivas was a madman who was destroying the island. This approach forced Grivas to lash out against Greek Cypriots, which reduced his following.

One interesting example of British restraint was in regard to the press. Under the emergency laws in force in Cyprus, press control was legal. This power was scarcely used, however. Only during the Suez operation was the press suppressed, and in the entire insurgency period, there was but a single prosecution.

Sensitivity to the propaganda value of press restrictions was not reflected in other areas. Even though actual resort to capital punishment was very limited (see previous chapter), EOKA was able to decry the barbarity of British emergency regulations which allowed execution even for carrying a weapon or conspiracy. (One of those under penalty of death was executed for carrying a gun, but he had been involved in a series of other activities and had even killed an elderly Cypriot.) Those executed (nine persons) were hailed as martyrs to the cause of enosis. EOKA referred to the "British tradition" of "hanging judges," insisted that evidence was often falsified by the Turkish police, and that the British were so eager to suppress Cypriot national feeling that they demanded low standards of evidence.

The other end of the penal spectrum also served EOKA well. The Emergency Regulations provided for caning for young boys, a practice that EOKA was able to portray as humiliating and primitive. The British received almost universal condemnation for their caning policy.

Tactics and Techniques

British behavior in Cyprus was largely passive before the arrival of Field Marshal Harding. Following his appointment, the response was much more military in nature, particularly in the non-urban areas. Within the built-up areas, however, British policy in Cyprus was not unlike the previous experience in Palestine. Harding, for example, initiated massive sweeps and hunt-and-kill operations on urban streets and in the mountains. Collective fines were imposed at times on towns whose residents did not provide information relating to EOKA to British security forces.

British techniques can be divided into five categories: combat or military; collective punishment; individual punishment; preventive techniques; and incentives. By combat techniques, we refer to aggressive or offensive actions, which may be contrasted with preventive techniques that are defensive in nature.

Combat actions include sweeps in urban areas and in the mountains. These operations were especially prominent in the period when large numbers of British forces first arrived on Cyprus and the administration had sufficient manpower to initiate offensive action with a mobile reserve. In October 1958, when it was clear that EOKA was on the run, the British began to emphasize the importance of active counter guerrilla tactics, stressing surprise attacks based on timely use of intelligence. "Cat patrols," that is, small groups of security forces who wore rubber soles, were instituted in cities and proceeded quietly through the streets on offensive patrols. They searched roofs, sometimes bursting into suspect quarters through transoms.

Collective punishment techniques included curfews, fines, closures, and resettlement.

Curfews were first employed in Cyprus in August 1955. The British used five types of curfew: simple, complete, fixed, indeterminate, and selective. These are not mutually exclusive. Simple curfews are night only; complete curfews are in effect both day and night, though frequently with some period of midday exclusion for shopping. Fixed curfews are announced for a specific period of time; indeterminate curfews are imposed without a finite duration. Finally, selective curfews apply to a specific category of inhabitant (e.g., Greek Cypriots between the ages of 12 and 27, the category most involved in the violence). Famagusta was the first city affected in October 1955. The most important curfew operation was the complete curfew of the old city of Nicosia (the Greek quarter with approximately 10,000 people) from September 28 to October 6, 1956. By the end of December 1955, more than 35 curfew orders had been issued, a number that increased in 1956, as did the length of the curfews imposed. Curfews dwindled in 1957. Those employed after 1957 were more frequently preventive. Long curfews were sometimes imposed on villages where guerrillas were thought to be hiding. In general, such curfews were seen by the local populace as punitive in nature. Curfews were generally resented and seem to have had little positive effect as punishment. They were ineffective in stopping communication and movement in the cities, because the houses were so close that unobserved movement was still relatively easy.

A second category of collective punishment involves fines. Fines were generally imposed on villages rather than cities, although both Limassol and Famagusta were fined (£35,000 and £40,000, respectively) in 1956. Fines were payable by adult males. They were computed on the basis of the school tax. The use of fines was abandoned after 1956.

Closures and other restrictions can also be imposed as punishments. "Public distractions" (i.e., cinemas, cafes, bars, restaurants) were closed for some time by the British. More significantly, the British, reacting to the growing display of Greek flags in elementary schools, issued a regulation by which any school having such a display would be closed. Eventually, nearly all elementary schools in Cyprus were closed, but most quietly abandoned their flags and reopened in the fall of 1956 on schedule. It should be noted that EOKA had ordered schools to display flags; it did not enforce the order in the fall of 1956 so that the schools could reopen, since British determination was clear.

A fourth category of collective punishment that can also serve preventive functions is resettlement. Resettlement was never used in Cyprus, but its use was studied briefly by the island administration.

Individual punishments included imprisonment, execution, and expulsion. We shall not discuss individual punishments in any significant way here, as these are judicial matters rather than military affairs. For issues of justice, see Chapter IX. Expulsion was never widely used in Cyprus. A few families in Nicosia were expelled from the city for 3 months. In two cases, occupants were evicted and their property confiscated or destroyed when they allowed its use by EOKA. Foreigners were expelled (deported) as well. In particular, a number of Greek nationals were expelled from the island. In the summer of 1956, all Greek teachers (120) were expelled in the "flag war."

Preventive techniques included many tactics used in Palestine, passive security around all government buildings, armed patrols and convoys, air and

naval blockade, the heavy use of roadblocks and patrols, predominance of cordon and search with large scale roundups and detention, and employment of group punishment.

Passive defense systems (barbed wire and sandbags) for all important buildings were more effective than in Palestine, since EOKA was smaller, far less sophisticated, and less inclined to technological innovation. By the end of 1955, soldiers were told to move about only in groups and armed. Certain sectors of cities were declared off-limits to troops. The isolated nature of the environment, however, dissuaded officials from prohibiting military personnel from venturing into the cities at all. Those with families, for example, had to shop in the cities, although the British administration suggested that wives shop only on certain days when protection could be guaranteed. After the autumn of 1958, British forces and dependents were confined to their camps and cantonments. Civilian officials could carry arms if they so desired. All Cypriot employees of the services recreation and support organization were discharged.

The use of armed patrols and road convoys was also more effective as a defense in Cyprus because of the more limited weapons supply of the insurgents and their belief that pitched battles were counterproductive. Blockade of the island by the RN and RAF proved quite effective in restricting arms supplies to EOKA. Roadblocks and patrols along LOCs may have created some inconvenience for the insurgents, but insurgent writings and statements make it clear that as in Palestine, it was easy for the insurgents to avoid these security forces.

Population control measures (roundups and detention, for example) were far more effective in Cyprus, with its limited population and smaller area than in Palestine, but they were effective again largely as defensive measures. They did not often result in capture of key EOKA suspects, and most EOKA leaders easily evaded such measures. Some curfews and cordon and searches were preventive. The curfews after 1957 were primarily designed to reduce the problems of Greek-Turkish conflict, for example.

Crowd-control measures were not very effective, since the crowds were always effectively manipulated by Grivas. EOKA's hold on the Greek Cypriot youth provided the organization with a very valuable PSYOP weapon. EOKA would call for demonstrations, or EOKA youth members would organize such demonstrations. Within the crowd, a small number would carry inflammatory banners or otherwise defy the administrative authority, finding some means of challenging it. The first appearance of security forces, even in an observation role, would provoke bottle and stone throwing by EOKA militants among the crowd, which provoked security forces to use tear gas, batons, and other techniques. The crowd would often disperse and then reform elsewhere, however, leading police through the urban area. On some occasions, EOKA members even threw bombs from the crowd. The results always provided excellent propaganda for EOKA, since the picture of British security forces applying crowd control measures to young people, including girls, consistently made the British appear repressive. Only preventive curfews seemed to avoid such scenes.

Rewards for information leading to the capture of senior EOKA leaders went unclaimed and were a complete failure. One approach was to encourage would-be informers to provide information using a unique pseudonym. The reward could be claimed by identifying oneself by the pseudonym at any time after the information was acted upon.

Venezuela

Combat Functions

Infantry

Most of the operations against the FALN in the city more closely resembled police actions than conventional military operations. Infantry and paratroops (used as infantry only) were employed in military operations in attacking rebellious marines at Carupano and Puerto Cabello, though the bulk of the force retaking the bases were loyal marines. In these clashes, small arms and .50 caliber machine guns were used for street fighting against the untrained and confused troops who were rushed into battle. Lack of combined arms training was rapidly apparent in the Puerto Cabello battle.

Armor

The only significant use of armor in urban anti-guerrilla actions in Venezuela was in the action in Puerto Cabello. Rebel forces had been driven from the marine base and were centered in a relatively large, well-constructed complex in the city. Loyalists attacking the rebels advanced with supporting fire provided by 20 AMX-13 and 10 Sherman tanks. The tanks eventually provided adequate firepower even in the city to advance on the rebel stronghold, but large numbers of loyalist troops were nevertheless hit by sniper fire from buildings and rooftops, and the initial attack was repulsed.

Air

There was relatively little use of air power in Venezuela. Because the armed forces were not highly developed as a military institution, and doctrine was certainly in its infancy for confronting guerrilla warfare, little thought had been given to the potential use of air power in insurgency. The fact that the Venezuelan insurgency consisted largely of urban operations also limited the role air power was able to play.

During the marine uprisings at Carupano and Puerto Cabello, however, the air force was able to assist government forces in suppressing the mutiny. The air force bombed and strafed the bases and flew numerous transport missions with C-47s and C-123s. At Puerto Cabello, air force attacks were a main factor in forcing the rebels to flee from their command post and establish a new one in the city. This was also subjected to air force attacks.

Navy

The Venezuelan navy experienced only limited use in the insurgency. Its role of preventing smuggling of contraband is believed to have been effective because the insurgents are known to have had relatively little armament. Like the air force, the navy was actively involved in the attack on

the mutinous marines at Carupano and Puerto Cabello. Navy destroyers patrolled offshore to prevent reinforcement or escape, and also provided supporting fire from the harbor for ground forces advancing on the base.

Support Functions

Intelligence

One of the main problems of the counterinsurgency was the development of adequate intelligence, combined with the political capacity to employ intelligence products appropriately. Although each branch of the armed forces had its own intelligence and counterintelligence sections, there was also an autonomous detachment (SIFA) under the direct supervision of the minister of defense. SIFA possessed independent authority overriding that of the other branches, and their intelligence services were required to cooperate and coordinate with it.

Initially, the authorities had little success against the insurgency in the urban areas either because of fear or sympathy for the insurgents. Therefore, the urban population was not cooperative. Massive arrests produced the initial intelligence required for the counterinsurgency effort.

Supply and Maintenance

The armed forces did not always demonstrate competence in their duties. Poor maintenance and some professional incompetence with mechanized equipment were demonstrated at Puerto Cabello. When a freighter was hijacked, the Venezuelan navy had no ships in condition for pursuit and had to accept U.S. Navy assistance to recapture the vessel.

Psychological Operations

The collapse of the Venezuelan insurgents may be attributed to deficient psychological strategy and, conversely, to appropriate and timely government PSYOP. The insurgents emphasized combat operations rather than building the psychological and political support of the population. This support, whether won through coercion or persuasion, is critical to insurgency. Efforts to provoke widespread strikes, riots, and uprisings failed because of an inadequate grasp of public attitudes and mass political behavior. By contrast, President Betancourt understood the existing political climate in Venezuela.

Betancourt understood that the opposition was inherently urban in nature, sophisticated and intellectual. From the outset, the government secured the loyalty of the armed forces and other security organizations and was able to concentrate on effective control of the mass media, thereby limiting the ability of the opposition to communicate to other sectors of the populace. Publications and broadcasting services were concentrated in the urban centers, which facilitated government monitoring of communication content. The opposition was

limited to indirect messages, pamphlets, and a few publications that made their way to the countryside. Insurgent actions were given the minimum coverage by the media, limiting even international involvement.

While the loss of the media could have been overcome by the insurgents within the city through effective organization and commitment, the opposition was divided, and the absence of ideological mobilization limited the degree of personal commitment. Organization was also deficient, and activities were not coordinated by a central body. Consequently, the movement was unable to mobilize the citizens around a single cause. The government correctly gauged that the student riots of October and November 1960 enjoyed no real public support. Consequently, in moving to stop the demonstrations, the government took care to contain rioters to specific areas rather than allowing the problems to spread and possibly affect new groups.

To mobilize a popular opposition, the insurgents had to persuade the public that they represented the views, values, and interests of the oppressed. Arson, sniping, riots, and attacks on Venezuelan economic interests did not communicate this idea at all, however; they alienated the public. The objective was to compel the authorities to undertake oppressive countermeasures, but the Betancourt government reacted within the bounds of the law. Security forces did not operate, for example, on the Central University campus, traditionally protected from government presence.

The value system the insurgents tried to promote was rejected, partly because so much of the insurgent action was difficult to distinguish from common crime. Insurgents "assassinated" uniformed security personnel, but having failed to first persuade the public of the righteousness of insurgent values, public perceptions were that a fellow Venezuelan, innocent of anything but doing his public duty, had been murdered. Government PSYOP exploited this issue effectively. Public commemorative services were held for security officers killed by the insurgents, and newspapers were encouraged to publish photographs of the bereaved family members as a means of building up the "human" image of security personnel. The insurgents failed to alienate security forces and public.

Bombings and sabotage as conducted by the insurgents alienated the public from the insurgents. Damaging oil installations appeared to the intellectual insurgents as an attack on foreign imperialism, but to the public, it was a threat to the major source of government income and therefore to countless Venezuelan workers. As in other areas, Betancourt was able to evoke a recognition in the larger part of the public that insurgent attacks were damaging the public interest.

Uruguay

Uruguay is a deviant study in terms of tactical military operations, since its military forces were not deployed and used according to normal military doctrine. Only in the town of Pando was the military called in to fight the insurgents in direct combat. In this case, helicopters were used as transport vehicles instead of fighting machines. APCs were also used to transport troops, but the fighting was strictly infantry small arms combat. Beyond this battle, the army was involved primarily in intelligence collection, while the police assumed the primary security role.

Support Functions

Intelligence

In the early stages of the Tupamaro problem, poor intelligence, poor intelligence security, and poor coordination of intelligence resources were among the most crippling problems of the government.

Operational intelligence was coordinated at the tactical and administrative level by OCOA, and for policy and administrative support by the RI. OCOA had a well-defined logistical structure that provided adequate vehicles, radios, and other equipment, and the RI facilitated the exchange of substantial intelligence and the development of common doctrine across service and police intelligence arms.

Intervention of the armed forces in the counterinsurgency produced substantially improved intelligence results, partly because of the greater resources available, but mostly because of the credibility of government determination and the resulting captured insurgents' fear. Moreover, military interrogators had a higher degree of professionalism than their police counterparts.

Psychological Operations

The OPFC coordinated and originated armed forces PSYOP during the counterinsurgency. OPFC depended to a great extent on broadcast media where it used a "news" framework. While government PSYOP was not particularly effective for some years, Tupamaro errors in audience analysis had a cumulative effect. Their intellectual inclinations and leftist rhetoric made no impression on the Uruguayan citizenry, and the "Robin Hood" aspect of their operations carried much more weight. In several cases, the public seemed to accept Tupamaro justifications for acts of violence, whether willingly or reluctantly. The murder of USAID advisor Dan Mitrione was clearly a psychological turning point after which the government was much more effective in portraying the targets of Tupamaro violence as victims.

Moreover, capture of Tupamaro documents in the early 1970s provided the government with a wealth of material on which to base PSYOP. These documents were expertly exploited, and public support for or identification with the Tupamaros plunged precipitously.

Tactics and Techniques

There was relatively little real combat in the anti-Tupamaro campaign. Following the attack on the naval training center in the spring of 1970, the armed forces undertook active patrols and cut off the city of Montevideo with roadblocks and checkpoints. Without any effective control over the population, however, and lacking popular support, these isolated tactics yielded little. Population and resources control techniques are not isolated, mechanical operations; in Uruguay they were just that, not a part of a systematic program to

integrate control over the population. While attempts were made to establish something like a primitive ilot system (landlords responsible for tenants and so forth), logistical support for such an operation was completely lacking. Personnel responsible for checking identification did not receive the data necessary to conduct their mission.

Once the military was committed to breaking the insurgency, intelligence personnel were still careful to allow suspects to make as wide a range of contacts as possible before arresting them. In this way it was possible to move decisively at a later stage, spreading a net substantially broadened by the interactions of the insurgents.

When possible, raids were executed in the early morning hours (3 or 4 a.m.) to catch the insurgents while still asleep and to minimize potential breaches of security.

FINDINGS

The nature of urban insurgency operations in the cases studied in this research has consistently placed primary emphasis on infantry or parachute units among the armed forces and on police. For the most part, the types of security operations conducted by these forces are typical of police activities in normal circumstances but at a higher level of intensity.

Classical insurgency challenges considered by governments pose different problems from those of conventional warfare, but many of the considerations are only relatively different rather than fundamentally so. The principles of war are still generally relevant and applicable to such engagements, and firepower, mobility, and protection remain important considerations in the struggle. Urban insurgency only rarely poses such issues, as in the Venezuelan troop mutinies at Puerto Cabello and Carupano, for example. Typically, firepower is not an issue, for the urban insurgent organization is first and foremost an underground, not a conventional combat institution. It is even less likely to conduct "combat" than the rural insurgent.

The fight against urban insurgents is almost exclusively that of infantry (including paratroops in those military establishments where paratroops exist and play such a role) among the combat arms branches. Whereas armor and artillery, for example, have been critical elements of rural insurgencies, and no less so in conventional MOUT, they have played no role in urban insurgency.

The air arm of the military forces does have a role to play. Aerial photographic reconnaissance is an important asset of security forces, depending on the nature of the urban terrain. Aircraft have also been used for PSYOP purposes, dropping leaflets, carrying loudspeaker messages. In addition, aircraft played a very important role in Palestine, Cyprus, and Algeria in patrolling to cut off insurgents from sources of external support. Helicopters were used in Algeria to provide rapid mobility of security forces to sealed off areas. In this way, they were able to move quickly to buildings without forewarning, land on the roofs, and descend.

Naval forces also served in the effort to isolate the urban insurgents in Palestine, Algeria, and Cyprus. In each case, at least one vessel with contraband was found or intercepted.

Undoubtedly, intelligence has consistently been the single most important element of urban counterinsurgency operations. The failure of British intelligence in Palestine made this the least effective example of counterinsurgency. By contrast, despite the much-heralded failure to discover Grivas, the Cyprus exercise was much more satisfactory. In Algeria, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Cyprus, the pace of the counterinsurgent military campaign was determined largely by the effectiveness of intelligence operations. As we have indicated, political and other environmental aspects probably condemned France to political failure in Algeria, as well as Britain in Cyprus (in terms of its original objectives), but good intelligence still yielded decisive military results.

Our five cases reflect a larger body of cases in the sense that intelligence responsibility may be centralized in a single organization or dispersed in two or more institutions. The advantage of the first approach is efficiency in handling data, which can be decisive in urban insurgency operations. Yet, multiple intelligence organizations also have advantages: double-checking the reliability of information and complicating the infiltration attempts of insurgents. Insurgents in all our cases succeeded in using double agents or other infiltration techniques to penetrate intelligence institutions. Such penetration may have much less value when a multitude of organizations do not exchange all information.

Despite the advantages of the armed forces in many areas of counterinsurgency, police forces often have important advantages in intelligence. They are permanent parts of the scene in the urban area, and therefore often develop friends and sources of information that the more transient military forces do not. They are organized to collect information relevant to the types of activities characterized by urban insurgency, whereas typical military staff intelligence arms are organized, equipped, and trained to focus mainly on conventional combat intelligence. Sometimes, police are on better terms with the populace than the military, and are seen as less political. This is not always the case. Sometimes, criteria for selection are such that police are undereducated, poorly trained, and poorly motivated.

Urban counterinsurgency intelligence is of a fundamentally different type than that traditionally collected, analyzed, disseminated, and used by the armed forces. In this case, the most useful intelligence concerns individuals and nontangibles (organizations, roles, activities, financial arrangements, power and leadership responsibilities), rather than classic military intelligence order of battle that focuses on collections of military assets.

By the nature of these intelligence priorities, it is evident that they are best collected from people. Overhead photographic support can be of some assistance, but the bulk of the most valuable data is necessarily that which can only be supplied by people. It is apparent that whether those sources come from inside the insurgent organization or not, the incumbent must protect them if they are to be exploited.

Human sources of intelligence include agents and informers, of course, but they will usually be innocent citizens, often reporting information they do not see as sensitive. The presence in a modern city opens a wide range of data sources to security forces (credit records, criminal justice records, personnel files, educational and health data, insurance records, telephone records, bills, employment data, hotel registers, and refuse).

Communications is an important element in the counterinsurgency effort in cities, and this is so for several reasons. First, insurgents place a high priority on infiltration. Thus, communications security is an important consideration in government efforts. Second, the nature of urban insurgency creates major impediments to effective insurgent communications. Insurgent communications techniques usually involve couriers and mail drops in situations where the government has begun to actively combat the insurgency. Because the urban guerrilla must remain invisible (otherwise he is susceptible to capture, since he has relatively little firepower for protection) he cannot afford to expose his LOCs, the discovery of which is usually a primary government objective.

This insurgent communications process in cities opens a range of possibilities, since inevitably some communications channels are compromised. At times, governments choose to remain quiet about the discoveries and to trace the connections made through surveillance of the communications process. On other occasions, the government uses its penetration to produce defectors and even to reinsert them as double agents. In yet other cases, government penetration permits the introduction of false messages into the communications system, messages designed to produce dissension, errors, or further compromises.

Psychological operations played a key role in all the urban insurgency cases studied in this report. Like intelligence and population protection and resources management, it is one of the fundamental elements deciding the military outcome. In theory, PSYOP should also be directly related to the political outcome, but it remains subject to many of the constraints under which other elements labor. No amount of persuasion could have convinced the Algerian Arab and Berber populations that they were French, or that they were not second class citizens in their country. No amount of PSYOP could have resolved the basic incompatibility of the British commitments to the Arabs and Jews of Palestine.

Psychological operations is a tool in the hands of military forces; it can help, but it will not be decisive in and of itself. Above all, PSYOP depends on reality. People perceive developments, and PSYOP can assist them in processing these perceptions in ways favorable to the incumbent. It cannot be expected to prevent them from perceiving developments, however, or compel them to interpret these developments in irrational ways. PSYOP cannot be divorced from the realities of the urban insurgent battlefield; it must be a part of those realities.

Tactical PSYOP (that is, psychological operations employed in conjunction with military operations) cannot be expected to realize objectives as ambitious as those possible once security is reestablished. The maximum that tactical PSYOP can accomplish sometimes is merely to provide information and guidance, to maintain credibility, to keep the channels of communication open so that they may be exploited in more favorable circumstances.

At the same time, it is clear that an ambitious PSYOP program linked directly to civic action and an overall government program for population protection can make a direct and significant contribution to establishing secure conditions. While PSYOP did not effect a political victory, it provided one of the foundations of the French military victory in Algiers (and in the most difficult environment in Algeria as a whole). Such a PSYOP program must offer an entire philosophy of participation and action to supplant those articulated by the insurgent group. And it must be accompanied by protection for the native population.

Population protection is the last of the major elements of urban counterinsurgency, but perhaps the most fundamental. The ability to protect defectors, to protect administrative and community leaders, and, in the struggle with a well-developed insurgent movement, to protect the population from intimidation, lies at the heart of the counterinsurgent effort. Population protection and control measures (such measures as previously described and used notably by France in Algeria) are essential to intelligence operations, and to rapid exploitation of intelligence in operations against insurgent leadership.

Population control presents a major problem in societies with democratic traditions. In addition to the logistical and administrative problems of creating and managing effective systems, such systems may alienate public opinion that, may consider them oppressive and totalitarian. The French imposed the system in Algeria because they cared little for the opinions of the Algerian masses and because there was no alternative. Less burdensome systems in the Latin American cases could have provoked greater concern, but the government was able to defuse the issue with assurances. Effective population control is the essence of urban counterinsurgency against well-developed insurgent groups, because such groups are necessarily deeply rooted in the society. If prevention has not worked, thorough systems of population control will certainly be necessary.

Population control and protection systems involve identification documentation (usually a photographic ID with other material, a duplicate of which is retained by security organizations and can be used for police work) and control mechanisms such as the ilot system used in Algiers. Modern technology provides computer support systems that facilitate the data management task, and the control element is imperative given the difficulty of surveillance and observation in the urban environment. Oppressive as the mechanisms may be, effective operation will certainly reduce the level of violence and therefore protect the economic interests as well as the physical property and lives of the residents.

No insurgent organization begins operations unless it believes there is a chance for success. Given the cost of a defeat, the chance must be seen as substantial. Thus, it is usually the perception of at least those in the insurgent group that a cause exists that will enable the group to mobilize a large enough body of the population to make victory possible. In our cases, we have seen instances when the group belief that the cause could become a source to mobilize the public was not true. In most cases, even if the insurgents have chosen to pursue their actions for self-serving reasons or reasons they choose not to disclose, grievances exist that may serve as rallying points for a larger support group. Government cannot satisfy itself with controlling the population, acting on intelligence, and conducting strike operations against the insurgents if the latter identify causes supported by the public. It is imperative that

government actively seek to contribute to improving the quality of life of the populace, whether through civic action programs as in the French case, or through new government legislation that makes the incumbent a benefit rather than a burden to the public.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Armed forces personnel not properly prepared and trained or motivated for the peculiarities of the urban insurgency environment may well find the urban insurgency challenge confusing, frustrating, and demoralizing. Confused, frustrated, and demoralized soldiers can be a serious liability in such operations.

2. Security forces facing urban insurgent organizations require manpower, a wide range of intelligence capabilities, efficient command and control, some mobility, good psychological operations, and effective leadership. In general, police forces may have some advantages in intelligence, but only rarely maintain a reservoir of the other resources adequate to combat an active and well-developed insurgency. The result is that armed forces are usually required to supplement or lead the struggle.

3. Among combat arms branches, urban insurgency is clearly a task for the infantry. Air and naval forces and helicopters may provide ancillary support, but the brunt of security operations must be borne by ground forces.

4. Intelligence organization may take a number of forms, but effective exploitation of intelligence and the most aggressive approach to deployment of intelligence assets probably argue in favor of a substantial degree of unity of intelligence assets, at least among the regular armed forces during the active period of insurgency. Intelligence organization cannot reasonably be divorced from overall counterinsurgency organization, however.

5. Temporary deployment of regular armed forces into an urban area does not alter the inherent advantages of police institutions and relationships for long-term intelligence collection, particularly of a noncoercive nature. Integration of these assets into the counterinsurgent effort can be troublesome if frictions develop between military and police forces, but the value of the diverse intelligence products argues strongly and compellingly for a major effort to coordinate the two.

6. Modern urban life provides vast new and important sources of intelligence data that should be integrated as soon as possible into standard military intelligence processes for insurgent contingencies. These sources supplement the basic source for urban operations--human intelligence.

7. The urban counterinsurgent must develop the capability to attack one of the main insurgent vulnerabilities, his communication system. This attack may take several forms, but one of the most potent is the indirect form of introducing false messages into the channel. Insurgent groups are naturally sensitive about security, and indications of treachery can produce a significant level of paralysis and self-mutilation in these groups.

8. Psychological operations is a critical component of government counterinsurgency, especially after some security has been restored. PSYOP is not lies; it is a systematic program designed in this case to provide an alternate value structure to that offered by the insurgent, and a value structure generally more in conformity with the core values of society and its members.

9. Population protection and control constitute the most important single element in many of the foregoing activities. Without security, little else is possible. Effective population protection in urban environments challenged by well-developed insurgent movements can only work in conjunction with population control systems designed to link the populace and the government.

¹In one case, a poison blow dart was used!

²We are not suggesting that Algeria was administered democratically, for it certainly was not. The system imposed on Algiers was French, but for a democracy to create such a system is itself very difficult, and the self-examination to which the French subjected themselves about the moral aspects of the functioning of this extraordinary system reflects precisely our point.

³Even in Algeria, there was a long tradition behind civic action. The Arab Bureaus, in which civil administration was extended to Muslim villages, had been created in the 1840s (disestablished in 1945), and in at least one important unit early in the Algerian revolution, an innovative French general had had good success with a local civic action operation.

CHAPTER XI

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

This chapter discusses some of the observations, findings, and conclusions of the research in the context of U.S. military operations in urban insurgency environments. It consists of three sections. The first discusses the U.S. role in such an environment. The second section elaborates to some extent on the nature of the mission and the problem. The final section comments on U.S. capabilities for urban counterinsurgency.

THE U.S. ROLE IN URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

The U.S. military forces may encounter urban insurgency situations in the future, for, as Chapter I indicated, urban insurgencies are numerous and likely to become more so. There are clear limitations that are likely to attach to the U.S. role in urban counterinsurgency, however.

The effort to overcome an urban insurgency will take place on foreign soil. Thus, those U.S. assets that will be employed will operate under important restrictions. We can reasonably assume that the urban insurgency will not be a part of a conventional conflict, although urban insurgencies have at times been associated with such conflicts. Certainly, this is not the most likely case, nor is it one that would receive much attention in the context of a conventional conflict.

The urban insurgency situation facing the United States will not be a colonial situation. This is probably the least likely context for the employment of U.S. assets, because the United States for political reasons will not participate in an effort to suppress an anticolonial revolt.

Thus, the context will be some kind of urban insurgency in which a sovereign government, most likely in one of the developing countries, is the target. The U.S. will be in a supporting role. It will therefore assume one of the following characters:

- a. peacekeeping
- b. advisory (without combat personnel)
- c. security assistance (with combat personnel)
- d. police support
- e. political, financial, and technical support only (but including CONUS training)

All of these roles significantly limit the ability of the United States to bring the plenitude of its resources to bear on the problem, particularly in view of U.S. domestic political constraints that may come into play.

Division of labor in cases when U.S. forces are involved will be a problem. Even more confusing will be those cases in which U.S. forces are a part of a larger multinational effort to assist the host country or keep the peace.

Because we believe an urban insurgency requirement is most likely to arise in third world settings, another major problem that will confront the United States and its commitments is the nature of political reality in developing countries. In most developing nations, political institutions are fragile and do not enjoy deep roots in the society. Most societies in the Third World are torn apart by regional, religious, ethnic, tribal, racial, or other schisms, and the individual and family loyalties are more immediately identified with these symbols than with those of the state. Such problems are endemic in developing countries, but they are directly relevant to the nature of the potential U.S. effort to support countries that may be troubled by urban insurgency.

URBAN INSURGENCY, LIC, AND INDIRECT WAR

Urban insurgency is a form of limited intensity conflict (LIC), and is usually a form of indirect war. It is indirect in the sense that the nature of urban insurgents is that they are disguised, anonymous, and clandestine. Unlike other insurgents, urban insurgents do not try to build their capacity to attack directly, and usually never intend to attack directly. Rural insurgents often plan the escalation of their capabilities and their cadres. They intend to use the principle of concentration of forces against incumbent vulnerabilities. Urban insurgents use their "combat" forces only when forced, because their main uses of violence focus on secrecy and surprise; their forces intend to sabotage, assassinate, disrupt, and demoralize, and contact incumbent forces directly only as a function, usually undesired, of these actions. Many insurgents depend on political change and psychological pressure; urban insurgents use their physical resources almost exclusively to create psychological leverage.

Urban insurgency may also be a form of surrogate war in which a foreign power or movement or group uses local groups to pressure or destroy the target government.

The psychological offensive that, as we have seen, is an essential element in every urban insurgency will have several components. It will always have an important element that targets the host government. It will usually have an international component. If U.S. forces are involved, part of the psychological offensive will certainly be aimed at the U.S. domestic audience. There is a direct relationship between the emphasis placed on such an offensive and the degree of dependency relationship that develops between the host country and the United States.

U.S. CAPABILITIES FOR URBAN COUNTERINSURGENCY

U.S. capabilities to conduct or support urban counterinsurgency operations cannot easily be separated from overall U.S. capabilities to conduct limited intensity conflict and specifically conduct counterinsurgency missions. Yet, there are differences of some importance.

In the five cases we considered in this report, it is interesting that no new technology was needed or used in any major way by any of the counterinsurgents. They used off-the-shelf technologies and weapons systems. There was very little real innovation in application. Some of the most important areas of technology were in detection systems, not a high technology area.

Overall, it is clear that U.S. technology is more than adequate to address urban insurgency problems. In some respects, U.S. technology strengths are uniquely well suited to the mission. That is, with the emphasis on intelligence and population and resources control, U.S. computer support could be a critical area. Similarly, some technologies developed for previous conflicts have important applications in the cities: night vision devices (urban insurgents move people and supplies at night), helicopters for rapid mobility, and so forth.

Certainly, the United States is better equipped and better supported with technology than any other counterinsurgent, and far better equipped than insurgents. Materiel resources, then, are not a particular problem, at least in the combat area.

By contrast, doctrine is less clear. The unhappy American experience in southeast Asia has left a heavy political impact on U.S. LIC doctrine, and nowhere is this clearer than in urban insurgency. While it has been impossible to overlook insurgency, it has not received the same level of attention as it did before and during Vietnam. Urban insurgency, never a focal point of attention, has received even less attention. Doctrine for urban counterinsurgency is not spelled out with clarity or realism in the United States.

It is even less easy to handle the question of political support, which has always had an important association with low intensity conflict. These political questions are important not only to ensure that U.S. forces will receive adequate support, but also to prevent serious and crippling political setbacks and loss of political and military credibility that result from withdrawing dishonorably from highly visible commitments.

It is clear that in the current situation of public affairs, the executive branch is expected to exert extreme caution before the commitment of U.S. military resources, whether U.S. military forces or even advisory, direct support, or peacekeeping personnel. In this connection, Secretary of Defense Weinberger presented "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad."¹ Certainly, these are important considerations. While it is politically realistic to insist upon U.S. public support for overseas military actions, even support actions that do not involve combat forces, it is an error to project public opinion in a linear fashion. Public opinion concerning the commitment to South Vietnam shifted over time. American public opinion will not be treated as off-limits; on the contrary, any adversary is almost certain to focus heavily on shaping American public views, since urban insurgency situations are consistently confusing, unsettling, and nasty.

It is therefore desirable that the U.S. government undertake an accurate and compelling program to educate the public concerning the nature of American responsibilities and interests abroad, the importance of protecting those interests and living up to the responsibilities, and the types of dangers and challenges the United States may well face. We can afford no more withdrawals, and certainly our hosts overseas can ill afford them.

Doctrine on urban insurgency is deficient. Yet, in the range of military environments, few present situations are easier to define than urban insurgency. We believe an effort should be mounted to elaborate doctrine for urban insurgency. To undertake this effort, very little is necessary to construct a scenario because while there are as many variables in an urban insurgency situation as there are in others, the key variables that will influence the military outcome are few. Whether the host is a majority or minority government (i.e., whether the insurgent has the capacity to easily mobilize a large proportion of the public against symbols representative of the national leadership) is certainly important. It is important to determine whether the insurgency is solely urban or whether it is linked to rural insurgency. How deeply rooted the insurgency is in terms of organization and identification is also important. Traditional factors of weapons inventories, size of forces, and the like appear to be less so. With these few variables, it is relatively easy to construct scenarios that allow a fuller development of urban counterinsurgency doctrine. These few key variables will profoundly influence the role of the most important counterinsurgent tools (intelligence, psychological operations, civic action, population protection, and resources management).

Intelligence remains the key to effective urban counterinsurgency against a well-rooted movement. We have discussed intelligence at length in this report, but U.S. doctrine for intelligence operations is certainly not deficient. While that doctrine does not address urban counterinsurgency per se, doctrine on intelligence and police operations provides all the essential types of actions necessary to address the basic intelligence problems. We feel organization and management of intelligence assets in the kinds of operations described here may be a more significant problem. We also feel that an unduly narrow perception of intelligence and of the interaction and even interdependence between intelligence and other operations (especially psychological operations and population protection and resources management) is a problem.

Psychological operations doctrine for urban actions is very meager. Moreover, all urban PSYOP doctrine focuses on conventional conflict. At the same time, much of the PSYOP relevant to urban counterinsurgency efforts is not unique to cities. The greater proportion of the overall PSYOP campaign will apply to city and countryside. As this report has noted, tactical (combat) PSYOP will play only a marginal role in urban counterinsurgency. By contrast, post-combat PSYOP may be decisive.

U.S. doctrine for civic action has been developed over a number of years. In principle, it is not seriously deficient, but civic action has certainly had a predominantly rural emphasis since its inception, and understandably so. The French experience in Algeria demonstrates that civic action has an important place in any urban counterinsurgency effort against a well-rooted insurgent movement. The French effort, though suffering from serious deficiencies in personnel, was innovative and effective to the extent it was used; it made a difference.

Population protection and resources management² present perhaps the single most significant problem for U.S. support efforts. In principle, population and resources control raises major image and value problems for American public opinion, that is, political problems for the U.S. effort. In practice, it is difficult to develop detailed doctrine for cases that vary as widely as those presented in this study. We believe that a doctrine can be spelled out, however,

movement. It is only this type of insurgency that requires an ambitious effort in the area of population and resources control, although protection and resources management are essential in every case.

In terms of organization and personnel, U.S. forces are not currently capable of undertaking an urban counterinsurgency campaign of any magnitude, since the brunt of the effort must fall on PSYOP resources, which are being modernized and improved but are still targeted at different objectives; on civic action and civil affairs resources, which are scarce; and on organization and integration of effort across these domains, which appears to be deteriorating.

PSYOP has received a much greater level of attention in recent years, but for a variety of reasons, U.S. PSYOP capability is not prepared or preparing for an urban counterinsurgency effort. Fortunately, the United States would probably assume a supporting role in such an effort, and in terms of training and support, the United States may be able to provide some help. Recent U.S. efforts have not been encouraging, but the contemporary emphasis on PSYOP and the efforts to centralize and systematically rebuild the capability provide some hope. The PSYOP shortfalls are not essentially a problem of urban counterinsurgency, but of U.S. organizational and personnel developments over time. Similarly, civil affairs and civic action are underdeveloped at present, with little realistic prospect of major change.

One major area of urban counterinsurgency support that should be developed, whatever the level of U.S. participation in foreign urban counterinsurgency efforts, is the integration of PSYOP, civic action, population protection and resources management, and intelligence institutions and resources. We have discussed this subject substantively in the foregoing chapters, but we feel some development of the concepts of operations and techniques for coordination would be a material contribution to more effective urban counterinsurgency planning.

Certainly, the most important area in which the United States will engage itself during any commitment to urban counterinsurgency is intelligence. Even a political commitment without any direct (i.e., on-site) manpower implications may employ the very significant U.S. intelligence capabilities to benefit a friendly host. We believe the United States has the physical assets to produce invaluable and timely intelligence that may be decisive in an urban counterinsurgency effort. Based on the five cases studied here, however, we are less confident about the probability that those assets will be used effectively.

Intelligence support must be coordinated closely to be effective. This coordination will be extremely difficult in an urban insurgency, because whereas we may coordinate closely other supporting functions, the United States will probably preserve complete autonomy in its intelligence operations. This suggests that there will be at least two national collection efforts (the host's and our own). As we have seen in this report, the host will probably have several or many intelligence channels, especially since his police will also be active. The United States will also have a number (national technical means, aerial reconnaissance, contact or tactical intelligence, political intelligence from the diplomatic corps, human intelligence supplied by agents or informers, communications and electrical intelligence, and quite possibly others). The management of this intelligence jigsaw puzzle is not adequately addressed in our view in current doctrine or mission statements. Time is critical in urban counterinsurgency, for the insurgent's main strategy is to retain his anonymity, his invisibility. Intelligence is highly perishable, especially in the urban

insurgency environment where targets disappear quickly, and where the most important targets are not even tangible (i.e., the organizational structure). From the defense standpoint against insurgency, and from the attack standpoint of counterinsurgency, it is imperative to exploit intelligence on a timely basis.

The political aspects of the intelligence situation are equally problematic. The interpretation of political and even physical phenomena is at least partially dictated by context. If the United States is supporting a host government against an entrenched and elusive urban insurgent movement, and public demonstrations take place, demonstrations opposing the government or government policy, demonstrations perhaps manipulated or partly mobilized (invisibly) by the insurgent, how does the United States interpret those demonstrations? How do we distinguish between developments related to the insurgency and those that are integral to it? To what extent do we depend on and accept the host's interpretation or analysis? These are political considerations that significantly complicate the U.S. mission and question the effectiveness with which our significant intelligence capability may be most appropriately used.

Finally, the role of the security forces in insurgent and incumbent strategies may be dictated by objective circumstances at least as much as by other factors. When security forces are administered and staffed largely by an external power (as in Algeria, Cyprus, and Palestine), they are a target for penetration but not for subversion. When, by contrast, no government is seen by the public as "foreign" (as in Uruguay and Venezuela), insurgents will generally place a high priority on subverting the security forces, either attracting them to the insurgent cause or, at the least, dissuading them from pursuing a wholehearted and unified antinsurgent effort. To some degree, the success or failure of insurgent appeals may be affected by the recruitment patterns for the security forces, whether they are drawn from rural or urban populations, for example.

¹Caspar Weinberger, speech before the National Press Club, November 28, 1984. An adaptation of the speech appears as Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Use of Force and the National Will," *The Sun* (Baltimore), December 3, 1984, p. 11.

²"Population protection and resources management" was developed as a euphemism for "population and resources control," which seemed to oppressive and totalitarian for public use. In this paragraph we distinguish between them on literal grounds. We recognize there is no technical distinction in the literature.

CHAPTER XII

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